US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3053

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PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

Identifier: 05ANKARA3053
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA3053 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-05-31 15:43:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM PREL ETTC MNUC TSPA IR TU MTCRE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T ANKARA 003053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, EUR/SE, EUR/PRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, MNUC, TSPA, IR, TU, MTCRE 
SUBJECT: PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY 
 
REF: A. STATE 99755 
 
     B. ANKARA 2836 
     C. ANKARA 2816 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (S) MFA Acting Undersecretary Nabi Sensoy raised the 
interdiction of missile-related items destined for Iran with 
the Ambassador and PolMilCouns on the margins of a lunch in 
honor of Senator Chuck Hagel May 31.  Sensoy informed the 
Ambassador that the GOT was running out of time to hold this 
shipment and Turkey wanted China to take the shipment back 
soon.  He thought Turkey could hold onto the shipment for 
about another week.  He had already conveyed the same message 
to the UK Ambassador.  PolMilCouns informed Sensoy that 
Washington thought Turkey might be able to use MTCR catch-all 
export controls and that he would be talking to MFA officials 
about it later in the day. 
 
2. (S) PolMilCouns met with MFA Disarmament Department Head 
Osman Yavuzalp that afternoon and provided ref A talking 
points.  Yavuzalp said Sensoy had instructed him following 
the lunch to reiterate that the GOT was holding the shipment 
now, but that it could not indefinitely.  He hoped that the 
Chinese would agree to take back the shipment soon.  As a 
member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Beijing had 
obligations that it should meet.  He asked whether the USG 
had any indication of Chinese authorities' thinking. 
PolMilCouns responded that we were letting the British take 
the lead with the Chinese and therefore had no information to 
provide on Beijing's attitude.  Nonetheless, missile 
technology proliferation has been a difficult subject with 
the Chinese over the years, and Turkey should consider ways 
to deal with the shipment, such as using catch all controls, 
if the answer from China was no. 
 
3. (S) Yavuzalp undertook to inform Sensoy about the 
specifics of our proposed course of action and to consult 
with legal and other authorities about the technical 
feasibility of that approach.  However, he continued, MFA 
still saw the Chinese option (taking back the shipment) as 
the best alternative.  The original British demarche had 
mentioned a previous case of this occurring, and this gave 
Ankara hope the same would occur with this shipment. 
PolMilCouns observed that one precedent did not constitute a 
pattern, and urged Yavuzalp to consider seriously an approach 
that did not rely on China.  PolMilCouns expressed the hope 
that this matter could be favorably resolved prior to the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister's meetings in Washington 
June 8.  Yavuzalp reiterated that he would consult with the 
appropriate authorities on the catch all controls approach. 
EDELMAN 

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