US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO998

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000998 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PREL, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  ASSASSINATIONS, COUNTER-KILLINGS 
WEAKEN CEASEFIRE, DIM PEACE PROSPECTS 
 
REF: A. USDAO COLOMBO IR 6 816 0140 04 
     B. COLOMBO 0812 
     C. COLOMBO 0786 
     D. COLOMBO 0458 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) The May 31 killing of a Sri Lanka Army intelligence 
officer as he drove to work in Colombo (Ref A) is only the 
latest installment in a recurrent pattern of assassinations 
and counter-killings by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) and its rivals, primarily members of the breakaway 
"Karuna" group, over the past year.  Although most of the 
violence has been "Tamil-against-Tamil," it is widely assumed 
that the remnants of Karuna's force enjoy some measure of 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) support.  In addition, the LTTE 
has undertaken several recent provocative actions in an 
apparent bid to incite a hostile reaction from GSL security 
forces.  The persistent violence suggests a decision by both 
parties to try to make tactical gains by abrogating key parts 
of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) while maintaining the polite 
fiction--at least to the international community--that they 
have not resumed hostilities.  The Co-chairs should use their 
June 13 meeting in Washington to warn both parties that the 
continued violence weakens the CFA, exacerbates an already 
precarious security situation, destroys the mutual confidence 
needed to resume negotiations, and raises serious questions 
about each side's commitment to a peaceful settlement.  End 
summary. 
 
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HIGH-LEVEL HITS 
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2.  (SBU) The May 31 killing of Sri Lanka Army intelligence 
officer Major Tuan Nizam Muthaliff in broad daylight on a 
busy Colombo street (Ref A) is only the most recent 
installment in an ongoing series of tit-for-tat violence 
between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and its 
adversaries over the past year.  While most of the more than 
100 victims have been Tamil--either LTTE cadres or anti-LTTE 
militants, including members of the dissident "Karuna" 
group--members of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security 
forces occasionally have been targeted as well.  Major 
Muthaliff was the 30th (and highest ranking) intelligence 
officer to have been killed since the Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA) was signed.  In addition, Police Inspector T. Jayarajah 
disappeared from Colombo on April 20, presumably 
abducted--and possibly killed--by the LTTE, while police 
sub-inspector Jude Thiyagarajah was gunned down in the 
eastern district of Batticaloa on May 28.  (Note:  It is 
likely no coincidence that all three of the victims were 
Tamil speakers--a rare asset in the predominantly Sinhalese 
security forces.  End note.) 
 
3.  (C)  Some sources have speculated that Muthaliff's bold 
killing could be "payback" for the February 7 assassination 
of Kaushalyan, the LTTE's eastern military leader (Ref D) 
and/or the April 28 abduction and murder of pro-LTTE 
journalist Dharmaretnam Sivaram (Ref B).  Others, including 
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, suspect that retaliation 
for the late April/early May disappearance (and presumed 
killing) of "Newton," the LTTE's deputy chief of 
intelligence, may be the motive.  (Note:  A journalist with 
sources in the LTTE had told poloff in mid-May that the LTTE 
was "extremely worried" about the disappearance and feared 
that the intelligence bigwig may have been lured over to the 
"Karuna" side.)  In each of these instances, it was widely 
assumed--especially by the LTTE--that GSL security 
forces/intelligence provided some level of assistance to 
anti-LTTE militants. 
 
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NEAR-DAILY ATTRITION, ABROGATION OF CEASEFIRE 
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4.  (C) Sivaram's and Muthaliff's killings captured public 
attention for several reasons, including the targets' 
personal prominence within the community, the boldness of 
their execution, and--probably most important--their 
occurrence in the capital.  In contrast, the near-daily 
assassinations of lesser lights on both sides--"Karuna" 
cadres, anti-LTTE Tamil militants, party members and putative 
Sri Lanka Army informants on one hand and LTTE cadres and 
putative LTTE sympathizers on the other--over the past year 
generate scant press coverage and even sparser public 
commentary.  That most of the bloodshed occurs far from the 
Sinhalese south in the ever-volatile north and east and that 
most of its victims are Tamils makes it especially easy to 
overlook, some observers have suggested.  D. Sidhathan, 
leader of the anti-LTTE People's Liberation Organization of 
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), summarized this view most bluntly:  "As 
long as Tamils are killing Tamils," public outrage will 
remain restrained and the GSL will do nothing to intervene. 
 
5.  (C)  Despite widespread public assumptions to the 
contrary, neither the GSL nor the Tigers acknowledge 
responsibility for the ongoing violence.  The GSL maintains 
that the violence is intra-LTTE--and thus outside its area of 
responsibility--while the LTTE contends that most of the 
killings occur in GSL-controlled territory--and thus outside 
its area of responsibility.  The GSL has also consistently 
denied providing any support to members of the Karuna group 
or other anti-LTTE militants.  Circumstantial 
evidence--including the proximity of some Karuna camps to GSL 
security installations, that attacks on some LTTE cadres have 
occurred soon after they pass through GSL checkpoints, 
eyewitness testimony, including from the French ambassador, 
of Sinhalese- and Tamil-speaking paramilitaries in the 
east--strongly suggests otherwise, however. 
 
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PROVOCATIONS, BRINKMANSHIP 
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6.  (C) In addition to its campaign of assassinations, the 
LTTE also appears to be engaging in sporadic, isolated acts 
of brinkmanship against GSL security forces in a presumed 
attempt to provoke a hostile reaction.  On April 5 a Sri 
Lankan naval vessel was fired on by suspected LTTE cadres in 
Trincomalee;  on April 23 Tiger cadres fired over the heads 
of a Sri Lanka Army detachment in Trincomalee (Ref C), and on 
May 9 suspected Tigers fired on an Army post in Batticaloa. 
Violent LTTE-instigated protests in Jaffna in March and in 
Batticaloa and Trincomalee in May may have been intended in 
part to elicit an over-reaction from GSL security forces 
against the civilian population. (Unfortunately, in both 
Jaffna and Batticaloa, the security forces obliged, firing on 
protesters and killing two civilians.)  IN another alarming 
incident, on May 9 several armed LTTE cadres crossed their 
checkpoint into the ICRC-manned "no man's land" separating 
LTTE- and GSL-controlled territories at Omanthai in Jaffna 
District and began advancing toward the Sri Lanka Army 
checkpoint.  The ICRC intervened quickly, calling in Sri 
Lanka Monitoring Mission truce monitors to defuse the 
situation, and the cadres ultimately returned to LTTE 
territory without incident.  ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation 
Robert Przedpelski (please protect) expressed grave concern 
at the unprecedented and potentially dangerous incident, 
opining that the standard LTTE explanation of "mistakes were 
made" was patently false.  The LTTE is too well trained and 
too disciplined and Prabhakaran wields too much control for 
that excuse to be plausible anywhere, he said, especially in 
a sensitive area where the two forces are literally staring 
at each other.  The only other explanation--that the Tigers 
were deliberately trying to provoke the Army--carries 
particularly worrisome implications for the CFA, he added. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7.  (C) The recurrent, low-level, tit-for-tat violence 
suggests that both sides have made a tacit decision to 
abrogate key parts of the CFA (including the agreement to 
disarm all Tamil paramilitary groups and a moratorium on 
assassinations).  The parties may be assuming that as long as 
their militaries have not returned to full-scale hostilities 
that they can maintain the polite fiction for Colombo and the 
international donor community that the CFA is alive and well. 
 If so, this is a serious miscalculation, both for the 
government, which should be using the ceasefire to repair its 
tattered credibility with the beleaguered civilian Tamil 
population, and for the LTTE, which should be using the 
ceasefire to improve its human rights record, end child 
recruitment and renounce terrorism.  Whether the government 
is providing Karuna militants with material support, 
occasional intelligence, or merely turning a blind eye to 
their depredations, the persistent violence further weakens 
the CFA, exacerbates an already precarious security 
situation, especially in the east, and aggravates tensions 
and mutual suspicions between GSL security forces and the 
Tamil community.  Worse still, continued violations of the 
CFA raise grave concerns about both sides' purported 
commitment to a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
Co-chairs should use the upcoming meeting in Washington, 
tentatively scheduled for June 13, to hold both sides 
accountable for the deteriorating security situation and to 
express concern that the abrogation of any part of the CFA 
undermines prospects for peace.  Co-chairs should also press 
the GSL to make a greater and more visible effort to rein in 
the violence and to apprehend suspects when such incidents 
occur in government-controlled territory.  Suggested points 
for a draft co-chairs statement will follow septel. 
LUNSTEAD