US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI4200

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MOPS, IN, PK, INDO-PAK, Kashmir 
SUBJECT: GOI CAUTIOUS ON SEPARATIST VISIT TO PAKISTAN, 
UPBEAT ON SIACHEN 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 3969 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: During a June 3 farewell call that GOI 
Kashmir Interlocutor NN Vohra requested with soon-to-depart 
D/Polcouns, the senior official focused on two unprecedented 
events: the ground-breaking visit of what he termed 
"so-called moderate separatists" to Pakistani Kashmir and 
Pakistan proper, and the planned June 12, first-ever visit of 
an Indian PM to the Siachen Glacier.  Vohra worried that 
jihadis might assassinate a prominent separatist to 
demonstrate their opposition to the landmark visit by 
All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) moderates across the 
LOC, the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, and other 
Kashmiri-focused people-to-people CBMs.  This could have a 
major dampening effect on improving Indo-Pak relations. 
Vohra also confirmed that the GOI was playing down recent 
high infiltration figures to preserve domestic support for 
rapproachement with Pakistan.  Vohra said he had been asked 
to cut short his planned month-long vacation to meet with the 
PM upon the latter's return from Siachen.  We remain cautious 
about any major Indian concessions on Siachen, but the PM's 
visit to the glacier could foreshadow a move by New Delhi to 
break the deadlock.  End Summary. 
 
Pakistan Trip May Cause Terrorism Spike 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Commenting on the June 2 travel by moderate 
All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and other Kashmiri 
separatist leaders across the LOC, Vohra cautioned that their 
visit to Pakistan could prompt further terrorist attacks in 
J&K, starting possibly after they return to J&K.  Citing 
Indian intelligence reports that terrorist communications and 
infiltration -- particularly commanders crossing into J&K -- 
had increased during May, Vohra worried about a spectacular 
attack, possibly an assassination attempt against a moderate 
leader such as Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.  This would be intended 
to express opposition to the separatists' travel across the 
LOC and their support for Kashmiri-focused people-to-people 
CBMs, including the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus.  Vohra's chief 
aide, Umang Narula, added that the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba front 
"Save Kashmir Movement" had recently threatened the Mirwaiz 
publicly.  Vohra agreed with D/PolCouns' observation that the 
GOI was playing down these indicators to preserve domestic 
support for rapproachement with Pakistan. 
 
PM Visit May Herald Siachen Shift 
--------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Turning to Siachen, Vohra agreed with D/Polcouns and 
Indian strategists (Reftel) that demilitarization of the 
glacier could be a relatively easy deliverable out of the 
Composite Dialogue.  Vohra recalled that in 1992, when he led 
the Indian delegation as Defense Secretary, the two sides 
were "inches away" from signing an agreement on Siachen. 
Vohra said that he had been asked to cut short his vacation 
to meet with the PM upon the latter's return from his planned 
Siachen tour.  Vohra offered that making the journey (by 
two-seater light helicopter) would give the PM additional 
political muscle to shift the Indian position on requiring 
the verification of the Actual Ground Position Line, or to 
propose any unilateral moves there, should he choose to do 
so.  The environmental degradation caused by prolonged 
stationing troops on the glacier and the non-combat hazards 
they face on a daily basis were further arguments for a 
speedy agreement, Vohra stated.  However, he did not promise 
any new GOI initiatives to follow up what appears to have 
been a fairly sterile round of talks in Islamabad. 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
4.  (C) Recapping the past few years of Kashmir-oriented 
highlights, Vohra also offered comments on: 
-- the 2002 (and subsequent) J&K elections were a watershed: 
"Despite low turnout in some areas, they were credible and a 
good start" in restoring the political process after the 
bitter decade of the 1990s. 
 
-- Musharraf's November 2004 (and subsequent) proposals for 
changing the political character of Kashmir: "When he talks 
about 'maximum autonomy,' we still don't know what he means." 
 "Musharraf should not talk so much.  He confuses people when 
he changes what he says from day to day." 
 
-- J&K Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's view of 
"maximum autonomy:"  This refers primarily to full control 
over economic and financial resources, rather than greater 
political and other forms of autonomy some scholars have 
proposed as a possible means to address Kashmiri aspirations. 
 
-- his long-term perspectives on Kashmir and Indo-Pak 
relations: "Maybe, after 20 years of normalized relations, 
the Kashmiri people should decide their own fate." 
"Islamabad should decide what they want relations with India 
to be in 50 or 100 years, and think about how we get there." 
 
-- dealing with hardline, pro-Pakistan separatist leader SAS 
Geelani: "He can only manifest his power through violence." 
 
Comment 
------ 
 
5.  (C) We have found Vohra to be an open, friendly, 
well-informed, and communicative interlocutor on one of New 
Delhi's most sensitive subjects.  Although his position lacks 
the clout of other senior government appointees on security, 
and most Kashmiri separatists refuse to meet with him, he has 
survived for more than two years in two governments, evidence 
that he obviously enjoys the confidence of the senior GOI 
leadership of both Congress and the opposition BJP.  Unlike 
the present Home Ministry leadership, Vohra is willing to 
think outside the box (to use the Prime Minister's phrase). 
 
6.  (C) Vohra's comments on Siachen are noteworthy, given his 
earlier and continuing role on this issue.  While we remain 
cautious about any breakthrough, the fact that Manmohan Singh 
will be the first PM to visit the glacier could foreshadow a 
move by New Delhi to resolve this issue, possibly by removing 
New Delhi's insistence on joint verification of troop 
positions prior to a pull-back, or perhaps a partial, 
unilateral redeployment of Indian forces to break the 
deadlock. 
BLAKE