US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2391

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DPM CHALABI ON IMPROVING MOD, PIPELINE SECURITY AND SUNNI OUTREACH

Identifier: 05BAGHDAD2391
Wikileaks: View 05BAGHDAD2391 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Baghdad
Created: 2005-06-04 11:20:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV MOPS PREL KDEM IZ Sunni Arab Security
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, MOPS, PREL, KDEM, IZ, Sunni Arab, Security 
SUBJECT: DPM CHALABI ON IMPROVING MOD, PIPELINE SECURITY 
AND SUNNI OUTREACH 
 
Classified By: Classified by Political Military Counselor Ronald 
E. Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi outlined 
his top three priorities to PolMilCouns on June 3.  He claims 
to be engaging MoD Sadoun Dulaimi on improving MOD staff to 
combat corruption and replacing Army officers in select units 
with locally born commanders.  Chalabi also briefed his 
position on the stand-up of the pipeline security forces and 
his outreach efforts to engage Sunni Sheikhs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Claiming he was close to the new Minister of Defense, 
Chalabi described Dulaimi as "beleaguered" as he grapples 
with the level of corruption in the ministry.  Chalabi 
suggested recruiting professional technocrats to fill 
mid-level ministry slots.  He pushed for drawing on the cadre 
of USG-trained Iraqis who received DoD training before the 
war.  While he did not say so, we suspect many are members of 
Chalabi's political party.  He also recommended replacing the 
commanding officers of select brigade and battalions in some 
of the most troubled areas with officers native to the 
region.  Chalabi believes this could temper the insurgency. 
PolMilCouns noted our strong view that professional military 
leaders should not be changed for political reasons.  Chalabi 
said he was not advocating a purge and hoped we could talk in 
detail.  Subsequently, the Minister of Defense made clear to 
PolMilCouns that he has no intention of changing commanders 
for political purposes.  He said Iraq will have problems to 
sustain financially the current size of the military the U.S. 
and Iraq are standing up. 
 
3. (C) Chalabi noted the country had lost $1 billion trying 
to protect the pipelines since liberation. He just returned 
from Kirkuk to survey several strategic (and heavily 
targeted) portions of the line and appeared confident that 
current interministerial planning for a new security forces 
would be successful.  Gathering intelligence in the areas 
along the pipeline were vital to its protection.  He 
mentioned the Minister of State for National Security al Anzi 
had proposed setting up a new intelligence agency, firmly 
under Anzi's control.  Chalabi reported Anzi has approached 
the Prime Minister for $40 million to fund the effort. 
Chalabi registered his firm opposition to this plan, but 
appeared unsure whether he alone could block it.  Chalabi 
added that INIS Director Shahwani is making the situation 
worse by refusing to show up at important meetings or deal 
with the Government. 
 
4. (C) Chalabi claimed he conducts his own campaign of Sunni 
outreach, meeting with many individuals privately.  He asked 
Deputy Prime Minister Abd Mutlak al Jaboori to accompany him 
on his recent trip to Kirkuk, "his neighborhood" according to 
Chalabi.  The purpose was twofold:  to bolster his efforts to 
reach out to Sunni tribal leaders and to use such contacts 
for the gathering of better intelligence on those targeting 
Iraqi's oil infrastructure.  Despite his well known 
credibility problems with the Sunnis, Chalabi asserted that 
reconciling them would be among his primary tasks. 
 
5. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, 
minimize considered. 
Satterfield 

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