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| Identifier: | 05CAIRO4121 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05CAIRO4121 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Cairo |
| Created: | 2005-06-01 14:51:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL EG Democracy Reform Demonstrations |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004121 SIPDIS FOR NEA, NEA/ELA NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, EG, Democracy Reform, Demonstrations SUBJECT: EGYPT: MAY 25 REFERENDUM - RESULTS AND REACTION REF: CAIRO 4005 (NOTAL) Classified by Acting DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d). ------- Summary ------- 1. (C) The GOE claims that 83 percent of those casting ballots on May 25 supported the amendment to permit future direct presidential elections. Voting day was marred by a disputed turnout and violence against opposition demonstrators in some locations. The violence, apparently perpetrated by supporters of the ruling National Democratic Party, was not prevented by Egyptian security officials. Both the presidential spokesman and state prosecutor made public comments in reaction to the incident, with the latter promising to investigate the incident and hold the perpetrators of violence accountable. If repeated, the problems that characterized the May 25 referendum threaten to discredit democratic reform in Egypt. End summary. ------------------ Referendum Results ------------------ 2. (SBU) Late in the afternoon of May 26, less than 24 hours after the polls had closed, the GOE announced the results. According to the GOE, 53.64 percent of eligible voters turned out, with 82.86 percent of them approving the referendum and 16.36 percent opposed. In numerical terms, the GOE asserted that 17,184,302 citizens voted (from a possible pool of 32,036,353 registered voters). 778,856 ballots were invalid. Of the valid ballots cast, the GOE asserted that 13,593,552 voters supported the amendment, and 2,811,894 opposed it. The announced results show significantly lower turnout and fewer "yes" votes than seen in past referenda. For example, in the 1999 presidential referendum, the GOE claimed a nearly 80 percent turnout and 94 percent "yes" vote. 3. (SBU) Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, who announced the results, reiterated the GOE's earlier claim that full judicial supervision over all stages of voting and vote counting took place through 54,679 "general committees and subcommittees." (Note: Per reftel, the Justice Minister had asserted that 1,225 judicial officials led the supervision of the referendum. The GOE has not explained the mechanics by which this relatively modest number of judicial officials managed to provide "full judicial supervision" of nearly 55,000 polling places. End note.) President Mubarak immediately endorsed the issuance of an amendment to the Egyptian constitution to reflect the results of the referendum. -------------------------------------- Skeptical Reaction to Official Results -------------------------------------- 4. (SBU) Notwithstanding the GOE's quick and precise tabulation of the votes, opposition activists and diplomatic observers quickly expressed their skepticism at the results. The opposition Wafd newspaper gleefully ran a front page story on May 26, replete with photos, claiming that two of its editors both managed to vote at eight different polling stations in Giza, across the Nile from Cairo. A third Wafd editor voted at six different polling stations. The Wafd concluded that the referendum was a "farce." The Wafd and other opposition critics of the GOE have complained about poorly maintainted voter lists, which were inconsistently consulted by the GOE officials overseeing the poll, as well as inappropriate get-out-the-vote efforts involving alleged misuse of NGO resources and NDP pressure on sympathetic business owners to ensure that workers went to the polls. 5. (C) A reliable Cairo-based observer of the political scene told us that "nobody knows anyone who voted." When asked if they voted, most of our business contacts simply laughed or rolled their eyes. At a May 30 meeting of poloffs from "like-minded" embassies, none of theses dozen or so analysts of Egypt's domestic politics gave any credence to the GOE's statistics about the referendum. These contacts had all attempted to verify GOE claims of heavy voter turnout in Cairo and the hinterlands, but without success. The consensus of the "like-minded" poloffs was that actual turnout was significantly less than the GOE's claim. --------------- Violent Clashes --------------- 6. (C) Several violent clashes in Cairo overshadowed the putative success of the referendum. As widely reported in the opposition press and by Cairo-based wire service reporters and other western journalists--and subsequently condemned by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the International Committee to Protect Journalists--young men apparently affiliated with the ruling NDP assaulted several protesters from the Kifaya (Enough) movement in several locations, most notably in front of Cairo's Saad Zaghlul Monument and next to the Press Syndicate building. Police officials at the scene failed to intervene to prevent the attacks. 7. (C) On May 28, Presidential Spokesman Soliman Awad described reports by foreign journalists as "exaggerated" and "biased and unjustified," but noted that if the attacks happened as described, it was "unacceptable." The National Council for Human Rights, a nominally independent body established by the GOE in 2004, called for prompt investigations into these "grave incidents." The Council noted that failure to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the assaults would be detrimental to the confidence of the Egyptian public in the democratic reform process and would serve as a "pretext" for foreign (read: American) interference in Egypt's internal affairs. On May 31, State Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed promised to investigate the complaints of violence and "take all legal measures to ascertain the truth and hold accountable anyone who is proven to have been responsible for any excesses." 8. (C) Remarks by President Bush and the White House spokesman critical of the referendum-day attacks received considerable play in the opposition press, with both Kifaya and Muslim Brotherhood seizing on the comments to bash both the GOE--for failing to answer the USG's "charges"--and the USG, for "cynically" playing the democracy card in Egypt to divert attention from Iraq and Palestine. 9. (SBU) In response to the attacks on the Kifaya protesters, particularly the groping of women protesters and journalists, two opposition initiatives have begun to mobilize additional protests scheduled for June 1. One effort calls on Egyptians to wear black, to mourn the attacks. A second movement has called for the wearing of white ribbons. In both cases, the protesters are seeking a GOE apology and the resignation/firing of Interior Minister Adly. As of midday June 1, the attire of average Cairenes did not suggest much support for these initiatives. However, many women dressed in black during a June 1 demonstration at the press syndicate building which was attended mostly by journalists but also by representatives of Kifaya, opposition parties and human rights organizations. ------- Comment ------- 10. (C) The events of the day illustrated well the roadblocks on the road to political reform in Egypt. In addition to broader questions of voter apathy and intimidation, the GOE and NDP face a huge challenge in establishing a transparent and fair electoral process that will meet the domestic and international scrutiny that is sure to attend the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections. The problems with the referendum may provide leverage for domestic pressure and international encouragement of, and support for, much-needed GOE measures such as allowing for a re-opening of voter registration and establishing a bona fide electoral commission. End comment. Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. GRAY
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