US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK3633

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, INR 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand 
SUBJECT: THAILAND: VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH: VISIT TO SONGKHLA 
AND SATUN 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1008 
     B. BANGKOK 3203 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke. Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Poloff visited the far southern province 
of Songkhla and the Muslim majority province of Satun May 
23-24.  Satun province has avoided the violence plaguing the 
three other Muslim majority Thai provinces despite a similar 
population and geographical location.  A separate historical 
identity and more widespread use of the Thai language may 
explain to some degree why Satun has thus far managed to 
avoid the increasing levels of violence experienced by its 
neighbors.  Local observers believe that the overall level of 
violence in the South will continue to rise due to a widely 
alienated populace -- potentially spreading to Songkhla or 
further north -- but cautioned against overstating the role 
of separatist groups.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (SBU)  On May 23-24 Poloff visited the far southern 
provinces of Songkhla and Satun, including border crossing 
areas with Malaysia.  In Songkhla Poloff met with Dr. 
Suttiwong Phongphaibun, Advisor to the Thaksin Institute for 
Southern Thai Studies and Somphong Jutansuan, Chairman of the 
Law Society of Thailand in southern Thailand.  In Satun, he 
met with Ibrahim Adam, Chairman of the Satun Islamic 
Committee; Thanwakom Kamasiri, Satun Vice Governor for 
Security; Gen. Tanacharoen Suvanno, Satun Provincial Police 
Commander; and Wongwut Chumthong, Chairman of the Satun 
Journalists Association. 
 
BACKGROUND: SATUN - A DIFFERENT HISTORICAL LEGACY 
 
3.  (U)  Satun is a majority Muslim, ethnically Malay 
province, which along with Songkhla, Narathiwat, Yala and 
Pattani makes up the Thai border area with Malaysia.  Many of 
the ethnically Malay population of Satun speak Yawi, not 
Thai, as a primary language.  Satun, like Narathiwat and 
Songkhla provinces, shares commercially valuable border 
crossing points into Malaysia.  Despite these similarities, 
Satun has somehow avoided much of the episodic violence which 
has afflicted the other far southern provinces of Thailand 
over the past one hundred years, and has been notably quiet 
since the accelerated pace of violence seen since January 
2004. 
 
4.  (U) Satun -- like the neighboring provinces of 
Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani -- shares historical ties with 
the northern Malaysian states.  However, unlike those other 
provinces which were part of the Sultanate of Pattani prior 
to absorption into the Thai Kingdom; Satun was the 
northernmost region of the Sultanate of Kedah.  While the 
rest of Kedah was eventually ceded to the British, and 
eventually became part of Malaysia, Satun was split off, and 
became a Thai province. 
 
5.  (SBU)  The environment in Satun is very different from 
its neighboring provinces.  There are no heavily armed police 
or military patrols or roadblocks -- all too common sights in 
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala -- and no obvious military 
presence.  The land and sea border points are quiet, with 
minimal traffic, and no additional security is visible on 
either the Thai or Malaysian side of the border. In Satun 
city the streets remain full at night, in stark contrast to 
Narathiwat where shopkeepers close early in order to be home 
before dark. 
 
SATUN - WHY NO VIOLENCE? 
 
6.  (U)  There have been varying explanations as to why Satun 
has avoided the violence that has plagued the rest of the 
South.  Satun has a relatively smaller Muslim population 
compared to Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani and a slightly 
higher percentage of non-Muslims among its total population. 
Satun's historical separation from the Kingdom of Pattani, 
around which most of the separatist propaganda revolves, 
appears to also be an important factor (NOTE: Separatists 
usually include Satun in calls for a Pattani State despite 
these historical differences. END NOTE) 
 
7.  (C)  Language appears to be a crucial factor.  Ibrahim 
Adam from the Satun Islamic Committee said that while many 
ethnically Malay Muslims speak Yawi, Thai is more widely 
used, even at the village level.  Satun Police Commander 
Tanacharoen Suvanno and Vice Governor Thanwakom agreed that 
the widespread use of Thai played a key role in the 
militant's lack of influence in the province.  Both noted 
that militants rely on Yawi speaking communities to establish 
networks, and thus found it more difficult to operate in 
Satun and in other more northern regions of Thailand. 
8.  (C)  The mutual mistrust between the Muslim community and 
Thai security forces which is readily apparent in much of the 
South is not visible in Satun.  Ibrahim Adam said his Islamic 
Committee -- and the local village Imams -- maintained good 
relationships with local security officials and that a high 
level of trust had been established between the Islamic 
Committee and the provincial government. 
 
OVERALL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH - DOWNWARD TRAJECTORY? 
 
9.  (C)  In our conversations, we heard concern that the 
overall situation in southern Thailand is continuing to 
deteriorate, and worries that the violence could soon spread 
to other provinces, like Satun, which have thus far been able 
to avoid bloodshed.  Dr. Suttiwong Phongphaibun, former 
advisor to the now disbanded Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Center (SBPAC) and Somphong Jutansuan, 
Chairman of the Law Society of Thailand in southern Thailand 
-- both lifetime residents of the South -- said the overall 
violence in the South is the worst seen in their lifetime. 
Suttiwong and Somphong specifically cited the deteriorating 
relationship between the Buddhist and Muslim communities as a 
cause for concern.  Suttiwong claimed that some local Muslim 
leaders have in recent months been highlighting religious 
differences between the Buddhist and Muslim communities. 
 
10.  (C)  NOTE: Post has reported on anecdotal evidence that 
significant numbers of the non-Muslim population of southern 
Thailand is abandoning the region out of fear, and that 
Muslim militants appear to be deliberately intimidating the 
non-Muslim populace through various means. Some reports 
(reftel A) suggest that as many as 100,000 non-Muslims have 
fled the southernmost three provinces over the past year.  A 
recent census, conducted in Yala City, seems to give some 
credence to these reports.  The census shows the city's 
population has dropped by 12,000 from March of 2004 to March 
of 2005.  END NOTE 
 
NO NEW EVIDENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL GROUPS INVOLVEMENT 
 
11.  (C)  None of our interlocutors reported any new evidence 
of the involvement of transnational groups in the violence in 
the South.  Vice Governor Thanwakom said Thai militants are 
copying the techniques used by transnational terrorists -- 
especially bombings -- but that the practice in itself is not 
an indication of the presence of foreign terrorists since the 
knowledge is readily available. (NOTE: A report produced by 
the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command  (SBPPC) 
in May said 65 bombs attacks have occurred in the far South 
over the past six months. END NOTE) 
 
ROLE OF THE SEPARATIST GROUPS - EXAGGERATED? 
 
12.  (C)  During discussions regarding the major factors 
behind the recent upsurge in the violence, several of our 
interlocutors downplayed the role of the southern separatist 
groups.  Dr. Suttiwong and Somphong Jutansuan argued that 
southern separatist groups were more influential in southern 
Thailand 20 years ago, and did not enjoy current widespread 
support.  Several of our interlocutors described the 
separatist groups as having little "street credibility" among 
the populace; and said that most Muslims did not believe that 
complete autonomy would solve their problems.  Vice Governor 
Thanwakom said the core numbers of hard-core separatist 
remained small.  He believes that the separatists themselves 
rarely conduct attacks, and instead rely on hired gunmen -- 
usually disaffected youths -- to conduct drive-by shootings 
and arson.  Dr. Suttiwong is worried that the government is 
exaggerating the role of the separatists in a similar fashion 
to security forces in the 1970s which labeled people as 
"Communists" for voicing any grievances against the 
government. 
 
13.  (C)  As in past visits, many of our interlocutors 
complained that the media greatly exaggerated the level of 
separatist related violence by lumping all incidents in the 
South under "separatist related."  Somphong said that while 
the strength of the formal separatist movement is 
exaggerated, the animosity felt by the population in the 
South toward the central government should not be 
underestimated.  Somphong cautioned that the deeply felt 
anger towards and suspicion of the central authorities by 
much of the Muslim population in the South created the 
environment in which the small group of separatists could 
operate freely. 
 
COMMENT:  WILL THE VIOLENCE SPREAD TO SATUN? 
14.  (C)  While the bloodshed has not yet spread to Satun; 
many observers we spoke with were concerned that Satun might 
not be able to escape the violence that plagues its 
neighboring provinces.  Vice Governor Thanwakom spoke 
optimistically about an RTG strategy to use Satun and 
Songkhla as "a wall" to keep the violence contained to the 
far South.  But it was obvious during the meeting with 
Thanwakom and others that they are deeply concerned that it 
is only a matter of time before the violence spreads. 
 
15.  (C)  COMMENT CONTINUED:  The connection of "separatism" 
in the South to the many reported incidents of violence in 
the region is often exaggerated, especially by the Bangkok 
press.  Yet the analysis in some official Thai circles seems 
to be hardening around the assessment that the separatist 
groups are the core factor behind the violence.  Our view is 
that we should be cautious about overstating the importance 
of separatist or Islamist groups on the ground -- although it 
continues to be difficult to identify who is responsible for 
the mounting violence.  It is worth noting that when local 
people in the South discuss the ongoing violence, separatism 
is not often cited as a reason for the attacks, and locals 
are often dismissive of the capabilities of the known 
separatist groups.  Southern Thais are much more likely to 
blame the violence on infighting between security forces, 
turf battles between smugglers, or the U.S. Government 
(reftel B) rather than connect the violence to the separatist 
movement.  However, what clearly cannot be overstated is the 
grassroots dissatisfaction or genuine anger and resentment 
among many southerners towards the central government.  If 
the RTG cannot address the basic sense of "injustice" in the 
South the violence could spread to Satun and other parts of 
Thailand. END COMMENT 
BOYCE