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| Identifier: | 05MADRID2114 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05MADRID2114 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Madrid |
| Created: | 2005-06-03 15:38:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PREL PHUM CU SP |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002114 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/CCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, SP SUBJECT: EU CUBA POLICY: SPAIN CONTINUES TO FAVOR INCREASED ENGAGEMENT REF: STATE 102505 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reason 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points on June 6 to MFA Director General for Latin America Javier Sandomingo and requested GOS views on Cuban government actions over the last six months and how the EU should respond. Sandomingo said that the GOS remained confident in its long term strategy towards Cuba and would support a continued suspension of the EU restrictive measures. He said the Spanish government believed its policy of engagement with the Castro regime had achieved "modest progress" in achieving greater political space for the Cuban opposition. Key successes, in Spain's view, included Cuba's release of 14 political prisoners and the GOC's decision not to repress the May 20 dissident meeting in Havana. Sandomingo asserted that dissident Martha Beatriz Roque's release by the Cuban authorities in 2004 had come as the direct result of Spanish pressure. While he acknowledged that the GOC had arrested other activists even as some were being released, Sandomingo said that none of the new detentions were the result of EU policy while the releases were clearly linked to EU overtures to Castro. On the May 20 meeting, Sandomingo said that the event itself was a mixed success in Spain's analysis, but the very fact that the GOC made the decision not to suppress the gathering would make it more difficult for Castro to justify banning future opposition meetings. 2. (C) In terms of how the EU should proceed, Sandomingo said the GOS agreed with recommendations to increase support for Cuban democracy activists. He said that the two meetings in Havana between EU chiefs of mission and Cuban opposition figures resulted in substantive discussions and argued that the EU's structured approach would encourage dissidents to better organize themselves in order to coordinate their positions to foreign interlocutors. Sandomingo said the GOC had thus far refused to discuss the possibility of reopening of the Spanish Cultural Center in Havana, but he was confident that it would be reopened in the next few years. Sandomingo agreed that Castro did not seem to feel an urgency to strengthen ties with the EU, but suggested that Castro's decision to allow the May 20 dissident event to take place rather and his decision not to retaliate for EU support for the UNCHR Cuba resolution were indicators that he did place some value in relations with Europe and could therefore be influenced in some way 3. (C) On the recent meeting between FM Miguel Angel Moratinos and Czech FM Cyril Svoboda, Sandomingo said that Svoboda had accepted the difficulty of returning to the restrictive measures, but would work to permit each EU mission in Havana to determine its level of contact with the opposition, including inviting them to national day events. Sandomingo said this was acceptable to the GOS since Spain had never believed the invitations to national day celebrations to be worthy of debate, either within the EU or between the EU and the Cuban government. He said Svoboda's main concern during the meeting with Moratinos had been to ensure that differences over Cuba would not affect other areas of Czech-Spanish bilateral relations; Moratinos reportedly assured Svoboda that there would be no linkage to other issues. 4. (C) Sandomingo urged understanding of the long-term basis of Spain's Cuba strategy. He said significant change was unlikely as long as Castro remained in power and that it was unrealistic to believe he would allow reforms to gain traction while he remained strong. In this context, the GOS believed that it was better to plan for the future by engaging Castro's probable successors and by consistently supporting democratic reforms. Sandomingo said Spain will never cut off diplomatic ties with Cuba and would work to avoid tit-for-tat measures that would inevitably lead in that direction (i.e. - the EU restrictive measures). He said the Czech Republic and some other EU countries could afford such a rupture, but Spain's economic and political stake in Cuba made a break in relations impossible to contemplate. MANZANARES
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