US embassy cable - 05PORTAUPRINCE1516

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PORT AU PRINCE 001516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM AMBASSADOR FOLEY 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, HA, Security Situation 
SUBJECT: U.S. TROOPS NEEDED IN HAITI 
 
REF: PAP 1483 (EXDIS) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Foley, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: The situation in Haiti has deteriorated to 
the point that elections, the central element of the 
transition process, are in jeopardy.  MINUSTAH has failed to 
establish security and stability here.  As much as we may 
pressure the UN and the Brazilians to take the more forceful 
approach that is needed, I do not believe ultimately they 
will be up to the task.  As I stated in reftel, a temporary 
deployment of U.S. forces is the only way to secure the 
elections and a successful transition and to prevent the kind 
of sustained instability that would provoke a much longer and 
costlier U.S. military intervention.  I outline below the 
nature and size of mission I believe is needed and urge 
relevant Washington agencies to consider positively such a 
limited deployment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Mission Justification and Definition 
----------------------------------- 
2. (S)  The security situation in Haiti has worsened in the 
past months to a degree that it is severely hampering voter 
registration and will make campaigning and the actual 
elections potentially impossible to conduct.  Despite the 
presence of UN forces, key political players are increasingly 
questioning the possibility of holding elections, and the 
Fanmi Lavalas party -- whose participation will be key to the 
credibility of the elections -- have not yet agreed to 
participate, citing inadequate security.  MINUSTAH forces 
have demonstrated they are not capable of fully managing 
security for the elections.  In addition, deteriorating 
security conditions have forced the U.S. mission to reduce 
its personnel at a critical moment. 
 
3. (S) The basic mission would be to augment the UN's 
provision of security throughout the campaign period and on 
election days.  Adding U.S. forces would enable MINUSTAH to 
more effectively use its troops and civilian police for 
electoral security in low-risk places and ensure an overall 
climate that permits campaigning and a legitimate and 
credible election to take place.  U.S. forces would be based 
in Port-au-Prince, with the following specific tasks: 
 
--  Election security in Port-au-Prince.  Provide a secure 
environment for election activities in Port-au-Prince 
"hotspots" including Cite Soleil, BelAir, Fort National and 
other areas where HNP and MINUSTAH military and police forces 
are either outmatched (HNP) or ineffective (MINUSTAH).  This 
would involve both static security, e.g. at election sites, 
and related patrolling. 
 
--  Deployable electoral security force.  On short notice, in 
coordination with MINUSTAH, U.S. forces would provide 
security for campaign rallies, marches, and other 
election-related events in Port-au-Prince as well as in major 
cities outside the capital.  U.S. troops would serve 
essentially as a needed, short-term surge capacity to 
MINUSTAH forces. 
 
--  Election Day security.  This would include tasks such as 
protection of polling places, secure transportation of 
election officials, ballots and otther election materials, 
and quick reaction capacity in case of trouble. 
 
4. (S)  The U.S. mission would be self-sufficient and 
independent of MINUSTAH, but linked through an appropriate 
coordination mechanism.  It would be based on a bilateral 
agreement with the Government of Haiti, which will eagerly 
welcome such a mission. 
 
Size and composition 
--------------------- 
5. (S)  I leave to military experts to determine the exact 
size and composition, but I envision a minimum of 500 troops 
and helicopter support, which would allow for periodic 
short-term deployments as needed outside the capital while 
maintaining operations in the capital.  Force protection and 
command element/support requirements needed to make such a 
force self-sustaining would be determined by DOD. 
Duration 
-------- 
6. (S)  Ideally, the U.S. mission would have a 150-day 
deployment to encompass the entire campaign and election 
season, which will run from approximately August 1 (the end 
of voter registration) until after the December 18 second 
round of parliamentary/presidential elections.  If that is 
not feasible, a 120-day mission beginning September 1 would 
provide adequate coverage for the bulk of the campaign period 
and for the actual elections. 
FOLEY