US embassy cable - 05GENEVA1342

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 001342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, AC, NP, VC, EUR AND S/NIS 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015 
TAGS: PARM, KACT, US, RS, UP, BO, KZ, START, JCIC, INF 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON RSM-56 
ATTRIBUTION, MAY 27, 2005 
 
REF: A. 04 GENEVA 3031 (JCIC-XXVI-055) 
     B. 04 STATE 253662 (JCIC-DIP-04-024) 
     C. MOSCOW 3000 
     D. STATE 84320 (RNC/STR 05-126/56) 
 
Classified By:  Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-010. 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  May 27, 2005 
                Time:  3:30 - 4:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
SUMMARY 
 
3.  (S) A Working Group meeting with all Parties present was 
held at the U.S. Mission on May 27, 2005.  The U.S. 
Delegation asked how Russia planned to attribute warhead and 
throw-weight accountability to the RSM-56, Russia's new type 
of SLBM in a launch canister.  The Russian Delegation 
responded that Russia had already provided this information 
during the March 2005 NRRC Consultations, and that it would 
provide all future notifications in strict accordance with 
the Treaty.  The Russian Delegation indicated that the 
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would apply to the RSM-56, but 
did not give a clear answer on when the process of discussion 
in the JCIC should begin.  The U.S. Delegation asked the 
Russian Delegation to present, during the current session, 
the briefing it delivered at the NRRC Consultations. 
 
RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR RSM-56 WARHEAD 
AND THROW-WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION 
 
4.  (S) Buttrick thanked the Delegations for their hard work 
on the four RSM-56 documents, and stated that the United 
States looked forward to completing them at the end of the 
first part of this JCIC session.  He stated that, during the 
NRRC Consultations in Washington, DC, Russia briefed that 
warhead and throw-weight attribution for the RSM-56 will be 
provided after flight-testing of the missile.  The United 
States attempted to determine Treaty timelines for the 
warhead and throw-weight attribution process, and found that 
it needed to understand Russia's plans for deploying the 
RSM-56.  He noted that START Treaty provisions were developed 
on the assumption that missile development would be conducted 
in a certain way, and it is now apparent that RSM-56 will not 
follow the approach envisioned by the Treaty drafters.  He 
gave an example, from the Russian press, which indicated that 
the RSM-56 may be deployed after a few flight-tests, and may 
be tested from a deployed submarine.  He emphasized that the 
United States is not necessarily saying Russia is doing 
anything wrong in the process, but that we are simply trying 
to understand how Russia is developing and deploying the 
RSM-56. 
 
5.  (S) Fedorchenko asked whether the United States wanted a 
repeat of what Russia briefed at the NRRC Consultations held 
in March 2005.  Buttrick indicated that this would be a good 
start, as Russia had not presented this information in the 
JCIC.  Fedorchenko stated that Russia briefed at the NRRC 
Consultations that it would attribute warheads and 
throw-weight to RSM-56 after its flight-tests, adding that 
Article III of the Treaty supports this.  He said that Russia 
must first start flight-testing, as currently the missile has 
neither warheads nor throw-weight attribution. 
 
6.  (S) Fedorchenko noted that four RSM-56 documents were on 
the table that brought the missile under the Treaty (REFS 
A-C).  He stated that Russia believed these documents allowed 
Russia to begin technical arrangements on the RSM-56 in 
accordance with the Treaty.  He said that the lack of these 
documents, however, would not stop Russia from transferring 
this missile to Severodvinsk, adding that the RSM-56 cannot 
currently be considered a missile under the Treaty because 
there are no provisions that apply to it in the Treaty.  As 
he saw it, the Parties' task was to work on the documents at 
the negotiation table.  He stated that Russia had provided a 
list of Treaty problems associated with RSM-56 at the NRRC 
Consultations, adding that the MOU changes discussed there 
would be provided to the United States in July of this year. 
 
7.  (S) Buttrick reiterated that the sides were in agreement 
on the four RSM-56 documents and that, if acceptable to the 
Parties, the documents were ready to be completed.  He stated 
that the United States had no questions on the documents, and 
hoped to complete them by the end of this session.  At that 
time, the RSM-56 would be recognized under the Treaty as an 
assembled missile in its launch canister, and Russia could 
begin deployment and flight-testing.  The United States was 
trying to understand Russia's plans on how it would 
flight-test the missile, and how it intends to attribute 
warheads and accountable throw-weight as required under 
START.  He gave the example of the START drafters' vision of 
missile development involving prototypes.  The United States 
understood from the NRRC Consultations that Russia plans to 
bypass the prototype stage and go directly into 
flight-testing of the RSM-56.  He emphasized that it was 
important for the United States to understand Russia's 
flight-test plans relating to warhead and throw-weight 
accountability, including whether the Thirty-Second Agreed 
Statement would be invoked, in order to avoid any pitfalls 
and confusion as Russia deploys the RSM-56. 
 
8.  (S) Fedorchenko replied that he had no directions to 
discuss plans to deploy or flight-test the RSM-56.  He stated 
that Russia had already provided notification that it had 
started conversion of SLBM launchers on May 5 (REF D), 
adding that this conversion was for the RSM-56 SLBM.  Russia 
planned to complete the conversion this year.  He stated that 
future notifications would be provided through official 
channels, and would be in strict accordance with the Treaty. 
 
9.  (S) Kottmyer stated that this issue was a U.S. problem, 
not just Russia's, as the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement 
mandates that the Parties come to agreement when certain 
conditions apply.  If a Party deploys a new type of missile 
before its eighth flight-test, the Parties have to come to 
agreement on procedures to establish throw-weight 
accountability.  She asked whether the Thirty-Second Agreed 
Statement applied and Fedorchenko concurred.  Kottmyer asked 
when Russia thought the sides should discuss reaching an 
agreement. 
 
10.  (S) Fedorchenko stated that the first issue to resolve 
was to capture the missile under the Treaty.  He said that a 
proposal must be tabled at the JCIC on a procedure for 
calculating throw-weight.  He added that Russia could table a 
proposal on throw-weight, but it would be useless as it would 
only involve a general approach.  Fedorchenko stated that 
Russia must conduct flight-tests, and only then could Russia 
discuss procedures for determining throw-weight.  After these 
flight-tests, and once Russia was sure the missile was 
working, then Russia could table a throw-weight proposal.  As 
Russia had not conducted any flight-tests, a proposal 
provided now would not work. 
 
11.  (S) Buttrick pointed out that the problem confronting 
the Parties was the requirement to agree in the JCIC 
regarding throw-weight accountability.  The next JCIC may not 
be until October, and the United States did not understand 
Russia's plans.  Since Russia had not tabled a proposal 
regarding the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, deployment of 
the RSM-56 could be delayed, because no agreement existed to 
preclude problems with the Treaty.  He stated that the United 
States was not trying to raise a compliance concern; it was 
trying to facilitate the process, and avoid raising concerns 
while Russia is in the middle of developing its new SLBM.  In 
addition, Russia must consider the Treaty provisions 
regarding how launchers are attributed on a submarine after 
it begins sea trials.  Buttrick asked at what point in the 
conversion process did attribution of the RSM-56 begin and 
attribution of the SS-N-20 stop for a particular submarine. 
He added that there were prohibitions in Article V that 
Russia will also have to consider.  He emphasized that the 
United States was not accusing Russia, but wanted to work in 
the JCIC to understand how Russia would attribute the RSM-56. 
 
12.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia had already clearly 
provided an answer during the NRRC Consultations.  Buttrick, 
noting that many members of the Working Group had not seen 
the briefing, requested that the Russian Delegation present 
the briefing this session.  Fedorchenko said that he would 
have to seek authority to present the briefing again. 
Ryzhkov asked whether the United States had any doubts about 
the fact that Russia does not have deployed RSM-56s, adding 
that there is no established legal status of this SLBM.  He 
noted that when Russia notified its colleagues of the RSM-56, 
Russia was doing so in the spirit of the Treaty because, 
technically, Russia did not have to provide the declaration 
at that time.  He added that now a Russian proverb applied: 
no good deed goes unpunished.  Russia had provided all the 
necessary information, conducted the exhibition, and provided 
the required notifications.  When the submarine was launched, 
it would be attributed with missiles immediately, even though 
they do not exist.  He said that Russia is acting strictly in 
accordance with the Treaty.  While there were some problems 
with the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement, the Parties should 
wait for flight-tests before proceeding further. 
 
13.  (S) Buttrick responded that the United States did not 
consider the RSM-56 to be deployed.  He said he understood 
the Russian Delegation's position, but clearly the 
Thirty-Second Agreed Statement directs the Parties to discuss 
in the JCIC, and reach agreement on, procedures for 
throw-weight accountability.  Ryzhkov answered that Russia 
could not do this until at least one flight-test was 
conducted. 
 
14.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian-proposed JCIC Agreement on Replacement of Sets 
of Radiation Detection Equipment, dated May 28, 2005; and 
 
    -- Russian-proposed Joint Text on Categories of Technical 
Data for SLBMs in Launch Canisters, dated May 27, 2005. 
 
15.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Foley 
Mr. Herrick 
Mr. Jones 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
LCDR Woods 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Abuseitov 
Mr. Baysuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Kashirin 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Col Maksimenko 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Shabalin 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Mr. Zakharchuk 
 
16.  (U) Look sends. 
Moley