US embassy cable - 05HARARE774

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR D. MOZENA, B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, MDC 
SUBJECT: MDC OFFICIAL ON PARTY TACTICS, INTERNAL TURMOIL 
 
REF: HARARE 713 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Eric T. Schultz under 
 Section 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs (and 
principal aide to Party President Morgan Tsvangirai) Gandi 
Mudzingwa on June 1 told poloff that the party was working 
closely with civil society to foment protests over the GOZ 
crackdown against the informal sector.  Mudzingwa asserted 
that the party planned to stimulate urban and rural 
disturbances that would lay the foundation of a larger 
national action ) possibly a "stay-away" ) within a few 
weeks.  He reported that a recent retreat in Botswana among 
the party leadership had reduced intra-party tensions but 
suggested that some friction likely remained.  Finally, he 
said Tsvangirai wanted to defer his planned visit to 
Washington until late June ) early July ) after the MDC's 
response to the GOZ's ongoing urban crackdown had taken more 
tangible form.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Agitating with Civil Society 
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2.  (C) According to Mudzingwa, party leaders had been 
meeting with leaders of prominent civil society leaders 
nearly daily for the past week to coordinate strategies in 
response to the GOZ crackdown against "illegal structures." 
A meeting later on June 1 was to have divided 
responsibilities among the party, churches, students, and 
NGOs such as the Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) 
and Lovemore Makhuku's National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA).  The MDC's liaison committee would be chaired by 
National Chairman Isaac Matongo and include Youth Chairperson 
Nelson Chamisa and Women's Chairperson Lucia Matibenga. 
 
3.  (C) The developing plan was to stimulate local 
disturbances that appeared to be spontaneous, and not 
associated with the party.  The MDC would be rhetorically 
supportive of such activity but not take responsibility for 
it publicly.  Although the party was &raising its profile,8 
with Tsvangirai publicly touring most of the affected areas 
on May 31, Mudzingwa asserted that overt involvement in 
fomenting resistance would give the GOZ a pretext to arrest 
the MDC leadership. 
 
4.  (C) Mudzingwa conceded that the party had yet to develop 
a plan for reaching out to the many Zimbabweans displaced by 
the crackdown.  Most of these people had been apolitical but 
now represented a potential asset for the MDC.  The party,s 
efforts to tap into them would likely be decentralized, with 
local leaders empowered to reach out to the displaced from 
both inside and outside MDC structures.  He predicted that up 
to 500,000 Zimbabweans would be displaced by GOZ efforts 
within the next three months. 
 
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Urban and Rural Fronts Leading to National Action 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5.  (C) Mudzingwa said MDC efforts would revolve principally 
around existing community anger in urban areas.  In addition, 
an element within the party (including him) wanted to agitate 
in rural areas, principally around the issue of food.  Rural 
activities were already underway, including in incidents not 
widely reported.  A well-publicized incident in Filabusi had 
involved the arrest (and subsequent release) of more than 100 
women who had demonstrated in front of the local chief's 
residence, demanding food when local GMB personnel denied it 
to them because they were from an MDC area.  The MDC had 
played a behind-the-scenes role in this incident.  In an 
incident not reported in the media, MDC-affiliated youths in 
Buhera had overcome the GMB's efforts to withhold food from 
them ) with police backing and even encouraging the youths, 
according to Mudzingwa.  He added that there were other 
similar unreported incidents, but internal divisions over 
tactics had kept the MDC from aggressively publicizing them. 
 
6.  (C) Mudzingwa asserted that rural disturbances would keep 
authorities stretched thinner and open up more opportunities 
in the cities.  Initial plans called for urban and rural 
disturbances to continue, laying the foundation for some 
national action ) a possible stay-away, for instance ) 
called for publicly by the MDC and its civil society allies. 
 
7.  (C) As for timing, Mudzingwa predicted that snowballing 
urban and rural actions would culminate in a national action 
in about three weeks ) late June.  He said MDC-civil society 
discussions originally contemplated national action on June 
8-9 but deferred it because "the people were not ready." 
Final dates would hinge on the developing GOZ and public 
response to continued rapid economic decline.  In the 
meantime, the MDC would continue to publicly press wedge 
issues, such as food, jobs, prices, water, transport.  It 
would also push for more international attention and write a 
letter to the UN, although Mudzingwa was vague on what such a 
letter would seek. 
 
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Internal Tensions Ease, Remain Unresolved 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Elaborating on reported internal party strife, 
Mudzingwa said that a recent IRI-arranged retreat in Botswana 
had done much to reduce tensions among the party leadership. 
It had clarified boundaries of responsibility, with the 
President responsible for vision, the National Chairman for 
structures, and the Secretary General for operations and 
administration.  In addition, frayed relationships, 
resentments, and inefficiencies had been exposed and 
addressed somewhat.  One positive outcome of the retreat was 
that leaders recognized that there had to be some tolerance 
for failure, but that all ultimately had to be accountable 
for their performance. 
 
9.  (C) Mudzingwa complained, however, that unspecified 
members were allowing recriminations over the election to 
distract the party from the growing national crisis.  Instead 
of recognizing the election as stolen, they wanted to 
apportion blame within the organization and use the results 
to advance personal interest at the expense of others.  He 
then proceeded to castigate Secretary-General Welshman Ncube 
for allegedly setting up a parallel Matabeleland command 
center during the election, and issuing public messages that 
had not been coordinated with the rest of the leadership. 
 
10.  (C) Mudzingwa confirmed that the party had expelled 14 
in connection with the recent occupation of its Harvest House 
Headquarters (reftel) and was in the midst of hearings to 
uncover the involvement of others.  (N.B. Mudzingwa is among 
those rumored to have been involved, ostensibly to reduce the 
influence of the party's "intellectual" wing, with which 
Ncube is associated.)  He lamented that internal issues were 
distracting the party from their national struggle and the 
developing national crisis, which offered potential important 
opportunities.  The party would have to refocus or become 
irrelevant, he concluded. 
 
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Tsvangirai Trip to Washington 
 
SIPDIS 
----------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Mudzingwa said that Tsvangirai would likely defer 
plans to visit Washington until between June 22 and July 15, 
by which time the party will have made substantive progress 
in its alliance with civil society to stimulate more 
organized protests.  He asked that the USG be flexible and 
undertook to convey to us a more definite proposal once MDC 
response to the crackdown had progressed further and the 
party had more to say about MDC plans.  He also urged that 
the USG and the EU coordinate closely with the MDC before 
engaging the regime constructively on anything ) he 
expressed special concern that the EU and/or some of its 
member states may be moving ahead quietly in rehabilitating 
relations with the GOZ. 
 
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Comment 
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12.  (C) The government's violent suppression of urban masses 
and the MDC's difficulty in responding highlight a central 
democratic dilemma: How does a non-violent opposition intent 
on gaining power by legal and/or democratic means gain 
advantage over a violent ruling party indifferent to the 
suffering of its people and willing to use all means 
available to perpetuate its power?  Compounding the conundrum 
for the MDC are internal tensions flowing from its failure to 
prepare adequately for the disappointment of another stolen 
election.  The party's domestic and international stature may 
depend in large part on its ability to overcome internal 
squabbling and exploit the political opportunity presented it 
by the GOZ's brutal urban crackdown. 
 
SCHULTZ