US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2392

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CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQI POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES WITH DEPUTY PRESIDENT MAHDI

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2392
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2392 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-04 11:30:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL ECON KDEM KISL IZ IR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, KDEM, KISL, IZ, IR 
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQI POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ISSUES WITH DEPUTY PRESIDENT MAHDI 
 
Classified By: Classified by Charge d,Affaires David Satterfield 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (SBU) CDA and DCM met with Deputy President Adil abd- 
al-Mahdi on May 31 to discuss local politics and 
international issues. 
 
---------------------------- 
IRAQI POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (C) After opening pleasantries, Mahdi noted that he has 
devoted a lot of time over the past three weeks to Kurdish 
issues.  He said the agreement giving Massoud Barzani a 
four-year term as President of the Kurdish Regional 
Government offers grounds to hope for a period of relative 
calm.  Mahdi cautioned, though, that agreement was possible 
because discussion of a number of sensitive issues, such as 
the flag and the status of the Kurdish and Arabic languages, 
has been suspended for now. 
 
4. (C) On Sunni outreach and the constitution-drafting 
process, Mahdi said the ITG must maintain a delicate balance. 
 On the one hand, it is essential to show respect for the 
Sunni community's position and equities.  However, this must 
be done without undercutting the legitimacy of the elected 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA), particularly its Sunni 
members. 
 
5. (C) Charge's expression of regret for the arrest of Iraqi 
Islamic Party leader Mohsen Abdul-Hamid elicited little 
reaction from Mahdi.  The Deputy President calmly took on 
board the explanation that the detention resulted from 
inadvertence and that coalition forces were fine-tuning their 
"hands-off" list to prevent future such occurrences. 
 
------------------ 
NO IRANIAN AMNESTY 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) Responding to a question from the Charge, Mahdi said 
that the proposed liberation of Iranian prisoners in Iraq 
will not take place.  Although Prime Minister Jaafari did 
indeed sign a letter authorizing a general amnesty for 
detained Iranians, he lacks the authority to implement this 
promise on his own.  According to Mahdi, the Presidency 
Council rejected the proposal; Charge noted that this was an 
encouraging example of how that body can use its powers 
responsibly. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
PREPARING FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Charge reminded Mahdi of the full slate of conferences 
facing the IIG in June and July:  the EU-US conference in 
Brussels, the US-Iraq Joint Economic Committee, and the IRFFI 
donors' conference.  Charge also underlined the importance of 
using these fora to present a coherent reconstruction and 
development strategy and to demonstrate tangible progress in 
reforming the policy distortions such as fuel and food 
subsidies that hamstring 
the capacity of the Iraqi economy to sustain economic growth. 
 
8. (C) Mahdi concurred in the value of these meetings for 
highlighting the progress Iraq has made and its continuing 
need for assistance.  Key economic policymakers such as Ali 
Allawi, Mahdi's successor as Finance Minister, and Central 
Governor Shabibi are fully committed to the need for economic 
reform and are explaining the need for these steps to other 
new members of the Cabinet who have not previously focused on 
these issues. 
 
9. (U) REO Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Mosul Minimize 
considered. 
Satterfield 

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