US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3105

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PHUM, TU, EUN, EU Accession 
SUBJECT: FRENCH AND DUTCH "NO'S": MINIMAL INITIAL 
CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
REF: ANKARA 3032 
 
(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Ruling AKP and most pundits and media 
channels say they have taken the French and Dutch "no" votes 
in stride and opine that the results will not affect Turkey's 
Oct. 3 start date for EU harmonization.  Markets have reacted 
in a similarly low-key way.  However, in the midst of 
continuing GOT drift and inability or unwillingness to find a 
workable modus vivendi with core institutions of the Turkish 
State, a broad range of contacts sees considerable negative 
consequences for Turkey down the road.  End summary. 
 
2. (U) GOT leaders (e.g., FonMin Gul) and Turkish 
commentators and markets have reacted in a low-key way to the 
French and Dutch rejections of the EU Constitution. 
 
3. (U) In May 30 comments to the press while on an official 
visit to Bahrain, Gul asserted that the French referendum has 
no bearing on Turkey's Oct. 3 accession harmonization start 
date.  Initial Turkish market and political commentary has 
focused on what pundits see as the two salient aspects. 
First, that the French "no" stemmed more from anti-Chirac and 
anti-globalization sentiments than from anti-Turkish 
feelings.  Second, that it is not the result of 
harmonization, i.e., possible membership, but perhaps not 
achievable for 10 years or more, but the process that matters. 
 
4. (C) Having discounted the possible no votes in the week 
running up to the referendum, Turkish markets have thus 
shrugged off the implications in subsequent trading.  While 
one of the leading London investment bank analysts of Turkey 
characterized this reaction as "cynical" in the face of what 
he sees as major difficulties ahead for the EU, Turkey's 
candidacy, and the Turkish economy, other analysts point to 
continuing high global liquidity still banking on Turkish EU 
convergence and pleased to take advantage of the relatively 
high Turkish yields. 
 
5. (C) A survey of contacts among ruling AKP MPs reveals a 
standard line: the AKP government is determined to move 
ahead, preparations for the start of harmonization are broad 
and energetic, and the appointment of Economy Minister 
Babacan as chief negotiator was timely and appropriate. 
 
6. (C) However, EU diplomats and Turkish political analysts 
point to significant challenges ahead for Turkey. 
 
7. (C) In looking forward to Embassy Berlin's assessments, we 
turned to the German Embassy press attache, whose views are a 
bellwether for the EU diplomatic community here.  Having 
noted the negative effect on the EU of the GOT's pressure to 
force postponement of an alternative-view university 
conference on the Armenian tragedy (reftel), he followed up 
May 30 with a two-pronged assessment of the French referendum 
consequences for Turkey. 
 
8. (C) First, he predicted that a more self-absorbed EU will 
be less willing to abide Turkish slippage on reform.  Second, 
Turkey appears to be its own worst enemy.  In this regard, he 
returned to the problem of Turkish drift.  PM Erdogan's 
"elusive" discounting of Justice Minister and GOT spokesman 
Cicek's menacing comments about the conference on the 
Armenian tragedy as merely Cicek's personal opinion does not 
answer the question of what the GOT's official view is. 
Schroeder's mania for stability (the press attache recalled 
that Schroeder's three honorary doctorates reflect his 
preferences since they are from universities in Russia, 
China, and Turkey, three countries which prize "stability 
uber Alles") may well be overriden by a keener post-German 
election focus on just how democratic Turkey is...or isn't. 
 
9. (C) Pre-eminent Turkish national security analyst Faruk 
Demir, leading political analyst Aydin Kanat, and seasoned 
journalists with good contacts in both the political arena 
and core institutions of the State (e.g., "Sabah" Ankara 
bureau chief Asli Aydintasbas, "Hurriyet" columnist Sukru 
Kucuksahin) have all drawn our attention to other troubling 
aspects of the GOT's drift which are likely to affect the EU 
accession process. 
 
10. (C) First is a willingness to provoke core institutions 
of the Turkish State in ways which challenge basic Ataturkist 
tenets of the Republic.  The AKP government's passage of an 
amendment to the new penal code which in effect renders 
meaningless any sanctions against unregistered Koran courses 
is the latest in what has been a series of provocative steps 
aimed at the secular system as defined by the State (e.g., 
the fall 2004 attempt to criminalize adultery, the spring 
2004 attempt to ease entry of graduates of Islamic preacher 
high schools into universities).  Second is the AKP 
government's lack of vision or strategy to deal with poverty, 
corruption, the PKK, or the Kurdish question.  These 
problems, together with the concern over attempts to 
undermine the secular order from within, are the ones CHOD 
Ozkok underscored in his landmark, nationally-televized April 
20 speech as being of terminal concern to the Turkish State. 
Third, calling into more open question AKP's sincerity about 
EU accession, is the more and more open deprecation of the EU 
by Erdogan and others, with Erdogan expressing doubt May 30 
to the AKP central executive board whether there would be an 
EU in 10-15 years. 
EDELMAN