US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA5207

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 
TAGS: PTER, MOPS, PREL, CO, FARC 
SUBJECT: PLAN PATRIOTA PHASE 2B UPDATE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) General Fracica took control of the Joint Task Force 
Omega (JTF-O), responsible for carrying out Plan Patriota's 
Phase 2B in Southeastern Colombia, in December 2004. 
Progress in the area of operations was slow in early 2005; 
changes by Fracica prompted some limited advancements but 
progress then slowed once again as the FARC adapted to 
COLMIL's strategy.  Fracica implemented a re-zoning of the 
mobile brigades in the 2B area and concentrated his forces in 
the southern zone in an attempt to pursue senior FARC 
leadership.  COLMIL has improved inter-service cooperation, 
made good use of information from deserters, and seized 
significant weapons and food caches.  The coming months will 
pose even greater challenges for the JTF-O as the FARC adapts 
to COLMIL operations. 
 
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Phase 2B Operations 
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2. (C) Plan Patriota is, in many ways, a tactical battle. 
The first three months following the appointment of General 
Fracica to the Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-O) in December 
2004 saw slow progress in the Plan Patriota Phase 2B area. 
Fracica then implemented changes that allowed limited success 
before progress slowed once again as FARC forces adapted to 
COLMIL strategy.  Fracica ordered a re-zoning of the brigades 
in the 2B area of operations in March 2005 to give his 
commanders more control of their own battlespace and the 
opportunity for more flexibility.  Operation Cazador del 
Caguan in April and May 2005 moved the force structure in the 
2B area of operations from the east of the Caguan River to 
the west by redeploying the First and Second Mobile Brigades 
to the area around Remolinas del Caguan.  The Rapid 
Deployment Force (FUDRA) headquarters was moved from La 
Macarena to Tres Esquinas and took control of the First, 
Second, Sixth, and 22nd Mobile Brigades.  Fracica's focus on 
the southern part of the area of operations was driven, in 
part, by a belief that a concentration of FARC senior 
leadership was located there.  Operation Cazador del Caguan 
was most successful in its first two weeks, but progress 
slowed in the following period.  In the end, the operation 
resulted in 29 enemy combatants killed in action, 40 wounded, 
and the seizure of 98 tons of food.  The mid-May Operation 
Romeo that took place between Tres Esquinas and Larandia 
officially resulted in 16 enemy combatants killed in action, 
although unofficial reports are as high as 80. 
 
3. (C) Under pressure from President Uribe and the High 
Command to produce greater results,  Fracica in mid-May 
ordered his troops against known FARC structures or mobility 
corridors.  His goal was to have his units actively seeking 
combat.  In April 2005 a similar strategy targeting FARC 
logistical infrastructure in the Sunsilla River area produced 
notable success, helping to make April the month with the 
greatest operational results in 2005 (29 FARC killed in 
action, 40 FARC captured).  The FUDRA is now directing all of 
its units--Mobile Brigades 1, 2, 6, and 22--to undertake the 
new objectives; the commanders in areas one and three are 
also planning for new operations to target known FARC 
structures. 
 
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Positive Developments 
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4. (C) Inter-service cooperation at tactical and strategic 
levels has improved.  The Army's 4th and 6th Divisions, 
located north and south of the JTF-O, respectively, have 
provided increased support to JTF-O forces in 2005 by moving 
to cut off mobility corridors in support of 2B operations. 
The Second Colombian Air Combat Command (CACOM 2) at Apiay 
plans to build a joint intelligence center run by the Air 
Force and staffed by all services. The center will service 
CACOM 2, the Army's Fourth Division, and Plan Patriota Phase 
2B operations.  On a strategic scale, the High Command of the 
Armed Forces reinforced its commitment to inter-service 
coordination in May 2005 with the dismissal of four top 
generals who opposed the creation of coordinated commands. 
 
5. (C) The Seventh and Tenth Mobile Brigades captured at 
least twenty combatants from the FARC's First Front using 
intelligence gathered from guerrilla deserters.  The Armed 
Forces succeeded in finding significant supply caches; in 
mid-January, the Ninth and Tenth Mobile Brigades found the 
largest food and weapons cache so far, containing machine 
guns, uniforms, and food. 
 
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Persistent Challenges and Constraints 
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6. (C) The terrain in the 2B area of operations is difficult 
and impedes intelligence collection, tactical surprise, and 
support for the 15,500 troops in the area.  Leishmanaisis 
continues to have a major impact as hundreds of soldiers, and 
even critical mine-sniffing dogs, contract the disease. 
COLMIL forces are getting little intelligence from the 2B 
area, which is making it difficult to know where the enemy 
is.  FARC three-man groups track and report on COLMIL 
movements--plus the large size of JTF-O force units--making 
it difficult to achieve tactical surprise.  As a consequence, 
COLMIL is forced to expend a great deal of effort on denial 
and deception activities.  Finally, air support to operations 
in the area continues to be a problem. By reallocating 
priorities to the JTF-O area, Minister of Defense Uribe and 
the military high command increased contract air hours for 
rotary wing support from 85 to 100 hours per month.  Fracica 
wants to further increase contract air hours in the JTF-O 
area of operations to 120 hours per month, but other programs 
will be impacted if this occurs.  COLMIL receives an 
additional 75 hours per month in contracted fixed wing 
support; the Colombian Airforce also provides another 80 
hours per month of rotary wing support and 140 hours per 
month of fixed wing support.  Even this, however, is 
insufficient to support a 15,500 troop operation. 
 
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An Uphill Battle 
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7. (C) Because the FARC have adapted to COLMIL offensive 
operations, JTF-O forces will have to make changes in order 
to go beyond what former JTF-O Commander General Castellanos 
was able to achieve.  It has become a war of attrition in 
which the most accessible camps and supplies caches already 
have been neutralized.  Moreover, the coming rainy season 
lasts until November. 
 
8. (C) Fracica expects this phase of Plan Patriota to 
conclude by the end of 2005, when the JTF-O will turn the 
mission over to the Fourth and Sixth Army Divisions. 
 
WOOD