US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3088

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PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

Identifier: 05ANKARA3088
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3088 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-06-01 15:29:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM PREL ETTC MNUC TSPA IR TU MTCRE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T ANKARA 003088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, EUR/SE, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, TSPA, IR, TU, MTCRE 
SUBJECT: PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 3053 
     B. STATE 99755 
     C. ANKARA 2836 
     D. ANKARA 2816 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (S) Summary:  Turkish authorities do not believe "catch 
all" export controls (suggested ref B) can be used unless the 
shipper of the missile-related equipment destined for Iran is 
formally imported into Turkey first.  MFA continues to put 
its hope on the Chinese taking the shipment back, but are 
also searching for other legal mechanisms to block the 
shipment.  Comparing bills of lading might provide a way to 
do that.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Disarmament and Arms 
Control Bulent Meric on June 1 invited PolMilCouns to discuss 
further the recommendation we had put forward the previous 
day about using "catch-all" export controls to stop the 
shipment of Chinese-origin missile-related equipment to Iran 
(refs A and B).  Meric underscored that Ankara agrees that 
the ultimate end-use of the material was "not good." 
However, as China is not a MTCR participant, Turkey had no 
basis to approach the Chinese itself.  And because the 
material is dual-use and not on the MTCR control list, Turkey 
had no export control basis to act against the shipment 
unless the shipper imports it to Turkey.  Currently, the 
material is in a free trade zone and under Turkish 
legislation (which Meric said is consistent with EU norms) 
this means catch-all controls cannot be applied.  No Turkish 
customs or export control laws apply to free trade zones, 
except for categories of goods prohibited from the zone under 
the Free Trade Zone Law.  These goods include illicit drugs, 
WMD material, etc, but no dual-use items, according to Meric. 
 
3. (S) That said, Meric continued, the GOT wants to stop this 
shipment, albeit in a way that is consistent with 
international and domestic law.  Turkish customs was 
currently using its authority to check cargo to run tests on 
the items in the shipment.  This is how the Turks are 
currently preventing the shipment from moving.  However, they 
can only hold onto the goods another week to ten days, he 
said. 
 
4. (S) Meric saw two alternatives:  Either the Chinese agree 
to take the shipment back (Ankara's preference), or we all 
wait to see whether the shipper will move the goods into 
Turkey's customs area where catch all controls could be 
applied.  In response to questions, Meric did not believe the 
authorities had any way to encourage the company to choose 
that option.  He said that MFA had not yet heard from London 
about its approach to Beijing, although the UK Ambassador was 
to see MFA Acting Undersecretary Nabi Sensoy late June 1 to 
discuss this issue.  (Comment:  Subsequent RMAS discussions 
with UK counterparts indicate that, contrary to info ref B, 
the Chinese option is still being discussed in Beijing and, 
while the Chinese have not agreed to withdraw the shipment, 
neither have they given a negative reply.) 
 
5. (S) While Ankara saw its options as limited, Meric 
emphasized, it was "leaving no stone unturned" in trying to 
find a way to legally stop the shipment.  For example, he 
said he planned to propose to an interagency group later that 
day that Turkish authorities examine the bills of lading 
presented for the arrival and the onward shipment of the 
goods to see whether any discrepancies could be discovered 
that would permit legal action against the shipper for making 
a false declaration.  He had no idea whether this would work, 
but Turkish authorities needed to try everything possible to 
find a basis to act, he stated.  PolMilCouns observed that a 
similar approach had been taken by investigators in the AQ 
Khan investigation in Istanbul. 
 
6. (S) Comment:  Separately, RMAS sources have reason to 
believe the approach of comparing bills of lading could prove 
fruitful.  End comment. 
 
EDELMAN 

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