US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV3244

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003244 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KPAL, KWBG, OREP, EG, SY, IS, GAZA DISENGAGEMENT 
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSSES DISENGAGEMENT WITH 
ISRAELI OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Norm Olsen; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
1. (C) Summary: Staffdel Talwar discussed the disengagement 
process with high-ranking Israeli military and foreign 
affairs officials, minister without portfolio Matan Vilnai, 
senior members of Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres' staff, 
and an opposition leader during a visit to Tel Aviv and 
Jerusalem on May 8-12.  An NSC representative called 
disengagement a "test case" of the PA's ability to handle 
security, economic, and political responsibilities.  The 
Israelis outlined coordination efforts with the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and complained of the lack of a unified 
Palestinian position.  Vilnai said that the Israeli cabinet 
agrees on the need to strengthen Abbas, but opposition 
figures countered that they do not believe this is PM 
Sharon's true objective.  MOD representatives stressed the 
need to balance security constraints with the desire to 
assist Abbas and complained that the PA is not doing enough 
to prevent terrorism. 
 
2. (C) Summary continued: Most discussion partners said they 
believe that the PA will postpone the upcoming legislative 
elections and all expressed concern that Hamas will win the 
vote.  Vilnai acknowledged that Israeli officials meet with 
Hamas representatives.  None of the Israeli politicians, 
officials, or staffers had a clear answer for staffdel on 
what will follow disengagement.  Peres' staff requested 
further U.S. leadership in the peace process, while an 
opposition leader urged the USG to update the roadmap, 
consider a third-party monitoring system, and provide the PA 
with a letter on U.S. views on a Palestinian state, security 
issues, and the question of a capital.  MFA and MOD officials 
expressed concern about Egypt's unwillingness to prevent 
weapons smuggling and cautioned that attacks by Hizballah 
from Syria or Lebanon could lead to Israeli retaliation.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Status of Disengagement and Coordination with the PA 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (C) Minister without portfolio Matan Vilnai greeted the 
staffdel with the words "disengagement is now the main issue 
in our lives."  He labeled the Cabinet's decisions on the 
security barrier and disengagement "historic," claiming they 
represent an acknowledgment by the right wing that there will 
be a two-state solution.  Eran Etzion, the deputy national 
security adviser for foreign affairs, stressed that the GOI 
sees disengagement as a "test case" of the PA's ability to 
handle security, economic, and political responsibilities. 
Opposition politician Yossi Beilin, on the other hand, called 
disengagement a "terrible misstep," claiming that it will 
only give Gaza to Hamas at a time when Israel finally has a 
real partner in PA President Mahmud Abbas.  Nevertheless, he 
said, U.S. support for disengagement leaves him "no choice 
but to support Sharon." 
 
4. (C) According to Einat Wilf, Vice PM Shimon Peres' foreign 
policy adviser, Peres sees his role as "making disengagement 
better" by coordinating the process with the PA and 
demonstrating that Palestinians will benefit economically. 
She said the process is complicated by splits within the PA, 
with PM Ahmad Quraya' opposing the process and Civil Affairs 
Minister Muhammad Dahlan leading a more pragmatic group.  In 
a separate meeting, MFA Director General Ron Proser also 
complained that Quraya' is opposing Abbas and Dahlan on 
disengagement.  Wilf described the coordination process as 
currently "in a bit of a lull," claiming that the PA appears 
to be torn between its desire to blame Israel for 
disagreements and its hope of demonstrating the PA's ability 
for self government.  Nevertheless, she stressed the positive 
aspects of the talks, saying that they are "creating 
structures" for closer cooperation. 
 
5. (C) Wilf noted that three coordination groups began 
meeting in the beginning of May to discuss technical issues: 
a security dialogue headed by DefMin Mofaz and Interior 
Minister Yusif, a dialogue on the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement 
led by PM adviser Dov Weissglas and senior negotiator Sa'eb 
Erakat, and an economic/civil dialogue led by Peres and 
Dahlan.  She said that the GOI will not discuss safe passage 
between Gaza and the West Bank or the reopening of Gaza's 
airport, items it considers to be final status issues.  Wilf 
described Israel's goal in the talks as the transfer of 
authority issue-by-issue to the Palestinians. 
 
6. (C) MOD adviser Baruch Spiegel called the GOI's 
willingness to coordinate disengagement and crossing points 
with the PA a "very important change."  Addressing the issue 
of property left behind in Gaza, NSC staffer Etzion said that 
the GOI will not destroy production facilities in Erez, but 
is still examining how to handle greenhouses and private 
property.  He noted that the NSC had recommended leaving the 
property in place, but the cabinet's amended disengagement 
decision states that it will be destroyed.  He added that 
many ministers are "not inclined" to reopen the disengagement 
debate. 
 
7. (C) Spiegel complained that talks with the PA have been 
"more negotiation than coordination."  Similarly, Etzion 
claimed, the PA had delayed technical meetings on ports, the 
economy, and customs.  Even now, he said, the Palestinians 
are placing conditions on further cooperation that they know 
Israel cannot accept.  He speculated that the Palestinians 
are stalling in order to create a crisis prior to Abbas' 
upcoming visit to Washington. 
 
----------------------------------- 
GOI Attempting to Strengthen Abbas? 
----------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Wilf said that Vice PM Peres is concerned that the GOI 
and the international community are not doing enough to 
strengthen Abbas in the run-up to disengagement.  According 
to Vilnai, the Israeli cabinet agrees on the need to 
strengthen Abbas but not on how to do so.  Vilnai expressed 
frustration with Sharon's refusal to release additional 
Palestinian prisoners.  Wilf noted that Sharon finds it 
difficult to take the necessary steps without further 
alienating his party base.  Beilin disagreed that the GOI is 
trying to strengthen Abbas, commenting, "at the end of the 
day, the last thing Sharon wants is a Palestinian partner." 
Labor Party supporters Ron Pundak and David Levy maintained 
that Sharon wants to maintain Abbas in a weakened state, but 
"would prefer to see him fail than to succeed." 
 
9. (C) MOD adviser Baruch Spiegel outlined steps that the GOI 
is taking to improve the life of Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza.  Spiegel said his office is focused on how to 
give the Palestinians a chance to succeed after disengagement 
and the completion of the security barrier.  In Spiegel's 
estimation, "the crossing regime is the major key."  He said 
terminal modernization, privatization and redeployment of 
many IDF personnel behind the security barrier will reduce 
friction between the IDF and the Palestinians in the West 
Bank by up to 80 percent.  In response to staffdel questions, 
Spiegel said that there are currently 14 manned Israeli 
checkpoints and 124 unmanned roadblocks in the West Bank, not 
including crossing points in the security barrier.  He 
compared these numbers to mid-2004, when the GOI maintained 
28 manned checkpoints and 250 roadblocks in the same area. 
Spiegel acknowledged that the Palestinians claim a much 
larger number of checkpoints and said he would met with OCHA 
on May 10 to go through the list barrier-by-barrier. 
 
10. (C) Spiegel admitted that there is little chance for 
improvement in the Palestinian economy without freedom of 
movement, adding that movement between the West Bank and Gaza 
is currently "almost zero."  He nevertheless insisted that 
only the security barrier gives disengagement a chance to 
succeed.  He discussed steps to increase capacity and speed 
passage of goods and people at the crossing points.  He 
called the new Erez terminal, which should be completed by 
the end of 2005, a model for nine other terminals in the West 
Bank.  He said that the new terminal will be capable of 
increasing the numbers of crossings from 5,000 today to up to 
20,000.  Likewise, he hopes that truck crossings at the Karni 
terminal will increase from 340 to 800 a day. 
 
11. (C) Spiegel noted that after the disengagement process, a 
contiguous area twice the size of Gaza will be under PA 
control around Jenin in the northern West Bank.  He claimed 
that the GOI has "stopped all physical activity" on 
construction in the E-1 area until planning work is completed 
and a final decision is made on how to proceed.  He noted 
that the GOI has begun planning a bypass road around the area 
to connect Bethlehem with Ramallah and the expansion of the 
existing Jericho-Jerusalem road. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Israeli Complaints of PA Inactivity on Security 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
12. (C) In IDF intelligence research chief Yossi 
Kupperwasser's view, the Palestinians are in a "problematic 
situation" with the PA and Hamas running parallel Palestinian 
authorities in the West Bank and Gaza.  He said that "the PA 
does not show any real readiness to cope with the problem," 
claiming that the PA has the capability -- but not the 
political will -- to act.  He called restructuring the PA 
security forces "a real move forward," but said that the PA 
is not investigating, arresting, disarming, trying, or 
punishing terrorist attacks or smuggling incidents. 
Kupperwasser said that Abbas challenges the political wisdom 
of terrorism, but continues to call Palestinian terrorists 
heroes. 
 
13. (C) NSC staffer Etzion claimed that "none of our security 
agencies say that Abu Mazen is fulfilling his 
responsibilities under Sharm."  He acknowledged that there 
have been minor improvements in Palestinian conduct under 
Abbas, but added that "even after lowering your expectations, 
the PA is not performing."  Beilin said that Sharon told him 
that the PA security forces are sharing information with the 
GOI about upcoming attacks, but are not taking action to 
prevent them.  Labor Party supporters Pundak and Levy 
suggested that Abbas could make visible progress by taking a 
harder line against extremists in Fatah, thereby sidestepping 
for the moment the problem of confronting Hamas.  Vilnai 
stressed that the PA must fight terror, or "disengagement 
will stop the day after Gaza." 
 
-------------------------- 
The PA Elections and Hamas 
-------------------------- 
 
14. (C) Etzion predicted that the PA will postpone its 
legislative elections "by a few months."  Pundak and Levy 
agreed.  Peres' aide Avi Gil noted that a delay might not 
help the PA or GOI.  In Wilf's analysis, Abbas is distracted 
by the upcoming elections and "panicked" about a possible 
Hamas victory.  Wilf expressed concern that a Hamas victory 
would be used as an excuse by other Arab states to postpone 
democratic reforms in their own countries. 
 
15. (C) Beilin complained that GOI pressure on the PA is 
forcing it to compromise with Hamas, thereby strengthening 
the extremists.  Drawing parallels to Hizballah in Lebanon, 
Vilnai said that dealing with Hamas is a "double edged sword" 
that has the potential to both moderate the group's behavior 
and legitimize the party.  He acknowledged that Israeli 
officials meet with Hamas representatives, saying he had done 
so himself in the past.  Wilf stressed the importance of 
formulating a joint U.S. and European policy on Hamas prior 
to the PA elections, a policy she said should insist that 
Hamas completely renounce violence if it wants a future 
political role. 
 
----------------------------- 
No Post-Disengagement Policy? 
----------------------------- 
 
16. (C) None of the Israeli politicians, officials, or 
staffers had a clear answer for staffdel on what will follow 
disengagement.  Spiegel said that post-disengagement 
political decisions are "still open."  Pundak and Levy agreed 
that there is "no real plan" on what to do next.  Beilin 
expressed concern that "no one is trying to square the 
circle."  He suggested that another interim agreement, 
possibly one linked to a third further redeployment 
envisioned by the Oslo Interim Agreement, would be a logical 
next step.  Pundak and Levy complained that the peace camp in 
Israel is currently adrift. 
 
17. (C) Wilf acknowledged that Peres and the Labor Party 
prefer a quicker and broader process, but "no one wants to 
push Sharon until after disengagement is complete."  Wilf 
listed three factors that she said inhibit consideration of a 
post-disengagement plan: Abbas's concerns about a Hamas 
victory in PA legislative elections; paralysis on the Israeli 
side as Sharon tries to recover his ground in Likud and the 
opposition forgoes any step that might postpone 
disengagement; and the U.S. electoral calendar, which will 
soon shift President Bush's focus squarely to domestic 
issues.  Beilin cautioned that a lack of progress after 
disengagement could lead to an "explosion" or third Intifada. 
 Separately, Wilf, Gil, Pundak, and Levy all agreed that such 
a scenario is possible. 
 
18. (C) Several politicians and staffers predicted early 
Israeli elections.  Vilnai said that a vote could be called a 
few months after disengagement or -- at the latest -- prior 
to the budget debate in May 2006.  He said his personal plan 
for peace is to "define borders for Israel and get inside 
them," calling disengagement merely the first step.  Beilin 
noted that he will withdraw his party's support for PM Sharon 
after disengagement and seek a permanent settlement with the 
Palestinians.  He claimed PM Sharon has dismissed the idea, 
telling him "You believe in a permanent agreement.  I do 
not." 
 
------------------------------ 
Israeli Views of the U.S. Role 
------------------------------ 
 
19. (C) When asked about any U.S. role in disengagement, 
Vilnai replied that the USG should ensure that the 
Palestinians adhere to the spirit of the roadmap.  He also 
advocated support for PM Sharon, claiming the prime 
minister's position is currently "very tenuous."  In 
contrast, Beilin urged Washington to focus on 
post-disengagement and increase pressure on Sharon for the 
dismantlement of illegal settlements.  Beilin claimed that 
the USG could move the peace process forward by updating the 
roadmap and establishing a public monitoring system.  In his 
opinion, only a third-party monitor can overcome the deadlock 
that occurs whenever Palestinians and Israelis judge each 
other's compliance.  Beilin also called any settlement 
construction in the E-1 area "the end of a permanent 
solution" and urged the USG to make this point clear to the 
GOI. 
 
20. (C) Wilf requested further U.S. leadership in the peace 
process, saying the current level of USG activity is "not 
enough."  She suggested either Abbas's visit to Washington or 
the day after disengagement as opportunities for the USG to 
invigorate the roadmap process.  Beilin suggested that the 
President give Abbas a letter addressing U.S. views on a 
Palestinian state, security issues, and the question of a 
capital. 
 
21. (C) All of the Israeli politicians, staffers, and 
officials welcomed the Wolfensohn and Ward missions.  Etzion 
suggested that Wolfensohn concentrate on improving the 
crossing points for Palestinians and help "create the 
conditions for Palestinians and Israelis to engage."  He also 
stressed the importance of obtaining financial assistance for 
the Palestinians from the international community. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Other Israeli Concerns: Egypt, Syria, and Hizballah 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
22. (C) MFA Director General Ron Proser told the staffdel 
that Egypt is "making good, constructive, noises, but nothing 
is getting done on smuggling" of weapons.  He noted that the 
smuggling issue will determine how the GOI proceeds in its 
planned evacuation of the Philadelphi strip.  Proser urged 
the USG to apply more pressure on Cairo, claiming that the 
Egyptians lack the will to police the Palestinians.  Etzion 
at the NSC echoed this appeal. 
 
23. (C) Kupperwasser claimed that the Iranians are flying one 
cargo plane a day to Damascus with money and supplies for 
Hizballah and Palestinian extremists in Lebanon. 
Kupperwasser noted the importance of Israel's northern border 
for Israeli-Palestinian relations, claiming that Hizballah is 
increasing its efforts to kidnap Israeli soldiers and may 
launch limited attacks to complicate the disengagement 
process.  He cautioned that Israel would consider retaliation 
against Lebanese or Syrian targets for attacks launched from 
their territory.  He raised the possibility that Hizballah 
may still decide to cooperate with the Lebanese armed forces. 
 
24. (U) This cable was cleared by staffdel. 
 
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