US embassy cable - 05SANAA1500

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SCENESETTER FOR NAVCENT COMMANDER - VADM NICHOLS VISIT TO YEMEN 12-13 JUNE 05

Identifier: 05SANAA1500
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA1500 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-06-01 12:57:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: MARR MASS MOPS YM COUNTER TERRORISM MARITIME SECURITY
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MOPS, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM, MARITIME SECURITY 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NAVCENT COMMANDER - VADM NICHOLS 
VISIT TO YEMEN 12-13 JUNE 05 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS KRAJESKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (a) 
 
1. (S/NF) EMBASSY SANAA WARMLY WELCOMES THE VISIT OF NAVCENT 
COMMANDER, VADM NICHOLS, AND HIS STAFF JUNE 12-13.  YOU WILL 
FIND THAT OPERATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING AND MARITIME 
COOPERATION BETWEEN USG AND ROYG IS INCREASING.  YOU WILL 
MEET WITH DEFENSE MINISTER, MAJOR GENERAL ABDULLAH ALI 
ALAIWA, AND INTERIOR MINISTER, MAJOR GENERAL RASHAD AL-ALIMI. 
 CHIEF OF STAFF (CHOD), MAJOR GENERAL MOHAMMED AL-QASSEMI MAY 
ATTEND IF HE IS AVAILABLE.  YOU WILL ALSO MEET WITH COMMANDER 
OF THE YEMEN NAVY, BRIGADIER GENERAL RAWAIS ABDULLAH ALI 
MUJOWAR, AS WELL AS BRIGADIER GENERAL ALI ABDULLAH RASSA, 
DIRECTOR (CDR) OF YEMEN COAST GUARD.  YOU WILL ALSO HAVE THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT ADEN, TOUR ADEN HARBOR AND MEET WITH THE 
GOVERNOR OF ADEN, DR. YAHYA MOHAMMED AL-SHUAIBI. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  YOU WILL FIND THESE ROYG OFFICIALS ANXIOUS TO 
DISCUSS WHAT THE THEY CHARACTERIZE AS INADEQUATE U.S. 
ASSISTANCE TO COMPENSATE YEMEN FOR IT'S PARTICIPATION IN THE 
GWOT.  ONE OR MORE OF YOUR INTERLOCUTORS WILL LIKELY ASK YOU 
FOR  USG ASSISTANCE TO EQUIP AND TRAIN AS WELL AS PROVIDE 
SPARE PARTS.  THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ECHO PRESIDENT SALEH'S 
MANTRA ("WE ARE FIGHTING YOUR FIGHT") THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE 
YEMEN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES TO SUPPRESS THE AL-HOUTHI 
"BELIEVING YOUTH" REBELLION IN VICINITY OF SA'ADA WAS DONE ON 
THE BEHALF OF THE USG, AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PART AND 
PARCEL OF THE GWOT.  YOU SHOULD EXPECT THE MINISTER OF 
INTERIOR, AS WELL AS YCG DIRECTOR TO BE MORE FRIENDLY AND 
ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH US, THAN THEIR COUNTERPARTS FROM THE 
MOD. YOU CAN EXPECT GOVERNOR SHUAIBI TO ASK FOR YOUR 
ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING BACK U.S. MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL 
SHIPPING TO ADEN, THEREBY ASSISTING IN THE REVITALIZATION OF 
THE HARBOR. 
------------------ 
PRESIDENT SALEH ON CT COOPERATION: WHAT HAVE YOU DONE FOR ME 
LATELY? 
------------------ 
 
3.  (C) PRESIDENT SALEH'S MODUS OPERENDI ON MILITARY, NAVAL 
AND CT COOPERATION IS TO LEVERAGE SUCCESSES INTO FURTHER U.S. 
MILITARY AND SECURITY COOPERATION, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT, 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND FOOD AID.  PRESIDENT SALEH'S 
MINISTERS, NAVAL AND COAST GUARD COMMANDERS ARE WELL VERSED 
IN THESE TACTICS.  SINCE 2001 PRESIDENT SALEH HAS DETERMINED 
THAT HIS INTERESTS LIE IN A PRO-U.S. STANCE IN THE GWOT.  HE 
AND HIS MINISTERS OFTEN CLAIM, HOWEVER, THAT THE USG DOES NOT 
MATCH THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITH COMMENSURATE ASSISTANCE. 
IN FACT, ROYG CT COOPERATION IS SPOTTY, AND IS TINGED WITH 
MISTRUST, LEADING AT TIMES TO HOARDING OF INFORMATION.  YOU 
MAY WANT TO PRESS YOUR INTERLOCUTORS FOR THE NEED FOR BETTER 
INFORMATION SHARING.  USG REQUESTS FOR CT COOPERATION FROM 
YEMEN NEVER FAIL TO GENERATE DEMANDS FOR LARGE SUMS OF MONEY 
IN RETURN.  WE CONSIDER PRESIDENT SALEH TO BE A MASTER 
BALANCER OF COMPETING INTERESTS AND HE WILL WEIGH ANY 
COOPERATION WITH THE USG AGAINST HIS INTERESTS IN APPEASING 
DOMESTIC TRIBAL AND ISLAMIST ELEMENTS. 
------------- 
TRAINING AND EQUIPPING ISSUES: WE GET THEM WHAT THEY NEED, 
NOT WHAT THEY WANT. 
------------- 
 
4. (S/NF) THE YEMEN NAVY (YN) DOES NOT ENGAGE WITH THE 
EMBASSY, CJTF-HOA, OR NAVCENT, EITHER BY POLICY OR OUT OF 
JEALOUSY FOR WHAT WE DO IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE YEMEN COAST 
GUARD.  EXCEPT FOR THE NEW 37.5 METER FRENCH PATROL BOATS 
THEY RECENTLY RECEIVED (PURCHASED- NOT GRANT AID), THE YEMEN 
NAVY VESSELS GENERALLY DO NOT DEPLOY EITHER BECAUSE OF LACK 
OF SPARE PARTS, FUEL OR OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. THE YN DOES 
SEND A FEW SAILORS TO TRAINING IN THE U.S., UNDER THE 
AUSPICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
PROGRAM (IMET). 
 
5.  (S/NF) YEMEN COAST GUARD.  THE YEMEN COAST GUARD (YCG) IS 
THE MARITIME CT SUCCESS STORY IN YEMEN.  PART OF THE MINISTRY 
OF THE INTERIOR, THE YCG WAS FORMED JUST THREE YEARS AGO WITH 
NO EQUIPMENT, INFRASTRUCTURE OR ASSIGNED PERSONNEL.  THE YCG 
HAS MATURED INTO A SEMI-CAPABLE ORGANIZATION THAT IS SLOWLY 
EXPANDING ITS OPERATIONS AWAY FROM THE HOME-PORT CITIES OF 
ADEN AND HODEIDAH.  MUCH OF THE YCG SUCCESS IS DIRECTLY 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GUIDING EFFORTS OF THE USCG PROVIDED 
MARITIME ADVISOR, CAPT BOB INNES, WHO HAS BEEN TDY IN YEMEN 
FOR OVER TWO YEARS.  YCG IS CAPABLE OF LIMITED MIO/LIO 
OPERATIONS IN YEMENI TERRITORIAL WATER, AND HAS THE MISSION 
TO BE THE MARITIME DELIVERY MEANS FOR THE CENTRAL SECURITY 
FORCE-COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT (CSF-CTU). YCG IS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR ALL WATERSIDE AND SOME LANDSIDE SECURITY OF OIL 
INFRASTRUCTURE.  THE YCG HAS BEEN THE MAJOR BENEFACTOR OF 
YEMEN'S ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) OVER 
THE LAST FOUR YEARS.  THE YCG REALIZES THAT THE USCG AND USN 
HAVE THE "GOLD STANDARD" FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPPING A 
MARITIME FORCE, AND THEY SEEK TO HARVEST THAT CAPABILITY. 
 
6.  (S/NF) CONTROLLING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SA/LW). 
IN EARLY MARCH THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED PRESIDENT SALEH WITH 
EVIDENCE THAT WEAPONS OSTENSIBLY PROCURED THROUGH OFFICIAL 
MOD CHANNELS WERE ENDING UP IN THE WRONG HANDS (E.G. 
TERRORISTS-SPECIFICALLY, THE JEDDA CONSULATE ATTACKERS).  AT 
THE SAME MEETING, THE AMBASSADOR INFORMED PRESIDENT SALEH 
THAT THE USG HAD JUST STOPPED ONE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM 
SERBIA.  PRESIDENT SALEH THEN PLEDGED TO STOP RELYING ON ARMS 
DEALERS TO EQUIP HIS ARMED FORCES.  WE NEED A SOLID 
COMMITMENT FROM SALEH THAT THE ARMS TRADE WILL END.  IT IS 
SIMPLY TOO DANGEROUS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE 
REGION, FOR OUR TROOPS IN IRAQ, AS WELL AS FOR THE SALEH 
REGIME.  WE ARE WILLING TO HELP HIM MONITOR THE FLOW OF ARMS, 
BUT WE EXPECT HIS POLITICAL WILL TO BE TOTALLY TRANSPARENT ON 
THE ISSUE.  INTERDICTION OF GRAY OR BLACK MARKET WEAPONS BY 
NAVCENT OR COALITION SHIPS, ESPECIALLY IF THE WEAPONS ARE 
TRACEABLE TO YEMENI MILITARY PURCHASES WILL GREATLY AID OUR 
DIPLOMATIC POSITION. 
 
7.  (S/NF) PRESIDENT SALEH AND HIS MINISTERS COMPLAIN THAT 
THEIR ENEMIES CONTINUE TO PORTRAY THEM AS TOOLS OF THE 
AMERICANS.  HE AND HIS TOP GENERALS SAY THEY ARE TAKING 
INTERNAL AND REGIONAL POLITICAL RISKS BY COOPERATING CLOSELY 
WITH THE U.S.  SALEH COMPLAINS THAT IN RETURN, THE U.S IS 
VERY SLOW TO RESPOND TO HIS NEEDS FOR MILITARY HARDWARE, 
SPARE PARTS, TRAINING AND AID.  EMBASSY SANA'A IS PREPARED TO 
RECOMMEND A MORE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH YEMEN, TO BE 
DISCUSSED WHEN SALEH VISITS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH LATER THIS 
SUMMER OR EARLY FALL, BUT WE WILL ADVOCATE THAT THE ROYG 
NEEDS TO MAKE SOLID AND VERIFIABLE COMMITMENTS ON COMPLETE 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE SHARING OF INTEL AND STOPPING THE ARMS 
TRADE.  NAVCENT SUPPORT FOR THIS CARROT AND STICK APPROACH 
WOULD BE HELPFUL INDEED. 
Krajeski 

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