US embassy cable - 05BAGHDAD2375

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002375 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2025 
TAGS: KDEM, PGOV, KISL, IZ, KINR, National Assembly 
SUBJECT: BADR CORPS AND MUC CONDUCT MUQTADA 
AL-SADR-FACILITATED NEGOTIATIONS ON "LETTER OF PROMISE" 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Henry S. Ensher. 
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Muqtada al-Sadr representatives 
facilitated discussions between Badr Corps and Muslim 
Ulema Council (MUC) officials on Hareth al-Dhari's May 
18 comments accusing the Badr Corps of assassinating 
Sunni clerics.  The group met May 28 in the residence 
of Transitional National Assembly (TNA) Sadrist member 
Baha al-Araji in Baghdad to come to terms on a 
proposed "Letter of Promise" agreeing to cast away 
past rhetoric and work to minimize sectarian violence. 
Despite initial progress in the discussions, no 
agreement has been signed.  Badr Corps representatives 
say they are committed to continued engagement with 
MUC. Muqtada al-Sadr continues to burnish his image as 
a nationalist leader.  End Summary. 
 
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MUC Accusations 
--------------- 
 
2.  (C) In a televised press conference on May 18, MUC 
leader Hareth al-Dhari accused police commandos and 
the Badr Corps of killing two Sunni clerics that week 
as well as participating in several other earlier 
killings targeting Sunnis.  Shia notable and SCIRI 
head Abdul Aziz al-Hakim responded by calling for calm 
and an end to accusations that could lead to sectarian 
war.  Badr Corps chief Hadi al-Amiri on May 19 
denounced the accusations.  Al-Amiri told PolCouns on 
May 21 that he was doing his best to keep things calm. 
PolCouns emphasized that it is important for senior 
leaders on all sides to keep young, impressionable men 
off the street in this sensitive period.  Al-Amiri 
said that Sunni notable Adnan Dulaimi (Sunni Waqf) 
visited SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim on May 20. 
According to Al-Amiri, both men agreed that all 
mosques (Sunni and Shia) should not be used for 
political or military purposes. 
 
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Negotiations Commence 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Sadrist TNA member Baha al-Araji and Iraqi 
Hizbullah TNA member Abd al-Karim Muhammadawi told 
PolOff May 31 that discussions on May 28 between the 
MUC and Badr Corps over a proposed "Letter of Promise" 
were initially encouraging.  Al-Araji asserted that 
the discussions were initiated by Muqtada al-Sadr and 
that his brother, Hazim Al-Araji, and Sadr Bureau 
notables Abdul Hadi al-Daraji and Shaykh Nasser al- 
Saadi were facilitating these discussions "in the 
interest of Iraq."  Badr Corps Political Advisor Abdul 
Kareem al-Naqib told PolOff on May 31 that the Badr 
Corps refused to sign the letter without an apology 
from Hareth al-Dhari or presentation of hard evidence 
of Badr Corps participation in the recent attacks on 
Sunni clerics.  Al-Naqib said that Badr Corps leader 
Hadi al-Amiri went to visit Muqtada al-Sadr on May 29 
in Najaf and the two men agreed to continue engaging 
the MUC. 
 
4.  (C)  Al-Naqib said that the MUC representatives 
(Al-Rawi and Al-Ani) alleged that the Badr Corps 
participated in MNF-I operations in Fallujah and 
helped the Iraqi Government manipulate the elections 
results through their control of elections security. 
According to Al-Naqib, Al-Rawi and Al-Ani also 
asserted that the Badr Corps is predominant in MOI's 
Wolf Brigade now conducting operations in Baghdad and 
that this unit was likely behind the Sunni clerics' 
deaths.  Al-Naqib told PolOff that, in response, he 
detailed several acts of political violence directed 
against the Shia.  Al-Naqib said that while the MUC 
represents a minority of Sunnis, he believes that the 
Shia must engage in these discussions in the interest 
of national unity.  According to Al-Naqib, the MUC 
representatives originally proposed signing the Letter 
of Promise to "wash away the past". 
 
5.  (C) Hadi al-Amiri told PolOff on June 1 that the 
Badr Corps is willing to sign "100 letters" if they 
receive an apology.  Conversely, Al-Amiri said that if 
there is such evidence of Badr Corps militia taking 
part in these killings, he would personally seek 
justice against these criminals and drop the lawsuit 
against Hareth al-Dhari.  PolOff urged al-Amiri to 
avoid harsh rhetoric that could disrupt efforts to 
promote inclusion in the constitutional process. 
 
6.  (C) Al-Amiri said that the Badr Corps is committed 
to continue engaging the MUC.  Al-Naqib was much more 
ominous in his comments.  He said that if Al-Dhari 
does not apologize, he could find himself unable to 
move freely about Iraq, especially in the middle 
Euphrates region and the South.  After Poloff 
criticized the implied threat, Al-Naqib said that he 
simply meant that Al-Dhari would be met by public 
demonstrations that would be peaceful but would 
effectively limit his ability to move about the 
country. 
 
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Muqtada's Role 
--------------- 
 
7.  (C) Al-Amiri told PolOff that he felt compelled to 
personally meet Al-Sadr as he is now a legitimate 
political force.  According to Al-Amiri, Al-Sadr urged 
a peaceful resolution to the conflict between MUC and 
Badr.  Al-Sadr also reportedly told Al-Amiri that he 
is committed to joining the political process but from 
a distance through his key lieutenants.  Al-Naqib was 
much more blunt in his analysis of Al-Sadr's 
involvement.  He told PolOff that he thought Al-Sadr 
was being opportunistic and that his actions should be 
watched closely. 
 
8.  (C) Comment:  The Badr Corps-MUC discussions may 
not result in a written agreement.  Both sides' 
willingness to engage is positive.  Both sides also 
appear to be sensitive to the fragile, simultaneous 
outreach efforts to promote at Sunni participation in 
the constitutional drafting process.  The seeming 
contradiction between Muqtada's willingness to play 
peacemaker and his harsh rhetoric against the US is 
explained by his drive to be seen as a true 
"nationalist" leader.  His remarks demanding immediate 
release of detainees should be seen in the context of 
his key lieutenants' willingness to engage the Iraqi 
government on facilitating additional releases of 
detained Sadrists.  The restraint demonstrated by the 
Sadr Bureau in reaction to the May 23 car bomb attack 
on the edge of Sadr City was also indicative of their 
growing willingness to engage in politics rather than 
combat.  End Comment. 
 
9.  (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO 
KIRKUK minimize considered. 
 
 
Satterfield