US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE1555

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NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH STRADDLING THE FENCE

Identifier: 05THEHAGUE1555
Wikileaks: View 05THEHAGUE1555 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2005-06-03 12:51:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PHUM PGOV PREL CU NL SP
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, CU, NL, SP 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA:  DUTCH STRADDLING THE FENCE 
 
REF: A. STATE 102505 
     B. THE HAGUE 1439 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1. (C)  In a meeting with POLOFF on June 3, Jan Jaap 
Groenemeyer, senior advisor on Cuban issues at the Dutch MFA, 
took issue with Ref A demarche points describing the EU's new 
approach to Cuba as a failure.  He asserted that results were 
more mixed:  some prisoners had been released but new ones 
arrested; new repressive measures were balanced by the fact 
that the regime allowed Roque's meeting of dissidents. 
Preparing for the COLAT on June 7, the Dutch see merit in 
Spain's argument that extending the policy might eventually 
produce more positive results.  Groenemeyer acknowledged that 
some new ideas were on the table, but would not discuss them 
in detail, noting that "the decision is really at the 
ministerial level now" (presumably referring to the upcoming 
GAERC.) 
 
2. (C) Groenemeyer responded more positively, however, to the 
specific proposals outlined in ref a.  Some EU countries, he 
said, already provide information access to the opposition by 
making the internet available to them at Embassies or in 
other ways.  The Dutch modestly support independent libraries 
with funds and books.  Groenemeyer expected the COLAT and 
GAERC would discuss the idea of inviting key opposition 
members to Europe.  As for a visa ban for human rights 
abusers, the Dutch support the idea in principle, but "it has 
not been raised by the hard-liners, such as the Czechs."  The 
EU as a whole does not favor a visa ban, he added, because it 
would have little more than symbolic value since the persons 
in question usually do not leave the island anyway. 
Groenemeyer thought it was a good idea for EU states to call 
in Cuba's EU Ambassadors for human rights discussions. 
Finally, he understood that some EU embassies in Cuba do send 
delegations to visit other parts of the island to meet 
opposition figures, albeit "unofficially." 
 
3.  (C)  Comment:  Groenemeyer's equivocation and reluctance 
to call the new measures a failure in light of the record 
suggests the Dutch will continue straddling the EU fence (ref 
b).  Facilitating an EU consensus remains the highest 
priority for the Dutch, even if this means simply tweaking 
current measures to find a compromise that avoids a direct 
confrontation with Havana.  End Comment. 
SOBEL 

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