US embassy cable - 05MADRID2114

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EU CUBA POLICY: SPAIN CONTINUES TO FAVOR INCREASED ENGAGEMENT

Identifier: 05MADRID2114
Wikileaks: View 05MADRID2114 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Madrid
Created: 2005-06-03 15:38:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM CU SP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 002114 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, SP 
SUBJECT: EU CUBA POLICY: SPAIN CONTINUES TO FAVOR INCREASED 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: STATE 102505 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Bob Manzanares; reason 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel points on June 6 to MFA 
Director General for Latin America Javier Sandomingo and 
requested GOS views on Cuban government actions over the last 
six months and how the EU should respond.  Sandomingo said 
that the GOS remained confident in its long term strategy 
towards Cuba and would support a continued suspension of the 
EU restrictive measures.  He said the Spanish government 
believed its policy of engagement with the Castro regime had 
achieved "modest progress" in achieving greater political 
space for the Cuban opposition.  Key successes, in Spain's 
view, included Cuba's release of 14 political prisoners and 
the GOC's decision not to repress the May 20 dissident 
meeting in Havana.  Sandomingo asserted that dissident Martha 
Beatriz Roque's release by the Cuban authorities in 2004 had 
come as the direct result of Spanish pressure.  While he 
acknowledged that the GOC had arrested other activists even 
as some were being released, Sandomingo said that none of the 
new detentions were the result of EU policy while the 
releases were clearly linked to EU overtures to Castro.  On 
the May 20 meeting, Sandomingo said that the event itself was 
a mixed success in Spain's analysis, but the very fact that 
the GOC made the decision not to suppress the gathering would 
make it more difficult for Castro to justify banning future 
opposition meetings. 
 
2. (C) In terms of how the EU should proceed, Sandomingo said 
the GOS agreed with recommendations to increase support for 
Cuban democracy activists.  He said that the two meetings in 
Havana between EU chiefs of mission and Cuban opposition 
figures resulted in substantive discussions and argued that 
the EU's structured approach would encourage dissidents to 
better organize themselves in order to coordinate their 
positions to foreign interlocutors.  Sandomingo said the GOC 
had thus far refused to discuss the possibility of reopening 
of the Spanish Cultural Center in Havana, but he was 
confident that it would be reopened in the next few years. 
Sandomingo agreed that Castro did not seem to feel an urgency 
to strengthen ties with the EU, but suggested that Castro's 
decision to allow the May 20 dissident event to take place 
rather and his decision not to retaliate for EU support for 
the UNCHR Cuba resolution were indicators that he did place 
some value in relations with Europe and could therefore be 
influenced in some way 
 
3. (C) On the recent meeting between FM Miguel Angel 
Moratinos and Czech FM Cyril Svoboda, Sandomingo said that 
Svoboda had accepted the difficulty of returning to the 
restrictive measures, but would work to permit each EU 
mission in Havana to determine its level of contact with the 
opposition, including inviting them to national day events. 
Sandomingo said this was acceptable to the GOS since Spain 
had never believed the invitations to national day 
celebrations to be worthy of debate, either within the EU or 
between the EU and the Cuban government.  He said Svoboda's 
main concern during the meeting with Moratinos had been to 
ensure that differences over Cuba would not affect other 
areas of Czech-Spanish bilateral relations; Moratinos 
reportedly assured Svoboda that there would be no linkage to 
other issues. 
 
4. (C) Sandomingo urged understanding of the long-term basis 
of Spain's Cuba strategy.  He said significant change was 
unlikely as long as Castro remained in power and that it was 
unrealistic to believe he would allow reforms to gain 
traction while he remained strong.  In this context, the GOS 
believed that it was better to plan for the future by 
engaging Castro's probable successors and by consistently 
supporting democratic reforms.  Sandomingo said Spain will 
never cut off diplomatic ties with Cuba and would work to 
avoid tit-for-tat measures that would inevitably lead in that 
direction (i.e. - the EU restrictive measures).  He said the 
Czech Republic and some other EU countries could afford such 
a rupture, but Spain's economic and political stake in Cuba 
made a break in relations impossible to contemplate. 
 
MANZANARES 

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