US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1666

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001666 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ETRD, ETTC, CU, VE 
SUBJECT: GOV UNLIKELY TO SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN 
CUBA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 096300 B. CARACAS 1359 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Abelardo A. Arias 
for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
1. (C) President Hugo Chavez,s support for Fidel Castro and 
antagonism toward the United States is well publicized and 
makes GoV support for democratic transition in Cuba 
improbable.  The cooperation that exists between Castro and 
Chavez is extensive, as evidenced by the over 10,000 Cuban 
doctors and teachers working in Venezuela, the amount of 
subsidized oil flowing from Venezuela to Cuba and a series of 
recent economic agreements intended to strengthen trade 
between the two countries. 
 
2. (C) On April 28, Chavez and Castro signed 49 economic 
agreements in Havana (Ref B).  These agreements covered areas 
such as energy, oil, nickel, agriculture, furniture, shoes, 
textiles, toys, lingerie, tires, construction materials, 
electricity, transportation, health and education.  The 
central focus of the agreements, however, appeared to be oil, 
with the establishment of PDVSA-Cuba to coordinate oil 
shipments to the Caribbean and plans to increase oil 
shipments to Cuba from 53,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 
between 80 and 90 thousand bpd.  In addition to sending more 
than USD 400 million of various products duty free to Cuba, 
the GoV also plans to open an office of state-owned 
commercial Venezuelan Industrial Bank (BIV) in Havana to 
finance imports and exports of products between the two 
countries while Cuba will open an official Banco Exterior de 
Cuba in Caracas.  A plan to form 11 co-state-owned companies 
was part of the agreement. 
 
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COMMENT 
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3. (C) Chavez,s regard for Castro is deeply rooted and 
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  With personal 
and economic ties strengthening between the two governments 
alongside Chavez,s staunch criticism of capitalism, the more 
likely scenario is that Chavez will amplify his support for 
Castro,s socialist ideology while opposing any steps towards 
a democratic transition in 
Cuba.  In the event of a sudden leadership change in Cuba, we 
would expect Chavez to use the GoV's considerable resources, 
as well as its influence in the hemisphere, to support Cuban 
hardliners and to oppose USG initiatives. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01666 - CONFIDENTIAL