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| Identifier: | 05HARARE760 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05HARARE760 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Harare |
| Created: | 2005-06-02 15:45:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL ZI Economic Policy Food Assistance Restore Order |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000760 SIPDIS DEPT FOR U/S BURNS; AF A/S NEWMAN/DAS WOODS; OVP FOR NULAND; NSC FOR ABRAMS, COURVILLE; E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2015 TAGS: ECON, ETRD, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, ZI, Economic Policy, Food Assistance, Restore Order/Murambatsvina, U.S.-Zimbabwe Bilateral Relations SUBJECT: GONO LAYS IT ON THICK Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Dell, reasons 1.4 (b) (d) ------- Summary ------- 1. (C) Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono told the Ambassador June 1 that the GOZ wanted western financial assistance and better relations with the U.S. and the UK. The GOZ was prepared to play by global economic rules, including honoring bilateral investment agreements, and was prepared to negotiate compensation with commercial farmers who lost land as a result of GOZ,s land reform policies. The Ambassador responded that the GOZ,s recent crack down on the informal economy was sending a different message and that we would respond appropriately to positive GOZ policy changes ) political as well as economic. That said, we were prepared to provide food assistance if needed and requested. End Summary. ------------------- RBZ Monetary Policy ------------------- 2. (C) Gono said the business community might have complained publicly that the devaluation of the Zimdollar to 9000 was insufficient but privately they were thanking him (N.B. The parallel rate has held steady this week at roughly 25,000. This reflects the lack of trading activity in light of the government crack down on the informal sector rather than increased confidence in the Zimdollar.) With the subsidies he had established, Gono claimed Zimbabwean exporters would once more be competitive internationally. However, he would have been able to consider a steeper devaluation if he had greater reserves or international financial support. To that end, Gono said his May 19 presentation had a message in it for the international community, including the IMF, which was due in Harare next week for Article Four consultations: Zimbabwe would once more play by the global economic rules. This meant adhering to bilateral investment agreements, not just with respect to land but for all investments. 3. (C) Gono said it also meant that the GOZ had agreed &in principle,8 at his instigation, to compensate commercial farmers who had lost their land as part of the land reform program. The compensation would be limited to improvements to the land. His discussions with various farmer,s unions, including Justice for Agriculture (JAG) and the Commercial Farmer,s Union (CFZ), had established a baseline figure of USD 4 billion in compensation claimed. Gono said this would be the starting point for negotiations, though obviously the GOZ,s resources were much less. He added that he had also successfully argued in favor of inviting back commercial farmers with badly needed skills. In that regard, Gono noted that the next target of the government crack down would be on the farms, where the government could not, for instance, allow squatters to take over coffee plantations and tear them up to grow maize to the detriment of the national economy. This was part of a larger GOZ plan to restore agricultural productivity, including through completion of many irrigation projects, as the foundation for rebuilding the economy. ----------------------- Operation Restore Order ----------------------- 4. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. welcomed greater emphasis on agricultural productivity, which could indeed be the foundation of economic recovery in Zimbabwe. However, we saw little evidence that Zimbabwe was embracing global economic rules or sound economic policies. The events of the past two weeks, especially the attack on the informal economy, seemed to us to be courting economic meltdown. Gono said three-quarters of the cabinet had agreed the day before that Operation Restore Order had gone too far. He personally felt that it could have been conducted with &more finesse.8 The GOZ was now reassessing the importance of the informal sector and would look for ways to regulate it rather than destroy it. -------------- U.S. Relations -------------- 5. (C) Gono said the GOZ also had a message for the U.S. The GOZ wanted the U.S. to use its influence with the UK to facilitate a rapprochement. Zimbabwe wanted to turn a page in its relations with the UK and let bygones-be-bygones. Zimbabwe also wanted better relations with the U.S. Gono said without U.S. support there was no chance that the IMF or other global financial institutions would provide economic assistance. The Ambassador responded that U.S. policy was not based on past events but on current policies and that we would respond positively to positive changes in GOZ behavior ) political and economic. He added that there was no chance we would support IMF assistance absent those policy changes; in fact we would likely vote again in July to expel Zimbabwe from the organization since the GOZ had not used its two six month &reprieves8 to embrace a sound approach. --------------- Food Assistance --------------- 6. (C) The Ambassador said regardless of our differences with the GOZ, the U.S. would respond if Zimbabwe needed food assistance this year. While we would not play politics with food, our support was not unconditional. The GOZ would have to formally ask for assistance at an authoritative level, though this need not be public. It would also have to be fully transparent about what was needed, including full disclosure with respect to stocks and imports. Finally, we would not allow the GOZ to politicize distribution and would insist that international NGOS be involved. Gono promised to relay this to other GOZ officials. ------- Comment ------- 7. (C) In an effort to make sense of this meeting, our report is probably overly coherent. In fact, Gono was rambling, disjointed and defensive in the hour-long conversation. He spent most of the time talking about side issues and irrelevancies, attempting to portray his policies as sound and effective. They are neither. He also seemed at pains to distance himself from the excesses of GOZ economic policies, especially the recent crack down, while still claiming authorship of those policies and implying that his status as the preeminent GOZ economic decision maker remains intact. In fact, he is clearly diminished in stature, especially compared to Joyce Mujuru, whose presence at his May 19 announcement didn,t mark political support so much as the new pecking order. DELL
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