US embassy cable - 05AMMAN4370

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 004370 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NEA/IPA FOR 
RUBINSTEIN/GREENE/GERMAIN/LOGERFO; TREASURY FOR 
MILLS/DOWNARD; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DANIN/MUSTAFA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ECON, KPAL, KWBG, IS 
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 20 MEETING WITH 
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRIME MINISTER QURAYA' 
 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (U) The Deputy Secretary met with Palestinian 
Authority (PA) Prime Minister Ahmed Quraya' May 20 at 5 
p.m. at the Dead Sea Movenpick Hotel, on the margins of 
the World Economic Forum, in Jordan. 
 
2.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
The Deputy Secretary 
Ambassador Wilson 
Deputy Spokesman Ereli 
NEA DAS Carpenter 
NSC Director Pandith 
NEA Senior Advisor Gamal Helal 
Notetaker Schedlbauer 
 
Palestinian Authority 
--------------------- 
Prime Minister Quraya' 
Civil Affairs Minister Dahlan 
PLO Ambassador to Jordan Atallah Khairi 
Special Assistant Salah Elayan 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
3.  (C) Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Quraya' 
told the Deputy Secretary May 20 that all hopes are on 
the visit of PA President Abbas to Washington and that 
Abbas would be seeking strong USG support.  Quraya' said 
that he was pleased with US Security Coordinator General 
Ward's efforts but stressed that there needed to be 
greater pressure on the GOI to facilitate security 
reform, including the Badr Brigade's deployment and the 
provision of light arms to security forces in Gaza. 
 
4.  (C) Quraya' acknowledged the Gazan courts' review of 
several municipal election results and said the 
government would accept the courts' rulings.  He 
emphasized that he and President Abbas were committed to 
the July 17 date for legislative elections but there were 
difficulties in reaching agreement with the PLC on the 
electoral law framework. 
 
5.  (C) PA Civil Affairs Minister/Disengagement 
Coordinator Dahlan stressed that the PA had not yet 
received from the GOI the requested inventories of 
settlement assets.  Dahlan said that his Israeli 
interlocutors continued to refuse to discuss four issues 
that the PA had deemed essential to a meaningful 
coordination process: (1) customs and security 
coordination in the Philadelphi corridor; (2) the 
reopening of the Gaza airport; (3) safe passage; and (4) 
ending the back-to-back system.  Dahlan cautioned that if 
Abbas' trip did not produce concrete results, Hamas would 
win the legislative elections, but added that 90 percent 
of Hamas' success or failure in upcoming elections would 
depend on what Sharon does or does not do.  The Deputy 
Secretary stressed that Abbas' success was vitally 
 
SIPDIS 
important to the United States and that President Bush 
was committed to not stopping at Gaza disengagement and 
had been straightforward about his vision of a democratic 
Palestinian state.  End summary. 
 
Upcoming PA Presidential visit to Washington 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Deputy Secretary opened the meeting with 
Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister Ahmad Quraya' 
(Abu Ala'a), noting that the USG was looking forward to 
Palestinian President Abbas' visit to Washington May 26. 
Quraya' stressed President Abbas sought the USG's real 
support.  Quraya' stressed that the Palestinian 
government was doing as much as it could on security and 
economic and administrative matters.  He said that Civil 
Affairs Minister Muhammad Dahlan was leading the PA's 
preparations for Israel's disengagement from the Gaza 
Strip and the northern West Bank and had met most 
recently May 19 with Israeli Minister without Portfolio 
Haim Ramon and NSC Advisor Giora Eiland.  Quraya' noted 
that he had met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres and would meet with him again the next day. 
Quraya' stressed that the PA will facilitate a safe 
withdrawal but continued to question what would follow. 
He said that Palestinians remained suspicious of Israel's 
actions in the West Bank while it was moving forward with 
disengagement in Gaza.  He said he had asked Peres where 
the withdrawal fit within the Roadmap and Peres had 
responded that it was before the first phase.  Quraya' 
said he believed that was not right and that the PA is 
"not looking for coordination but wants cooperation." 
 
6.  (C) Quraya' continued, stressing that economically 
the PA is in a difficult situation with the population 
now facing real social problems after four years of 
intifada.  He noted that Hamas competed with the PA 
through its charities and its success was evident in 
recent local elections.  Quraya' asked for support to 
cover the PA's budget deficit.  He noted that no donors 
had yet committed to help the PA cover the USD 240 
million social safety net program included in the PA's 
2005 budget.  Quraya' cited the need for serious 
investment in the West Bank and Gaza and called for GOI 
cooperation to allow businesspeople to move freely. 
 
7.  (C) The Deputy Secretary stressed that President 
Abbas' success was important to the United States. 
President Bush was committed to the proposition Gaza 
first doesn't mean Gaza last and had been very 
straightforward about his vision of a democratic 
Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel.  While 
the Deputy Secretary said he understood the Palestinians' 
anxiety, he stressed that withdrawal is just the first 
step in the process and that President Abbas would hear 
this from President Bush.  Nevertheless, he acknowledged 
that the priority was on a successful withdrawal for the 
Palestinians, for the GOI, and for the international 
community, which was why the President and Secretary had 
asked General Ward to coordinate on security reform and 
why the Quartet had asked Mr. Wolfensohn to do the same 
on the economic side.  The Deputy Secretary stressed that 
if settlement assets are destroyed after the GOI pulls 
out, then that would be seen as a setback.  He said that 
the handover should not be done in such a way that 
violent groups can claim the Israelis were chased out. 
Disengagement needs to be a win-win situation for both 
sides.  Prime Minister Sharon was running his own 
political risks, and he too, like Abbas, needed to be seen 
as succeeding, . 
 
8.  (C) Noting that $50m of the FY05 Supplemental funding 
for the PA had been earmarked for Israel border 
trade/transit issues, the Deputy Secretary said that the 
US, PA and GOI needed to work together to make this 
beneficial and improve the movement of goods and people. 
The Deputy Secretary stressed to Quraya' that President 
Abbas now has the legitimacy of being elected and needs 
to work on issues, like corruption, in order to counter 
Hamas' political attractiveness.  With respect to the 
social safety net programs, he underscored the difficulty 
of launching new programs when so much of the budget is 
dedicated to the wage bill.  The Deputy Secretary 
stressed that there would have to be a transition of some 
civil servants to the private sector and other reforms. 
He underlined that the USG wanted to work with the 
Palestinian leadership, wanted it to do well in the 
upcoming legislative elections, and that a successful 
disengagement would help build momentum. 
 
PA pleased with Ward mission 
but needs more USG pressure on GOI 
---------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) The Deputy Secretary asked Quraya' about his 
perspective on General Ward's mission.  Quraya' stressed 
that he and others are cooperating well with General Ward 
but that the PA and the General needed more from the USG. 
Quraya' referenced his earlier meeting with Jordan's King 
Abdullah during which they had agreed on sending 2,000 
Badr Brigade forces (Jordanian-trained and sponsored 
Palestinian forces in the Palestinian Liberation Army) to 
the West Bank but noted that the GOI was not ready to 
approve the Badr Brigade's deployment across the river. 
Quraya' asked specifically for more USG help on security. 
He noted that Nasir Yusif had no light arms to give his 
forces in Gaza since the GOI was blocking such 
assistance. 
 
Quraya' on elections 
-------------------- 
 
10.  (C) Quraya', at the Deputy Secretary's request, 
provided an overview of the elections, noting that the 
presidential election had gone well.  He said that 
municipal elections, to date, had not met his 
expectations, especially in Gaza, and he referenced the 
court action overruling some of the electoral outcomes. 
He said that it was the first time the government had 
complained about the opposition.  He said that Hamas 
believed the most serious violations had occurred in 
Rafah.  Quraya' stressed that he had pressed everyone to 
act honestly as the cases were being reviewed; that the 
process would continue; and that the government would 
accept the courts' rulings.  On legislative elections, 
Quraya' said that he and President Abbas were committed 
to the July 17 date but that there were problems with the 
electoral law since the leadership wanted a 100 percent 
proportional system while the PLC members were concerned 
about their own reelections and, therefore, favored a 
mixed proportional/constituency-based system.  Quraya' 
noted that if the debate over the electoral law took 
longer, the date of the elections could be postponed. 
The Deputy Secretary remarked that it was better to stay 
on-time or else there could be problems with the public. 
Quraya' quipped that even if the elections were 
postponed, Hamas would exploit the delay. 
 
11.  (C) In response to the Deputy Secretary's question 
about the Palestinian leadership's popular support, 
Quraya' said the cabinet was working on reaching out to 
the people by holding cabinet meetings around the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip so that the cabinet members could 
speak directly to citizens.  He explained that he had 
held the May 18 cabinet session in Hebron.  Famous 
historically for its shoe manufacturing, he said, 50 to 
60 percent of the factories have closed because they 
cannot export their goods because of the closure regime 
and cannot compete within the Palestinian market because 
of cheaper goods from China.  Quraya' stressed that 
Israeli support is crucial to any economic revival since 
an economic revival would only be possible after the 
lifting of the closure regime. 
 
12.  (C) Turning to political issues, Quraya' said that 
the Palestinian leadership had found it difficult to 
demonstrate to the public that progress was coming.  He 
said that the Sharm al-Shaykh understandings must be 
respected, but the GOI did not respect them.  He stressed 
that the Palestinian leadership cannot renegotiate Oslo 
for the withdrawal from the cities.  Quraya' said he 
believed the GOI preferred to renegotiate everything.  He 
noted that there had been little progress on prisoners 
and no progress on fugitives.  He commented that the GOI 
continued to construct and expand settlements, an action 
that was killing the hopes of Palestinians.  He raised 
the separation barrier and its construction in Al-Ram 
down the middle of the road, though this road had existed 
since Ottoman times.  He asked why the GOI was dividing a 
road if the "wall" was for security reasons.  He 
continued that the GOI was actually dividing the road to 
"mark borders." 
 
13.  (C) The Deputy Secretary replied that he believed 
there were more opportunities now than there had been in 
some time, but on some issues the parties were going to 
have to crawl before they could walk or run.  He said 
that Prime Minister Sharon was committed and would keep 
moving forward.  The Deputy Secretary said he was pleased 
that President Abbas would soon meet with President Bush, 
and said their meeting would be a good opportunity to 
compare perspectives and focus on making disengagement a 
success. 
 
Dahlan on disengagement 
----------------------- 
 
14.  (C) PA Civil Affairs Minister and overall 
disengagement coordinator Muhammad Dahlan commented on 
the PA's efforts to coordinate on disengagement.  Dahlan 
said he had heard the word "disengagement" spoken at 
least seven times during the meeting and how it needed to 
be a success.  He said he recognized that if the Israeli 
withdrawal happened successfully, there could be many 
opportunities, from security, to the economy, to 
incorporating settlement assets into the PA's overall 
development plan.  In addition, he stressed that the PA 
planned to transparently manage the agricultural assets 
and that Quraya' had already issued a ruling about 
privatizing those assets.  Dahlan stressed that the PA 
had done its homework to prepare the ground and knew what 
still remained to be done. 
 
Four essentials for meaningful coordination 
------------------------------------------- 
15.  (C) Dahlan said that the PA did want to focus on 
coordinating with the GOI but found itself only on the 
receiving end and that the GOI had not yet provided the 
PA with the necessary asset inventories, though the GOI 
had already shared this exact information with Israeli 
and Palestinian businessmen and NGOs.  Dahlan went on to 
say that up until his last session with GOI interlocutors 
May 19, the GOI had not been willing to discuss four 
issues which the PA had deemed essential to a meaningful 
coordination process: 
 
a) the Philadelpi corridor (between Gaza and Egypt) -- 
Dahlan said he had asked to discuss (1) the customs 
system that must continue in order to keep the customs 
envelope between the PA and Israel intact; and (2) the 
security system which would have to be put in place with 
Egypt. 
 
b) the reopening of the Gaza airport -- Dahlan said his 
Israeli interlocutors referred to it as a political 
decision that only Prime Minister Sharon could make. 
 
c) "safe passage" -- Dahlan noted that the GOI had 
refused to discuss it since it was a phrase Sharon hated. 
 
d) back-to-back -- Dahlan said that the GOI was insisting 
on maintaining the back-to-back system into and out of 
Gaza.  He noted that even if the greenhouses were 
successfully transferred, the back-to-back system could 
well stymie the successful export of these agricultural 
products.  He said there should be a (greenhouse) door to 
(airplane) door system, not a back-to-back system. 
 
Without progress on these issues, Dahlan said 
coordination would be an empty process.  Dahlan wryly 
noted that GOI interlocutors were prepared to discuss a 
seaport since it could take up to five years to 
construct.  (Comment: This is the essence of the PA 
position.  Unless the Palestinian leadership can show its 
domestic public that it has obtained quantifiable 
improvements to the status quo from the coordination 
process, it finds it politically difficult to coordinate 
with the GOI on disengagement issues.  End comment.) 
 
Palestinians need to see benefit 
from Abbas' election or Hamas will win 
-------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Dahlan went on to say that Palestinians 
mistakenly assumed that after President Abbas' election 
and his ending of the intifada, in practice, the GOI 
would move the peace process forward.  Dahlan said that 
there should be a bonus for stopping the intifada, for 
example, family reunifications or allowing expatriate 
Palestinians to visit the West Bank or Gaza Strip or 
releasing more prisoners.  Up to now, Dahlan stressed, 
there had been "almost no practical benefit from Abu 
Mazen's election."  Due to this, Dahlan cautioned that 
Palestinians might attach some false hope to President 
Abbas' trip to Washington.  If the trip does not yield 
anything but more rhetoric, Dahlan predicted that Hamas 
would win the legislative elections.  Dahlan attributed 
90 percent of Hamas' success or failure in upcoming 
elections to what Sharon does or does not do. 
 
17.  (C) The Deputy Secretary encouraged Quraya' and 
Dahlan to have President Abbas stress in Washington that 
a successful disengagement with full coordination would 
afford the opportunity to show economic hope to 
Palestinians.  He promised to relay both Quraya's and 
Dahlan's points to the Secretary and the President. 
 
18.  (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this cable. 
HALE