US embassy cable - 05LAGOS838

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NIGERIA: IJAWS -- WHO ARE THEY AND WHY THEY MATTER

Identifier: 05LAGOS838
Wikileaks: View 05LAGOS838 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Consulate Lagos
Created: 2005-06-02 15:16:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PGOV PREL NI PTER ENRG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 LAGOS 000838 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, NI, PTER, ENRG 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: IJAWS -- WHO ARE THEY AND WHY THEY MATTER 
 
REF: A. 04 ABUJA 1715 
     B. LAGOS 605 
     C. LAGOS 507 
     D. LAGOS 276 
 
Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne per 1.4 b and d 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Ijaws are the largest ethnic group in the 
volatile, oil-laden Niger Delta.  As such, Ijaws view 
themselves as the legitimate stewards of the region's vast 
resources.  Though united in the desire for "resource 
control," Ijaw leaders differ over how to attain that goal. 
These tactical differences are made more dissonant by 
clashing personal ambitions and competitive power seeking 
among the diffuse Ijaw leaders. 
 
2.  (SBU) Politicians and Traditional rulers believe elected 
office the best vehicle for advancing Ijaw interests and have 
set their sights on the vice-presidency in 2007.  Ijaw civil 
society groups advocate civic action and protest (sometimes 
violent) as the means to greater political participation and 
fiscal federalism. Militias such as Dokubo Asari's Niger 
Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) opt for violence and 
intimidation.  By cloaking themselves in nationalistic 
ideology, militias draw from a wellspring of Ijaw discontent, 
inspiring adherents and admirers, while frightening their 
elder kith. 
 
3.  (C) Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha is the 
most prominent Ijaw. Yet he is far from being a dominant 
figure.  Moreover, the youth leaders seem to inspire more 
support than the older traditional rulers and elected 
officials. Among the youth, there is a discernable trend 
toward a more militant nationalism, speckled with violence, 
and rhetorical hints of separation.  Unless the Delta sees 
more economic and political development, this militant trend 
will continue.  Moreover, it could undermine US interests in 
the Delta and the overall stability of this important tract 
of Nigeria's real estate. End Summary and Comment. 
 
----------------------------------- 
IJAWS -- THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL HOPE 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) As the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta and 
the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, Ijaws believe 
they have been under represented in national politics. More 
than ever, they are clamoring to cure this perceived slight. 
Those Ijaws operating within the mainstream political 
framework have set their sights on controlling the 
south-south geopolitical zone and through this vehicle, 
placing one of their own in the vice presidency in 2007, 
preferably within the PDP.  A second goal is to occupy the 
gubernatorial seats in Bayelsa, Rivers, and possibly Delta 
states. 
 
5.  (C)  Bayelsa Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, an 
archetypal "big man" politician is the most likely VP 
candidate among the Ijaws (ref C). Alamieyeseigha is the sole 
Ijaw governor and serves as "godfather" to many Ijaw 
traditional chiefs and junior politicians. The presidents of 
the umbrella Ijaw civil society groups, the Ijaw National 
Congress (INC) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), are also 
beholden to him. Alamieyeseigha has Bayelsa's treasury at his 
disposal. In the last four years, federal oil allocations to 
Bayelsa state totaled over 100 billion Naira or roughly 800 
million dollars. Though widely acknowledged as a spendthrift 
who blurs the line between official and personal outlays, 
Alamieyeseigha gets credit for implementing some development 
projects in Bayelsa, namely roads, health care facilities, 
and a fledgling university. Recent press reports intimate the 
ICPC or EFCC may investigate the governor. For now 
Alamieyeseigha's camp is nonplussed telling us, they have 
"nothing to hide." 
 
6.  (C)  The governor is relatively popular among Ijaws. He 
has gained support from his public advocacy for increased 
political representation, fiscal federalism, and the desire 
for state jurisdiction over the politic service. Ijaws have 
also appreciated his "hands-on" personal involvement in 
containing community violence.  Of course, Alamieyeigha's 
lavish patronage helps buttress this popular support. 
 
7.  (C)  The governor had hitched himself tightly to current 
Vice President Atiku Abubakar. While still close, 
Alamieyeseigha has drawn some distance between him and the 
Vice President as the VP's fortunes in the PDP diminish as a 
result of his cold war with President Obasanjo. To win the VP 
nod for 2007, Alamieyeseigha realizes he will need northern 
support. Thus he has launched a conscious campaign to win the 
favor of key northern power-brokers and elites.  Given 
Alamieyeseigha's ample financial resources and the importance 
of the Niger Delta, former head of state Babangida has also 
sent feelers to the governor about possibly joining his 
presidential ticket in 2007, according to a Babangida insider. 
 
8.  (Comment:  An Ijaw VP (Alamieyeseigha or otherwise) would 
presumably advocate the Federal government give oil-producing 
states more than the 13% of oil revenues currently allocated. 
The success of such an effort is uncertain. However, in any 
event, an Ijaw vice president would be able to dispense 
considerable patronage to loyal subjects. His elevation would 
help quiet the lament that the Niger Delta has been Nigeria's 
financial lifeline, but "its sons" have yet to ascend to the 
senior ranks of national political office. If an Ijaw does 
not become vice-president in 2007, most contacts predict 
these mainstream adherents will not abandon electoral 
politics.  They will just sharpen their plans for 2011.  End 
Comment) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
IJAWS FOR GOVERNOR AND OTHER INFLUENTIAL POLITICIANS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
9.  (C) With financial and street muscle behind him, Dr. 
Abiye Sekibo, current Federal Minister of Transportation,  is 
the apparent front-runner to succeed Peter Odili as Governor 
of Rivers State. Sekibo, an Ijaw from Okrika, Rivers State, 
is widely acknowledged as having armed and helped finance 
Ateke Tom's NDVG, in order to "carry" the 2003 elections for 
Rivers Governor Peter Odili and the ruling People's 
Democratic Party (PDP). Sekibo reportedly continues to fund 
the NDVG and to play a key role in stoking conflict between 
rival militias as he prepares for his gubernatorial run in 
2007. Although a leading candidate, Sekibo is divisive and 
could further fragment Ijaw politics in Rivers State. 
 
10. (C) Sekibo's archrival is Chief Rufus Ada George--also 
from Okrika. George was Rivers Governor between 1990 and 
1992.  George is a prominent chieftain within the All 
Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and many identify him as having 
helped launch Dokubu Asari's NDPVF as a counterweight to the 
NDVG. Some contacts speculate that if IBB is in the market 
for an Ijaw vice presidential running mate, he will seriously 
consider his "former man" George. 
 
11. (C) The executive director of Finance and Administration 
for the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Timi 
Alaibe, occupies an enviable seat.  Alaibe lost the 2003 
Bayelsa gubernatorial race. Alaibe reportedly is tied to 
numerous armed gangs and cults in Bayelsa.  Alaibe will run 
for governor again in 2007 and may win this time. However, he 
will have rough sledding if Alamieyeseigha does not endorse 
him.  Alamieyseigha is no fan of Alaibe and he would probably 
prefer his deputy, Jonathan Goodluck, succceed him.  However, 
the need to win the favor of players who will help him in his 
vice presidential quest, may force Alamieyeseigha away from 
anointing Goodluck. In any event, Bayelsa will continue to 
have an Ijaw governor. If the Ijaws do not get the VP slot, 
that individual may remain the highest-level elected Ijaw 
elected politician. 
 
------------------------------ 
SECOND TIER - POLITICAL LIGHTS 
------------------------------ 
 
12.  (SBU/NF) Other influential Ijaw political figures 
include:  Prince Uche Secondus, Chairman of the PDP in Rivers 
State; Chief Albert Horsfall, founding Director General of 
both the Nigeria Intelligence Agency and the State Security 
Service (SSS); and Chief Lulu Briggs, who unsuccessfully 
contested the 2003 gubernatorial elections in Rivers, but 
remains active in politics.   Sekibo, Secondus, Horsfall, and 
Briggs are members of Odili's kitchen cabinet and buy, 
coerce, or otherwise help manipulate Ijaw "support" for 
Odili, an Igbo. The Ijaw technocrat roster includes 
Presidential Adviser for Petroleum Matters, Dr. Dakuro and 
the Federal Minister of Science and Technology, Dr. Isoun, 
neither of whom are politically ambitious. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MILITIA GROUPS -- THE CNN CALIBER 
---------------------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU/NF)  The three major militias operating in the 
Niger Delta are Dokkubo Asari's Niger Delta People's 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Ateke Tom's Niger Delta Vigilante 
Group (NDVG), and Oboko Bello's Federal Niger Delta Ijaw 
Community (FINDIC).  Contacts tell us there are dozens of 
smaller, localized armed Ijaw coalitions, whose members 
periodically contract to work for these larger militias. 
Neither the large nor small militias have strong command 
structures and members may only drift together for specific 
actions. Regarding the smaller formations, many do not even 
have a moniker. However, fealty to these local, smaller 
groups is much more robust than to the larger militias (Ref 
B).   Moreover, these smaller groups are often very 
well-armed, having fewer members to dissipate finite 
resources. 
 
14.  (SBU/NF)  Dokubo Asari and Ateke Tom became household 
names in Nigeria in the fall of 2004 after fighting between 
their rival miitias crippled the capital of Rivers State, 
Port Harcourt. Dozens were killed and hundreds displaced. 
Numerous threats were made against oil installations, causing 
some disruptions in operations and temporary evacuations of 
staff.  In the end, the presidency invited the two groups for 
disucssions in Abuja. A peace agreement, which called for 
demobilization, an arms buy-back program, and social 
reintegrationi programs, was the end-product of these talks 
(refs A and B). 
 
15.  (S/NF)  Asari now is under pressure from his own militia 
members and from the larger Ijaw community who applauded his 
firebrand ideology and brazen tactics. Many perceive him as 
having "sold-out" during his meetings with the presidency. 
Most ordinary Ijaw citizens do not believe the "peace 
agreement" advanced their fundamental issues. In addition, 
Asari's lieutenants are bitter because they say the never saw 
the financial proceeds from the disarming/demobilizing 
program.  In May, a group of disenchanted members announced 
they were leaving NDPVF to create their own organization. 
(Comment:  RAO sources say Rivers Governor Odili has 
recruited one of these splinter leaders as a counterweight to 
Asari. The source claims the governor is currently arming 
this new group. See TD 31412070505 for more details.)  Ateke 
Tom, who unlike Asairi, remained largely under the control of 
his political progenitors, has kept a relatively low profile 
since fall 2004. However, this group remains well armed and 
poised to intervene in the upcoming 2007 elections. 
 
16.  (C)  FINDIC, based in Delta state, is lead by Oboko 
Bello, who acts as spokesperson and political figurehead and 
Government Ekpomupolo (widely referred to by his first name), 
who serves as military leader.  While FINDIC appears to 
concentrate more on oil bunkering than do the NDPVF and NDVG, 
this is not their only focus. The group is also involved in 
the inter-ethnic-Ijaw/Itsekeri-disputes in Warri. FINDIC 
spouts the strongest version of Ijaw nationalism and the 
perceived right to resource control. 
 
---------------------------- 
THE SAMALLER MILITIAS/GANGS 
---------------------------- 
 
17.  (SBU/NF)  The dozens of smaller armed groups dispersed 
throughout Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa states represent 
amorphous collections of individuals who band together for 
specific actions, such as robbing or extorting money from oil 
and oil service companies.  These groups may be associated 
with a particular traditional religious rite or practice. 
Politicians also may finance them, again for specific 
purposes, e.g. political intimidation in a local council 
election.  Contacts report the groups are astonishingly 
well-armed, some with weaponry that rivals or surpasses that 
of the major militias.  Recent examples of actions carried 
out by these sorts of groups include the February 2005 Odioma 
incident in Bayelsa state, where Teme cult members allegedly 
killed 12 members of a delegation, including four local 
council members, who were attempting to resolve a dispute 
concerning which local community should receive benefits from 
Shell Petroleum Development corporation (SPDC) as the 
designated "host-community." (Ref D). 
 
18.  (SBU/NF)  Thus far these localized groups have tended to 
act independently.  Part of Asari's success last year was in 
managing to recruit members from a variety of these small 
dispersed groups. In the words of one Ijaw contact, Asari was 
the first to "mobilize violence across creek boundaries, and 
state lines."  The contact added this effort was made not 
because "Asari was so smart," but rather because he had no 
choice.  "He was outflanked in Rivers State by Ateke Tom, the 
Nigerian Military Join Task Force (JTF) was breathing down 
his neck, having been sicced on him by his former patrons, 
Asari was, thus, compelled to be innovative."  The gambit 
paid off, at least in the short term. Asari's rank swelled 
and though his affiliates continued to bear first allegiance 
to their local groupings, they did also support Asari. 
 
------------------- 
IJAW CIVIL SOCIETY 
------------------- 
 
19.  (SBU)  The INC and IYC are the most prominent Ijaw Civil 
Society associations and even militia leaders such as Asari 
identify them as the legitimate " voice" for the Ijaw people. 
The INC was founded in 1992 with Chief Joshua Fumudoh of 
Delta state as its first president. Fumodoh is widely 
credited with helping formulate a cohesive Ijaw platform. 
Fumudoh is currently as federally nominated delegate at the 
National Political Reform Conference (NPRC), which disaffect 
Ijaw youth say is appropriate commentary on how mainstream 
the INC has become. The INC's current president Kemsi Okoko 
of Bayelsa Sate is also a delegate to the confab. Ijaws give 
the INC an "A" in articulating Ijaw interests.  However, 
many, particularly the youth, give the organization an "F" in 
achieving meaningful results. Part of the problem, according 
to the youths, is that the INC is only willing to use 
constitutionially-sanctioned methods to advance the Ijaw 
platform. The other part of the problem is that many INC 
leaders have been co-opted by the Nigerian political 
establishment. Aside from its president Okoko, other 
influential leaders within the INC include F. J. Williams 
(Ondo), Joseph Evah (Delta) and Graham Douglas (Rivers). 
 
20.  (SBU)  The IYC was founded in 1998 by Felix Tudelo of 
Delta State. Oyinifie Jonjo of Bayelsa is the current 
president, but Tudelo remains influential within the group. 
IYC members insist the organization is not a youth-wing of 
the INC.  Rather, it was formed because Ijaws believed more 
confrontational tactics were needed than those employed by 
the INC.  The IYC, they say, was conceived to be more 
"action-oriented."  Members say, unlike the INC, they are 
prepared to insist oil companies invest more in the community 
development and to use the companies as a lever with the 
federal government to advance the broader objective of 
resource control. Like any organization, IYC has its hawks 
and doves--with the hawks preferring violence as a 
methodology and the doves advocating civil disobedience. 
 
21.   (SBU) Asari, a former treasurer and current member of 
the IYC, is among the hawks. From the organization's 
inception, he advocated "armed rebellion."  Though now a 
convert to Islam, IYC members tell us Asari has not 
relinquished his penchant for quoting the Bible in explaining 
why change needs to come through force. Asari and other 
militia/gang leaders are intermittent participants in IYC 
actives, showing up for the headline events such as national 
conferences, but not much involved in the day-to-day running 
of the organizations. 
 
22.  (SBU/NF)  To the disappointment of many Ijaw youths, the 
IYC has not fared much better than the INC in moving forward 
the Ijaw agenda. The IYC leadership is fractured and 
co-opted. Its leadership spends much of its time lambasting 
the INC as opposed to developing appropriate political 
strategies. This lack of a viable civil soci ety alternative 
is a long-term feeder into the militias. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
TRADITIONAL RULERS -- LONG ON CEREMONY SHORT ON POWER 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
23.  (SBU) Traditional Ijaw rulers have lost much of their 
relevance. They are looked to for ceremonial functions or for 
moral suasion. However, for the most part government actors, 
oil companies, and increasingly radicalized Ijaw youth, no 
longer treat seriously with traditional rulers.  Moreover 
stripped of their former official governmental stipend, many 
rulers have been co-opted by the various political figures on 
whom they depend for their livelihoods. 
 
24.  (SBU) That said, some traditional rulers are hanging on 
to the last vestiges of influence/relevance and speak out for 
Ijaw interests and occasionally help resolve disputes between 
rival communities, gangs and militias. The list includes: 
 
Chief EK Clarke of Warri, Delta State. Chief Clarke is a 
former federal Minister of Education. While he once may have 
harbored ambitions to return to political office, failing 
health has kept the septuagenarian sidelined recently. 
 
King Alfred Diete-Spiff of Brass, Bayelsa. The king now in 
his mid-60s, became the first military governor of Rivers 
State at the young age of 27. He is thus a blend of military 
and traditional background. He has many peers in the 
government and is a delegate on the on-going National 
Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in Abuja. 
 
King William Dappa-Pepple of Bonny Island. The king's 
influence is largely due to the billions of dollars of 
investment located in natural gas projects situated on the 
island. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
25.  (C)  Ijaws, like most Nigerians, want to be on the side 
of the winner. If mainstream Ijaw politicians are seen as 
successfully advancing their core interests, many Ijaws will 
support non-violent political strategies.   However, many 
Ijaws, particularly the youth, continue to feel marginalized 
and believe the current national structure of mainstream 
plutocracy runs adverse to their interests. Against this 
backdrop, many Ijaws feel that more militant, even radical, 
approaches are necessary to win the political and economic 
concessions they seek. The lack of effective Ijaw civil 
society organizations is troublesome. If such organizations 
were to become more effective and the doves within them are 
strengthened, Ijaws would perhaps be able to advance their 
interests within a nonviolent context.  In their absence, 
aggrieved Ijaws look for other avenues to redress, such as 
the militias. 
 
26.  (C)  USG interests are threatened if the miitias with 
their inchoate yet violent brand of ethnic nationalism become 
seen as the best vehicle through which to channel Ijaw 
aspiration and grievance. Projection of USG long-term 
interests in the Delta region hinges on keeping large swaths 
of Ijaw youth from becoming irreversibly disaffected from the 
conventional political and economic system. On the political 
side, USG support for electoral reform is vital so the 
electoral burlesque of 2003 is not repeated in 2007.  On the 
economic side, labor-intensive development is needed to take 
young men out of the creeks and to replace their weapons with 
productive work tools. 
 
BROWNE 

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