US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI4193

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, MASS, IN, NP, India-Nepal 
SUBJECT: GOI WILL ENCOURAGE NEPALESE LEADER TO SHUN MAOISTS 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 1192 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae told 
A/DCM and Poloff on June 3 that India will caution Nepali 
Congress leader GP Koirala to avoid allying with the Maoists 
during his upcoming visit to New Delhi.  Following a visit to 
Kathmandu, Rae worried that the gap between the King and the 
parties was widening, but suggested that the time was ripe 
for the GOI and USG to consider the "endgame" for finding a 
political settlement that would satisfy the monarchy, the 
parties, and enough Maoists to steer them away from violence 
and into the political mainstream.  End Summary. 
 
Koirala Visit to New Delhi 
-------------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Rae said that Koirala's New Delhi visit for medical 
treatment beginning the weekend of June 3 would include 
meetings with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, MEA 
officials and opposition leaders.  The GOI will emphasize to 
the former PM the danger of any collaboration with the 
Maoists, since "they still have guns," and sound out 
Koirala's views on where the parties could compromise with 
the King, and what directions to take next.  Noting that UML 
party member Jhalanath Khanal was stopped by HMGN from 
visiting India this week (reftel), Rae said that he hoped 
Koirala would be permitted to depart as planned, adding that 
HMGN was aware of Koirala's plans and GOI interest in his 
trip. 
 
Political Impasse Grows 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Rae reviewed his impressions from his recent trip to 
Nepal, commenting that although the gap between the Palace 
and the parties is widening, the military situation seems to 
have improved, at least in the Kathmandu area.  Although the 
Maoists have shown themselves unable to prevail against the 
RNA militarily, the RNA has not made any effort to expand its 
control from Kathmandu and a few district headquarters.  As a 
result, "official Nepal" is confined to major cities and 
towns, while the rest of the countryside is subject to 
control by the Maoists, he stated. 
 
4.  (C) The political parties are upset by the Palace's 
appointment of new administrators at all levels of 
government, Rae reported.  The parties fear that the King is 
using the time before next year's proposed municipal 
elections to entrench himself in power, ensuring that the 
administrators involved in conducting the polls will be loyal 
to him.  As a result, the parties will not participate in the 
elections unless there is first an accommodation with the 
King to bring the parties into the government, Rae said. 
 
5.  (C) Rae worried that the deep mutual distrust between the 
King and the parties was hardening irreversibly.  As the gap 
between them grows, he speculated, the more radical party 
elements, including the student leaders, will push the 
parties to adopt a Maoist-aligned agenda calling for a 
republic.  If the parties publicly joined the Maoists against 
the King, reconciliation with the Palace would be almost 
impossible.  Rae said that the party leaders in Kathmandu had 
interpreted the GOI decision to release some non-lethal 
military assistance to the RNA as a sign that India was 
siding with the King, adding that he had sought to correct 
that perception in meetings last week.  A/DCM expressed 
concern that the reports of GOI dalliances with Maoist leader 
Bhattarai risked sending other mistaken signals to Nepal, 
leading party leaders to conclude that they should throw 
their lot in with the Maoists.  Rae acknowledged that the 
Palace had spun the reports in this direction, and underlined 
that a Maoist convergence with the parties would be bad for 
India. 
 
Consultations on the Future 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Admitting that India's entire Nepal policy was under 
internal review, Rae suggested that it was time for the US 
and India to consider an "endgame" to the crisis.  We should 
identify the "broad contours" of a political settlement that 
could accommodate some of the demands of all sides.  Rae 
speculated that the split in the Maoist leadership and losses 
against the RNA may have affected their willingness to 
compromise, and that we should assess whether significant 
numbers could be "peeled off" and brought into the political 
mainstream.  He commented that after Koirala's visit the GOI 
would have a better sense of what policy to follow.  A/DCM 
welcomed the suggestion of consultation on a future 
settlement, and acknowledged that India's own domestic 
experience was relevant to the task of bringing Maoist 
ideologues into the political mainstream.  However, 
experience with other insurgencies, including Punjab, also 
teaches that some of the Maoists will not be brought into the 
political process, and must be dealt with as a security/law 
enforcement problem.  In this context, we told Rae that 
Washington would be interested in the GOI's conclusions. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) As the GOI rethinks its Nepal policy and seeks a 
political outcome that could satisfy enough of the actors to 
end the political crisis and the insurgency, we will need to 
consult closely to ensure that our positions remain 
coordinated.  The Bhattarai incident shows how readily 
uncoordinated actions from one faction of India's pluralistic 
system can appear to be signals of policy direction.  The New 
Delhi meeting between U/S Burns and FS Saran later in June 
might be a good opportunity to hear India's views on Nepal's 
future and share ours. 
BLAKE