US embassy cable - 05CAIRO4121

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EGYPT: MAY 25 REFERENDUM - RESULTS AND REACTION

Identifier: 05CAIRO4121
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO4121 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-06-01 14:51:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KDEM PHUM PREL EG Democracy Reform Demonstrations
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 004121 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA, NEA/ELA 
NSC STAFF FOR POUNDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, PHUM, PREL, EG, Democracy Reform, Demonstrations 
SUBJECT: EGYPT: MAY 25 REFERENDUM - RESULTS AND REACTION 
 
REF: CAIRO 4005 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified by Acting DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4. (b) 
and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  The GOE claims that 83 percent of those casting 
ballots on May 25 supported the amendment to permit future 
direct presidential elections.  Voting day was marred by a 
disputed turnout and violence against opposition 
demonstrators in some locations.  The violence, apparently 
perpetrated by supporters of the ruling National Democratic 
Party, was not prevented by Egyptian security officials. 
Both the presidential spokesman and state prosecutor made 
public comments in reaction to the incident, with the latter 
promising to investigate the incident and hold the 
perpetrators of violence accountable.  If repeated, the 
problems that characterized the May 25 referendum threaten to 
discredit democratic reform in Egypt.  End summary. 
 
------------------ 
Referendum Results 
------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU)  Late in the afternoon of May 26, less than 24 
hours after the polls had closed, the GOE announced the 
results.  According to the GOE, 53.64 percent of eligible 
voters turned out, with 82.86 percent of them approving the 
referendum and 16.36 percent opposed.  In numerical terms, 
the GOE asserted that 17,184,302 citizens voted (from a 
possible pool of 32,036,353 registered voters).  778,856 
ballots were invalid.  Of the valid ballots cast, the GOE 
asserted that 13,593,552 voters supported the amendment, and 
2,811,894 opposed it.  The announced results show 
significantly lower turnout and fewer "yes" votes than seen 
in past referenda.  For example, in the 1999 presidential 
referendum, the GOE claimed a nearly 80 percent turnout and 
94 percent "yes" vote. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Interior Minister Habib al-Adly, who announced the 
results, reiterated the GOE's earlier claim that full 
judicial supervision over all stages of voting and vote 
counting took place through 54,679 "general committees and 
subcommittees."  (Note:  Per reftel, the Justice Minister had 
asserted that 1,225 judicial officials led the supervision of 
the referendum.  The GOE has not explained the mechanics by 
which this relatively modest number of judicial officials 
managed to provide "full judicial supervision" of nearly 
55,000 polling places.  End note.)  President Mubarak 
immediately endorsed the issuance of an amendment to the 
Egyptian constitution to reflect the results of the 
referendum. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Skeptical Reaction to Official Results 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  Notwithstanding the GOE's quick and precise 
tabulation of the votes, opposition activists and diplomatic 
observers quickly expressed their skepticism at the results. 
The opposition Wafd newspaper gleefully ran a front page 
story on May 26, replete with photos, claiming that two of 
its editors both managed to vote at eight different polling 
stations in Giza, across the Nile from Cairo.  A third Wafd 
editor voted at six different polling stations.  The Wafd 
concluded that the referendum was a "farce."  The Wafd and 
other opposition critics of the GOE have complained about 
poorly maintainted voter lists, which were inconsistently 
consulted by the GOE officials overseeing the poll, as well 
as inappropriate get-out-the-vote efforts involving alleged 
misuse of NGO resources and NDP pressure on sympathetic 
business owners to ensure that workers went to the polls. 
 
5.  (C)  A reliable Cairo-based observer of the political 
scene told us that "nobody knows anyone who voted."  When 
asked if they voted, most of our business contacts simply 
laughed or rolled their eyes.  At a May 30 meeting of poloffs 
from "like-minded" embassies, none of theses dozen or so 
analysts of Egypt's domestic politics gave any credence to 
the GOE's statistics about the referendum.  These contacts 
had all attempted to verify GOE claims of heavy voter turnout 
in Cairo and the hinterlands, but without success.  The 
consensus of the "like-minded" poloffs was that actual 
turnout was significantly less than the GOE's claim. 
 
--------------- 
Violent Clashes 
--------------- 
 
6.  (C)  Several violent clashes in Cairo overshadowed the 
putative success of the referendum.  As widely reported in 
the opposition press and by Cairo-based wire service 
reporters and other western journalists--and subsequently 
condemned by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and 
the International Committee to Protect Journalists--young men 
apparently affiliated with the ruling NDP assaulted several 
protesters from the Kifaya (Enough) movement in several 
locations, most notably in front of Cairo's Saad Zaghlul 
Monument and next to the Press Syndicate building.  Police 
officials at the scene failed to intervene to prevent the 
attacks. 
 
7.  (C)  On May 28, Presidential Spokesman Soliman Awad 
described reports by foreign journalists as "exaggerated" and 
"biased and unjustified," but noted that if the attacks 
happened as described, it was "unacceptable."  The National 
Council for Human Rights, a nominally independent body 
established by the GOE in 2004, called for prompt 
investigations into these "grave incidents."  The Council 
noted that failure to investigate and prosecute those 
responsible for the assaults would be detrimental to the 
confidence of the Egyptian public in the democratic reform 
process and would serve as a "pretext" for foreign (read: 
American) interference in Egypt's internal affairs.  On May 
31, State Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed promised to 
investigate the complaints of violence and "take all legal 
measures to ascertain the truth and hold accountable anyone 
who is proven to have been responsible for any excesses." 
 
8.  (C)  Remarks by President Bush and the White House 
spokesman critical of the referendum-day attacks received 
considerable play in the opposition press, with both Kifaya 
and Muslim Brotherhood seizing on the comments to bash both 
the GOE--for failing to answer the USG's "charges"--and the 
USG, for "cynically" playing the democracy card in Egypt to 
divert attention from Iraq and Palestine. 
 
9.  (SBU)  In response to the attacks on the Kifaya 
protesters, particularly the groping of women protesters and 
journalists, two opposition initiatives have begun to 
mobilize additional protests scheduled for June 1.  One 
effort calls on Egyptians to wear black, to mourn the 
attacks.  A second movement has called for the wearing of 
white ribbons.  In both cases, the protesters are seeking a 
GOE apology and the resignation/firing of Interior Minister 
Adly.  As of midday June 1, the attire of average Cairenes 
did not suggest much support for these initiatives.  However, 
many women dressed in black during a June 1 demonstration at 
the press syndicate building which was attended mostly by 
journalists but also by representatives of Kifaya, opposition 
parties and human rights organizations. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  The events of the day illustrated well the 
roadblocks on the road to political reform in Egypt.  In 
addition to broader questions of voter apathy and 
intimidation, the GOE and NDP face a huge challenge in 
establishing a transparent and fair electoral process that 
will meet the domestic and international scrutiny that is 
sure to attend the upcoming presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  The problems with the referendum may provide 
leverage for domestic pressure and international 
encouragement of, and support for, much-needed GOE measures 
such as allowing for a re-opening of voter registration and 
establishing a bona fide electoral commission.  End comment. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY 

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