US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI530

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/CC, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, 
AF/E, AF/EX, S/CT, CA/OCS, S/ES-O/CMS, INR 
EMBASSIES ADDIS ABABA, ASMARA, NAIROBI AND SANAA FOR RSO 
EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF HOA FOR CG, J2, J2X, J3, ATFP, MARCENT CO, ATFP, S-2 
AND JSOTF S-2 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 25X1 
TAGS: ASEC, AEMR 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: EAC 06/05/2005 
 
REF: TDX-315/33604-05 
 
Classified By: RSO MARC RAMOS FOR REASON 1.4 (G) 
 
1. (C) Post convened a meeting of the Emergency Action 
Committee (EAC) on 05 June, 2005 to review recent threat 
reporting in REFTEL.  The EAC discussed the potential of 
attacks on U.S. government interests and the addition of 
needed security measures to mitigate the threat.  Potential 
targets in Djibouti include the Embassy, the U.S. Military 
Base Camp Lemonier, residential compounds and USAID contract 
facilities.  In addition, the EAC addressed the potential 
risk of personal attacks to American and other Western 
civilians. 
 
2. (S/NF) Due to the highly classified nature of the 
information (TS/SCI), the core EAC met prior to holding a 
regular EAC meeting to discuss releasable information.  The 
core EAC was composed of the Ambassador, RSO, COS, USLO, 
NCIS/FPO and U.S. Military representatives.  Due to the 
sensitivity of HUMINT controlled and third party sources, the 
EAC cannot reference particular information, but the report 
notes that attack planning is being carried out by terrorist 
cells in Somalia and that the focus of the attack could be 
against U.S. and Djiboutian government interests.  Djiboutian 
and French authorities have been notified of the potential 
for attacks, but the methods, personnel, resources and 
operational planning is unknown at this time. The EAC 
believes that this report serves to strengthen recent threat 
reporting from the region and shows a continual and 
legitimate desire on behalf of terrorists to conduct attacks 
on U.S. interests.  Furthermore, the EAC agreed that 
information outlined in the report could indicate the Embassy 
facility as a potential target. 
 
3. (C) Mission personnel have been at a heightened level for 
a period of time and are carrying out appropriate personal 
security measures.  Military representatives from Camp 
Lemonier are aware of the current threat and will take 
measures IAW their SOPs.  RSO will engage the Host Nation in 
an effort to increase Police presence around the Embassy 
perimeter and to modify shift schedules to vary times. 
Unfortunately, the added cost to feed the Police, per 
existing MOA, will increase.  RSO will forward the cost 
estimates per SEPTEL to DS/OPO.  The EAC agreed that the 
information was not specific enough to impact the U.S. 
civilian community and believes that the public announcement 
and travel warning remain sufficient.  The EAC discussed 
using sporadic closings as a random countermeasure, but 
agreed that further Departmental consultation is required. 
Members of the EAC will discuss this countermeasure with 
Executive Bureau offices via separate channels. 
 
4. (C) As the result of a DS/OBO vulnerability survey 
conducted in February 2005, Post has been actively fortifying 
the Embassy facilities with recommended field expedient 
security measures that would provide a greater degree of 
protection for personnel located in buildings other than the 
Chancery.  Although current attempts to enhance physical 
security measures at the Embassy are notable, the speed by 
which the countermeasures are implemented is too slow and 
would not be effective if an attack would be carried out in 
the near future.  Post's GSO section has made a valiant 
effort to accomplish many of the enhancements, but the 
reality is that the GSO section has neither the fiscal or 
manpower resources to complete all the tasks in a timely 
fashion.  Two of the greatest vulnerabilities, a man-trap 
gate for the sally port and safe areas for three buildings 
remain untouched.  Post requests that emergency funding be 
allocated in the amount of 15,000USD to obtain local contract 
companies that could accomplish the task quickly. 
 
5. (C) The EAC also requests that a DS/MSD team be deployed 
at the earliest possible time to provide security support in 
the form of emergency action training.  RSO is due to depart 
Post in approximately 30 days and along with the report 
deadlines, existing counter terrorism projects, security 
force reductions, transition preparations, physical security 
enhancements and numerous other responsibilities, RSO 
Djibouti is stretched too thin to dedicate the proper amount 
of attention needed to effectively prepare Embassy personnel 
to respond to a terrorist attack.  The last MTT conducted by 
DS/MSD was in December 2003 and Post has gone through several 
personnel and facility changes since then. 
 
6. (U) POC is RSO Marc Ramos at 253-35-39-95 ext. 2307 or 
253-35-09-49 (secure). 
RAGSDALE