US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE833

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, CU, EZ, EUN 
SUBJECT: CZECH VIEWS ON DEBATE OVER CHANGES TO EU'S CUBA 
POLICY 
 
REF: A. PRAGUE 814 
 
     B. BERLIN 1747 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Kimberly C. Krhounek for reasons 1.4(b 
) and (d). 
 
1.  (U)  This is an action message, please see paragraph 8. 
 
2.  (C) Summary.  The Czechs expect the June review of EU 
Cuba policy to result in a number of tougher measures, 
although the package will remain less robust than it was 
before the current policy was adopted earlier this year.  The 
expulsion of several European politicians from Cuba, combined 
with the lack of any improvement in the plight of imprisoned 
dissidents, has strengthened the hand of the Czechs in 
internal EU negotiations.  Following Czech-Spanish meetings 
during the past two weeks at the FM and Political Director 
levels, the Czech MFA believes they are close to agreement on 
a package that other EU member states can support.  The Czech 
MFA also believes that it would be "helpful" for the USG to 
propose including Cuba in the list of countries in the 
declaration on democracy that is being drafted for the June 
US-EU summit.  End summary. 
 
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RELATIONS AT A NEW LOW 
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3.  (C) Czech MFA Cuba Desk Officer Petr Mikyska briefed us 
June 1 on the status of the review of EU policy towards Cuba. 
 While the softer EU measures adopted earlier this year had a 
few initial benefits, such as the Cuban regime "unfreezing" 
relations with all EU member states, the honeymoon period was 
short-lived.  According to Mikyska, when the UNCHR resolution 
on Cuba received EU support, Cuba once again began limiting 
contacts with certain "troublesome" embassies, including 
those of Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and the 
Netherlands.  The lack of progress made in human rights, 
particularly the failure to obtain the release of jailed 
dissidents, is another disappointment.  Mikyska also said 
that many EU member states were upset that when the Spanish 
Minister for Regional Development visited Cuba to sign an air 
traffic agreement, she did not meet with any Cuban 
dissidents.  The Spanish tried to characterize this 
Ministerial level visit as a "technical visit," but it 
angered a number of other EU member states who felt they were 
not adhering to the EU policy and that the Spanish gave Cuba 
concessions that it had not earned. 
 
4.  (C)  For the Czechs, the standoff reached a new low on 
April 15, when the Cuban government refused to grant a visa 
to FM Svoboda to travel there on an official visit.  Svoboda 
had planned to meet with both Cuban officials and dissidents, 
as authorized by the current EU policy.  The Czechs believe 
this incident was a "turning point for the EU" as many member 
states were "shocked" by the visa denial and all have 
expressed support for the Czechs.  The European Commission 
made a statement and even some of the best "friends of Cuba," 
like Commissioner Louis Michel, agreed that such actions were 
unacceptable.  Last month's expulsions of German, Czech and 
Polish politicians prior to the May 20 opposition gathering 
garnered significant negative media coverage across Europe 
(reftels) and further undermined EU confidence in the GOC. 
 
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SIX MONTH REVIEW AND NEW POLICY 
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5.  (C) The Czech MFA believes that all of the above have 
strengthened the Czech position on Cuba within the EU and 
made the Spanish government more amenable to finding a mutual 
compromise.  As the two countries represent the main 
ideological extremes on Cuba within the EU, the Spanish and 
Czechs met at the FM-level in late May in Madrid, and at the 
Political Director level in early June in Prague.  The Czech 
goal is to change the January Council Conclusions and Mikyska 
believes that chances are quite good that the Czechs and 
Spanish will agree on a new draft policy.  The new package 
under discussion has four prongs:  First and most important 
for the Czechs, they expect agreement that individual member 
states will be able to decide for themselves whether to 
invite Cuban dissidents to national day receptions.  For the 
Czechs, this would nullify the most distasteful aspect of the 
current policy.  The new policy would also include 
encouragement of cultural cooperation, something that would 
allow the Spanish to re-open their Cultural Center in Cuba, 
which is priority for them.  The two countries are still 
arguing over the issue of high-level European visits -- the 
Czechs would like to ban such visits, but the Spanish support 
them.  Mikyska believes that a final agreement will be 
reached only with the whole of the EU and that they will 
probably reach a compromise to allow "limited" high-level 
visits.  Finally, the structured dialogue with dissidents 
will continue, with the support of most EU countries. 
 
6.  (C) Mikyska expects discussions to be concluded shortly, 
and expressed hope that "this time the Council Conclusions 
will be acceptable to everyone."  Time is indeed short as the 
next COLAT meeting takes place June 6, followed shortly by 
the June 9 meeting of Permanent Representatives and the June 
13 GAERC meeting of EU foreign ministers.  That said, most of 
the Czech's discussions have taken place bilaterally, rather 
than in a larger EU context.  Mikyska attributes this to the 
Luxembourg Presidency, which only sponsored one meeting where 
Cuban affairs were discussed, rather than continuous 
discussions at the working group level which had been the 
case during the Dutch presidency. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MAY 20 OPPOSITION MEETING 
----------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Mikyska believes that the controversy over the May 20 
meeting of the opposition was a debacle for the Cuban 
government, which had probably hoped to use it as an example 
of freedom and human rights in their country.  There was 
tremendous pressure on the Cuban government to allow some 
kind of meeting to take place, but from the beginning they 
limited media access and prevented full dissident attendance. 
 Mikyska is convinced that the GOC hoped that the meeting 
could be successfully used by Spain and other sympathetic EU 
member states to argue for making the current, more lenient 
policy, permanent.  While it did succeed in presenting the 
Cuban opposition as divided, the international repercussions 
of the expulsions were significantly stronger than the GOC 
probably intended and gave the Czechs an excellent 
opportunity to strengthen their hand within the EU. 
 
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JUNE US-EU SUMMIT 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) ACTION REQUEST:  Mikyska concluded our discussion 
with an appeal for the USG to propose including mention of 
Cuba in the democracy declaration which is being prepared for 
the US-EU summit later this month.  The Czech human rights 
department would like to see Myanmar, Belarus and Cuba all 
mentioned by name, but due to the ongoing sensitive nature of 
the Cuban policy evaluation at this time, they do not feel it 
is appropriate for them to raise it within the EU and risk 
overplaying their hand.  As the USG is the host for the 
summit, they would like to see us propose text for discussion 
that would mention Cuba, so that the European Commission and 
Secretariat would have to consider it, and Mikyska promised 
 
SIPDIS 
that the GOCR support us. 
 
9.  (C) Comment:  The Czechs believe that a series of Cuban 
government missteps have played into the Czechs' hands at the 
perfect time to use them during the six-month review process. 
 It is equally clear to them that the Cuban government does 
not fully comprehend how one bilateral "problem" can 
influence the decisions of the entire EU bloc.  They will 
continue to take advantage of this weakness and Mikyska 
declared that they are prepared to invoke the EU solidarity 
clause if necessary, to remind Castro that when he deals with 
the Czechs, it has repercussions for the entire relationship 
with the EU.  End comment. 
HILLAS