US embassy cable - 05MANILA2590

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANILA 002590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR S/CT/CHANDLER AND EAP/PMBS 
STATE ALSO FOR DS/DSS/ATA/VANCIO, SCHNAIBLE, AND SCHEEL 
NSC FOR GREEN 
DOD/ISA/EA FOR ALLEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINS, ASEC, MOPS, PINR, RP 
SUBJECT: STAYING ENGAGED WITH COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 
 
REF: A. MANILA 1614 
     B. MANILA 2434 
     C. MANILA 2105 
     D. MANILA 2108 
     E. MANILA 1792 
     F. 04 MANILA 5502 
 
Classified By: (U) Political Officer Paul O'Friel 
for reasons 1.4(b), (c) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) SUMMARY.  US counterterrorism assistance, ranging 
from operations/intelligence fusion support for the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to RMAS' involvement with the 
Philippine National Police (PNP), has helped the Philippines 
register some counterterrorism successes in 2004 and 2005. 
While we have tremendous access here, continued, sustained 
engagement is needed if we want to ensure that the GRP turns 
the corner on terrorism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (S) The Philippines continues to be one of the hotbeds of 
terrorism in East Asia, with the active presence here of 
three US designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI); the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); and the Communist 
Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA) (ref A). 
Active US engagement has helped the GRP score some 
anti-terrorism successes in 2004 and 2005. 
 
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (S) In a series of near-misses in November 2004 and 
January and April 2005 the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) narrowly avoided eliminating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
operative Dulmatin, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader Khaddafy 
Janjalani, and other major terrorist targets.  In each case, 
the AFP conducted after-action reviews and attempted to apply 
lessons learned to subsequent operations.  It also used the 
US-trained Light Reaction Companies of the Joint Special 
Operations Group (JSOG) in combat for the first time against 
terrorist targets in Central Mindanao in the April raid. 
This action involved night movement to contact and night 
helicopter-borne insertion of forces.  US doctrine and advice 
has begun to shape and influence AFP thinking and operations. 
 SouthCom has demonstrated a growing willingness to integrate 
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) 
Operations/Intelligence fusion support into its operations, 
and continued Operations/Intelligence Fusion Team (OIFT) 
support is needed to bolster AFP counterterrorism efforts. 
 
4.  (C) US-trained light infantry battalions have also 
demonstrated improved combat mettle.  The 27th Infantry 
Battalion in a January 3-16, 2005 operation in Mindanao's 
Kraan River Valley killed three ASG terrorists and wounded 10 
more, disrupting ASG safe havens in the area.  The SouthCom 
Commander, Lieutenant General Braganza, directly attributed 
the success of the operation, which involved a night 
envelopment, to US training, saying "the assistance of US 
military experts has produced outstanding results." 
 
5.  (C) In seeking to tackle the root causes of terrorism, 
JSTOF-P has under consideration a comprehensive plan to 
bolster AFP civil-military operations capabilities in the 
Sulu Archipelago and Central Mindanao.  The US effort would 
support the AFP's own program to improve its ability to meet 
the needs of disaffected populations in conflict-affected 
areas.  This type of engagement, in synergy with existing 
USAID efforts, can make a real difference over the long term. 
 
 
 
RMAS SUPPORT CRITICAL TO PNP SUCCESSES 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (S/NF) RMAS support for the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) and AFP intelligence services has proven key to 
breaking apart ASG and JI networks.  Arrests in March 2004 
disrupted an ASG plot to attack the US Embassy and conduct 
terror bombings in Metro Manila.  The subsequent apprehension 
of Khair Malvan Mundus in May of that year broke an important 
link in the ASG's ties with its foreign financiers.  RMAS' 
continued close engagement likewise was a significant factor 
in the aftermath of the February 14, 2005 "Valentine's Day" 
bombings that rocked Manila and Mindanao.  Follow-up PNP 
operations derailed further attacks by the JI/ASG that were 
designed to replicate the December 2000 bombing campaign in 
Manila. 
ATA TRAINING PROVES ITS WORTH 
----------------------------- 
7.  (S) Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) trained hostage 
negotiators and crisis response teams played a crucial role 
in the GRP's reaction to the attempted mass jailbreak of ASG 
prisoners from the Bureau of Jail Management detention 
facility in Bicutan.  The PNP's Special Action Force (SAF) 
was able to retake the prison and restore order with the loss 
of only one SAF trooper.  Post's proposed expanded ATA 
program (ref B) would focus on building up the capabilities 
of the existing interagency Anti-Terrorism Task Force to 
serve as the dedicated national-level response team for 
terrorist attacks. 
 
REWARD PROGRAMS HAVE AN IMPACT 
------------------------------ 
 
8.  (S) DoD Rewards and Rewards for Justice (RFJ) payouts in 
2004 and the ongoing DoD Rewards advertising program were 
developed and executed in close coordination with AFP and 
Department of National Defense counterparts.  These 
initiatives have begun to attack the web of social, 
religious, and cultural ties upon which Janjalani and other 
terrorists have long relied for their safety and freedom. 
Post has proposed adding JI terrorist bombers Dulmatin and 
Umar Patek to State's RFJ list (refs C and D). 
 
US SUGGESTIONS INCORPORATED INTO ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
9.  (C) Intervention by the Political Section and the 
Department of Justice Attache has helped shape the GRP's 
pending anti-terrorism bill, a major US foreign policy 
objective.  Executive and legislative branch contacts have 
quietly welcomed US proposals and incorporated them into 
draft legislation.  Defense Secretary Cruz, who is 
shepherding the bill through Congress, predicts it will be 
passed by yearend 2005. 
 
USAID PROGRAMS ATTACK ROOT CAUSES 
--------------------------------- 
 
10.  (U) This year, USAID completed its highly successful 
Livelihood Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) Program, which 
reintegrated nearly 28,000 former Moro National Liberation 
Front (MILF) combatants back into society.  This type of 
assistance, which attacks some of the base causes of 
terrorism, could play a similar role in reintegrating Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters should the GRP's 
peace talks with the MILF prove successful. 
 
STAYING ENGAGED 
--------------- 
 
11.  (S) These examples underline the importance of staying 
engaged in the counterterrorism fight here.  Our involvement 
makes a difference, and our absence would be telling.  In the 
decade of the 1990's after the closure of the US bases, Ramzi 
Youseff, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, JI operatives, and other 
terrorists stepped into the vacuum created by the diminished 
US presence.  Continued, targeted US counterterrorism 
assistance makes sense, has an impact, and serves US 
interests.  Proposals, such as our suggested enhanced ATA 
program (ref B), Streamlined Terrorism Prosecution Program 
(ref E)  and Management Assistance for the Philippine Police 
- MAPP (ref F), aim to bolster and improve counterterrorism 
cooperation, as does our support for Philippine Defense 
Reform. 
 
12.  (S) While the Philippines may be a complex challenge, it 
is one of the few countries in East Asia, if not globally, 
where US personnel and military forces have such wide access 
and influence.  While Philippine institutions are weak, our 
presence here does make a difference.  Sustained long-term US 
engagement is essential to defeating terrorism in the 
Philippines and safeguarding the US homeland. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
MUSSOMELI