US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2433

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W, US COAST GUARD HQ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, CH, TW 
SUBJECT: COAST GUARD ASKS FOR USG INTERVENTION OVER SOUTH 
CHINA SEA DISPUTE 
 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: TAIWAN COAST GUARD MINISTER SYU HUEI-YOU MET 
WITH AIT DIRECTOR JUNE 3 TO REQUEST USG ASSISTANCE OVER 
RECENT SUSPECTED PRC INCURSIONS AROUND THE DISPUTED PRATAS 
ISLAND, CURRENTLY OCCUPIED BY TAIWAN.  SYU PROVIDED 
BACKGROUND ON THE RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING TAIWAN COAST 
GUARD VESSELS AND PRC SURVEY SHIPS AND ASSERTED THAT TAIPEI 
EXPECTS FURTHER PRC ACTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.  SYU NOTED 
THAT TAIWAN WILL RESIST EFFORTS BY BEIJING TO ENCROACH IN THE 
AREA, NOTING THAT PRC EXPLORATION IN THE DISPUTED EAST CHINA 
SEA HAS EFFECTIVELY MARGINALIZED TAIWAN'S ABILITY TO ENFORCE 
ITS EEZ CLAIMS THERE.  THE DIRECTOR REGISTERED CONCERN OVER 
THE LACK OF PRIOR U.S.-TAIWAN COORDINATION OVER THE INCIDENT, 
AND OFFERED TO ESTABLISH A MORE REGULAR SYSTEM FOR SHARING 
INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION.  AIT SEPARATELY 
ASKED THE TAIWAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) TO IMPROVE 
INTERNAL POLICY COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE USG 
OVER TAIWAN NAVY/COAST GUARD OPERATIONS IN THE DISPUTED 
PRATAS ISLAND REGION.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) AIT DIRECTOR PAAL MET WITH TAIWAN COAST GUARD MINISTER 
DR. SYU HUEI-YOU AT SYU,S SHORT-NOTICE REQUEST ON 3 JUNE. 
SYU WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY MINISTER JAMES YOU CHIAN-TSHIZ 
AND OTHER SENIOR COAST GUARD OFFICIALS AND STAFF MEMBERS. THE 
DIRECTOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AIT/T POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
LIAISON AFFAIRS SECTION OFFICERS. 
 
3. (C) SYU BEGAN THE MEETING BY PRESENTING THE DIRECTOR WITH 
A DOCUMENT TITLED 'EXPEL CHINA'S SURVEYING SHIP,' DATED 3 JUN 
05.  HE THEN DESCRIBED THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE PRATAS 
(DONGSHA) ISLAND AREA, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF 
INCREASING OPERATIONAL INTENSITY IN THE AREA WITH PRC SURVEY 
SHIPS SUPPORTING OIL EXPLORATION OPERATIONS AND ENCROACHMENT 
BY PRC FISHERMAN (SPECIFIC DETAILS TO BE REPORTED SEPTEL). 
HE SPECIFICALLY HIGHLIGHTED LAST WEEK'S INCIDENT DURING WHICH 
INITIAL INFORMATION PASSED TO AIT INDICATED THAT THE TAIWAN 
COAST GUARD MIGHT ATTEMPT TO BOARD THE PRC SURVEY VESSEL 
FENGDOU NO. 4.  SYU STATED THAT ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE 
THROUGH THE QUASI-OFFICIAL STRAITS EXCHANGE FOUNDATION 
(SEF)-ASSOCIATION FOR RELATIONS ACROSS THE STRAIT (ARATS) 
CHANNEL TO HAVE THE SURVEY SHIPS VACATE THE AREA HAD GONE 
UNANSWERED, AND RESULTED IN A NEED FOR THE COAST GUARD TO BE 
MORE FORCEFUL IN EXPELLING THESE PRC SHIPS.  SYU SAID THAT IF 
TAIWAN DOES NOT EXPEL THESE SHIPS, THEN THEY WILL CONTINUE TO 
COME BACK.  HOWEVER, SAID SYU, FORCEFUL ACTIONS ON TAIWAN'S 
PART COULD PROVOKE AN INCIDENT, POSSIBLY INVOLVING OFFICIAL 
MARITIME ASSETS. 
 
4. (C) IN RESPONSE TO SYU,S REMARKS, THE AIT DIRECTOR 
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER INCIDENTS 
GIVEN SIGNS OF AN INCREASING WILLINGNESS TO ENFORCE ITS 
CLAIMS OVER DISPUTED WATERS IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS. 
 THE DIRECTOR ASKED SYU WHAT HE WAS SEEKING FROM THE UNITED 
STATES.  SYU RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS THE USG COULD USE SOME 
CHANNEL WITH THE PRC TO ADDRESS THESE CONDITIONS.  THE 
DIRECTOR NOTED TO SYU THE AIT IMPRESSION THAT TAIWAN'S 
INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION ON THIS ISSUE WAS 
LACKING.  SYU RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THE INTERNAL 
COORDINATION WAS FINE, BUT THAT PERHAPS SOME OF THE 
COMMUNICATION WITH AIT WAS MISUNDERSTOOD SINCE INFORMATION 
HAD TO PASS THROUGH SEVERAL HANDS.  HE OUTLINED THAT THE 
MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL (MAC) HAD MADE THE INITIAL CONTACT 
WITH AIT, AND THAT INTERNALLY MND AND OTHERS HAVE 
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS WITH THE COAST GUARD AND WITH THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.  IN RESPONSE TO THE DIRECTOR'S 
CONCERNS OVER WARNINGS MADE ON MAY 27 ABOUT BOARDING THE PRC 
VESSELS, SYU ASSERTED THAT TAIWAN HAD SIMPLY BEEN 'POSTURING' 
ON THE ISSUE OF BOARDING.  IF THE PRC SHIPS HAD NOT LEFT BY 
THE TAIWAN-GIVEN DEADLINE, THEN THE COAST GUARD WOULD HAVE 
USED 'COUNTERMEASURES' SO THAT THE SURVEY SHIP COULD NOT 
CONDUCT ITS WORK.  SYU CONCLUDED THESE COMMENTS SAYING THAT 
IN THE FUTURE THE COAST GUARD COULD COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH 
AIT. 
 
5. (C) IN RESPONSE TO SYU'S QUESTION ON THE DIRECTOR'S VIEWS 
CONCERNING WHY THE PRC IS PRESSING THESE ACTIVITIES AT THIS 
TIME, THE DIRECTOR SAID THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT 
THEORIES, MANY RELATED TO INTERNAL DYNAMICS WITHIN THE PRC. 
THE DIRECTOR THEN PUT A PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE, NOTING THIS 
WAS A LOCAL IDEA THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN VETTED BY WASHINGTON, 
FOR A TAIWAN COAST GUARD TEAM TO VISIT THE U.S. COAST GUARD 
IN HONOLULU FOR A BROAD-BASED VISIT AND BRIEFINGS ON ISSUES 
AND AREAS OF CONCERN.  THIS VISIT MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE A 
SUBSIDIARY ELEMENT THAT INVOLVES USPACOM BRIEFINGS.  MINISTER 
SYU READILY ENDORSED THIS CONCEPT AND THE DIRECTOR SAID THAT 
AIT WOULD MOVE FORWARD TO OBTAIN WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE IN 
THIS PROPOSAL AND COORDINATE SUCH A VISIT.  IN THE MEANTIME, 
AIT NEEDED TO ESTABLISH DIRECT LIAISON WITH THE COAST GUARD 
AND A LIAISON AFFAIRS SECTION VISIT TO THE COAST GUARD 
OPERATIONS CENTER WAS REQUESTED FOR NEXT WEEK TO BEGIN THE 
PROCESS. 
 
NSC PROMISES TO DO BETTER 
------------------------- 
6. (C) AIT SEPARATELY RAISED THE RECENT PRATAS INCIDENT WITH 
NSC DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL HENRY KO, NOTING THE NEED FOR 
CLOSER COORDINATION WITH THE USG ON THE ISSUE.  KO 
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FORMAL INTERNAL 
INTERAGENCY MEETINGS OVER THE PRC ACTIVITIES IN THE PRATAS 
BUT SAID THAT NSC SECGEN CHIOU I-JEN HAS CALLED FOR SUCH A 
MEETING NEXT WEEK.  KO SAID THAT THE NSC WILL ESTABLISH A 
POLICY-LEVEL CHANNEL TO DISCUSS TAIWAN'S REACTIONS TO PRC 
ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEAS TO SUPPLEMENT THE 
TECHNICAL CHANNEL PROPOSED BY THE TAIWAN COAST GUARD.  KO 
SAID THAT THE NSC FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE 
PRATAS ISLANDS AFTER SYU ASKED CHIOU IN WRITING TO PRESS THE 
TAIWAN NAVY TO HELP REINFORCE COAST GUARD ELEMENTS ON THE 
ISLAND (NOTE: THE TAIWAN NAVY TURNED OVER CONTROL OF THE 
PRATAS ISLAND FACILITY TO THE COAST GUARD IN 2002.  END 
NOTE.)  KO SAID THE NAVY HAD REFUSED TO SEND WARSHIPS CITING 
THE POTENTIAL FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH PLA NAVY ELEMENTS. 
 
COMMENT: COAST GUARD SETTING POLICY AGENDA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7. (C) DESPITE SYU,S ADMONITIONS TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS 
CLEAR THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES' INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS 
AND COORDINATION ON THIS LATEST INCIDENT WAS DECIDEDLY 
LACKING.  FOR INSTANCE, MND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER OF 
THE COAST GUARD'S STATED INTENT (PASSED TO AIT THROUGH THE 
MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL) TO BOARD THE FENGDOU NR. 4 NOR WERE 
THEY AWARE OF THE COAST GUARD'S ALTERNATIVE THREAT TO BOARD 
THE TWO FISHING VESSELS AS CONVEYED TO AIT RSO ON MAY 27.  IN 
A BROADER SENSE, IT ALSO APPEARS CLEAR TO US THAT TAIWAN HAS 
NOT YET REALLY THOUGHT THROUGH HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE PRC 
'ENCROACHMENTS.'  AS A FURTHER CONSIDERATION, IF THE TAIWAN 
COAST GUARD IS DIRECTED TO RESPOND TO FURTHER PRC SURVEY SHIP 
OPERATIONS BY CONDUCTING DISRUPTION OPERATIONS OR, AS A LAST 
RESORT, BY BOARDING, THEN HOW DOES THAT POTENTIALLY AFFECT 
U.S. SURVEY SHIP OPERATIONS IN THE AREA?  AIT WILL CONTINUE 
TO PRESS TAIWAN'S NSC TO ESTABLISH POLICY GUIDANCE ON SUCH 
INCIDENTS THAT WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION TAIPEI'S BROADER 
INTERESTS, INCLUDING THE NEED TO AVOID A CONFLICT AT SEA.  WE 
ALSO BELIEVE A VISIT TO HONOLULU COULD BE VERY VALUABLE NOT 
ONLY IN PROVIDING INFORMATION AT MORE TECHNICAL LEVELS, BUT 
BY PROVIDING THE TAIWAN COAST GUARD WITH A MUCH BROADER 
REGIONAL VIEW AND THE BROADER U.S. POLICY CONCERNS. 
 
BIONOTE 
------- 
 
8. (C) THE LACK OF POLICY COORDINATION IS LIKELY IN LARGE 
PART DUE TO THE PERSONALITY OF COAST GUARD MINISTER SYU.  SYU 
IS A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE IN CROSS-STRAIT POLICY CIRCLES.  A 
HOLD OVER FROM THE LEE TENG-HUI ADMINISTRATION, MANY CURRENT 
TAIWAN OFFICIALS BLAME SYU'S ACTIONS AS SEF SECRETARY GENERAL 
FOLLOWING THE 1999 "STATE-TO-STATE" INCIDENT FOR BEIJING'S 
DECISION TO SEVER CONTACTS BETWEEN SEF AND ITS PRC 
COUNTERPART.  BASED IN PART ON THAT EPISODE, SYU IS VIEWED BY 
MANY INSIDE THE CHEN ADMINISTRATION AS A LOOSE CANNON 
HARDLINER.  HIS TENURE AT SEF UNDER THE CHEN ADMINISTRATION 
WAS MARKED BY FRICTION WITH THEN-MAC CHAIR TSAI ING-WEN AND 
NSC SECGEN CHIOU.  SYU'S 2004 APPOINTMENT AS COAST GUARD 
MINISTER WAS INTERPRETED BY MANY CROSS-STRAIT INSIDERS AS AN 
ATTEMPT TO SIDELINE SYU FROM THE PRC POLICY PROCESS. 
 
9. (C) THIS BACKGROUND AND SYU'S OWN ACTIONS IN THE RECENT 
EPISODE OVER THE PRATAS RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT SYU'S CURRENT 
AGENDA.  IN APRIL, FORMER NSC SECGEN CHANG JUNG-FENG 
RECOMMENDED THAT AIT SEEK A BRIEFING FROM SYU ON A SERIES OF 
INCIDENTS INVOLVING COAST GUARD PERSONNEL AND PRC ENTITIES ON 
PRATAS ISLAND, BUT SYU'S OFFICE DID NOT AGREE TO THE MEETING 
UNTIL SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE TAIWAN TOOK ACTION AGAINST THE PRC 
RESEARCH VESSEL IN LATE MAY.  SYU WAS LIKELY RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE DECISION TO INFORM AIT OF TAIWAN'S MAY 27 MOVE AGAINST 
THE PRC VESSEL VIA MAC SENIOR SECRETARY JAN JYH-HORNG RATHER 
THAN THROUGH MORE STANDARD DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY CHANNELS. 
JAN SERVED AS SYU'S DEPUTY AT SEF FOR NEARLY FIVE YEARS AND 
THE TWO HAVE MAINTAINED CORDIAL RELATIONS DESPITE JAN'S TIES 
WITH SYU RIVALS CHIOU AND TSAI. 
 
10. (C) ACTION REQUEST.  REQUEST WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE IN A 
TAIWAN COAST GUARD VISIT TO HONOLULU AND TO USPACOM, PROGRAM 
DETAILS AND TIMING TO BE DETERMINED. 
PAAL