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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA3035 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA3035 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-05-27 15:13:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | OVIP PREL PINR TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003035 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2020 TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PINR, TU SUBJECT: AMERICAN-TURKISH COUNCIL BRINGS DEFENSE/SECURITY HEAVYWEIGHTS TO WASHINGTON REF: ANKARA 2911 Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: MOD Gonul, DCHOD Basbug and NSC SecGen Alpogan will all be in Washington June 5-7 for the American Turkish Council's annual conference. (It is possible that Alpogan may postpone his visit due to the heavy traffic of Turkish visitors that week.) While we understand many officials in Washington are appropriately focusing on the visits of PM Erdogan and FM Gul in this same time period (septel), the three security/defense officials will need to hear messages that are consistent with one another and with those Erdogan and Gul will receive on the state of the relationship and the necessary Turkish steps to put it back on an even keel. With Gonul, Basbug and Alpogan, expressions of appreciation for their public words and Turkey's support for us in Iraq and Afghanistan would also be appropriate. End Summary. -------------- The Principals -------------- 2. (C) The American-Turkish Council (ATC) annual conference, June 5-7 this year, will bring several senior GOT defense and security officials to Washington at the same time Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul are there. They are: -- Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul: Gonul is one of the few consistent supporters of a strong U.S.-Turkish relationship within the Turkish cabinet. He has spoken out publicly in support of our bilateral relationship, recently staging a press conference with the Ambassador to mark the conclusion of an agreement with the USG on upgrading Turkey's F-16 fleet to underscore an example of positive bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, Gonul is not a heavyweight in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) or on Turkey's defense policy. The Ministry of National Defense that he heads is an agency that handles the GOT's defense budget, personnel matters and major procurements. Even on procurements, his influence is limited as the military develops requirements and the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM) negotiates contracts. While SSM reports to Gonul, its current head, Undersecretary Murad Bayar (who is also attending the ATC), is close to Gul, who brought him back from the U.S. to head SSM. Without a policy role on defense matters, significant decisions are worked out between TGS and government agencies, or between CHOD General Hilmi Ozkok and PM Erdogan directly. Yet, as MOD and as one of the few AKP members the military can work with, Gonul can act as a bridge between the two. We understand that the Turkish Embassy is seeking an appropriate appointment in the Pentagon for him. If this does not work out, we would urge senior USG officials attending the ATC, particularly those from DOD, to seek him out for a brief exchange. -- NSC Secretary General Yigit Alpogan: Alpogan is the first civilian secretary general of the National Security Council in that institution's history. A former ambassador to Greece and deputy undersecretary of foreign affairs -- and a staunch secularist -- Alpogan is an accomplished diplomat who is trying to carve out a role for himself and his institution after EU-mandated reforms downgraded the military's role and stripped the NSC of its previous authority. (NOTE: We understand some in the Turkish military now view the NSC merely as a disaster coordination center. END NOTE.) He has brought in a number of MFA officials and new civilian analysts in an effort to build up an independent policy analysis capability. Unlike his somewhat reclusive 4-star predecessors, Alpogan is out on the diplomatic circuit in Ankara, and his trips this month to Israel and next month to Washington are unprecedented for a NSC secgen. He has also spoken publicly in support of the US-Turkey relationship. As he has fewer policy axes to grind than other bureaucratic players in Ankara, we believe the USG should encourage and support Alpogan's institution-building efforts. At the same time we need to remain realistic about how far he will be able to take the NSC as an institution given the organization's new designation as a policy advisory body. -- Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) Ilker Basbug: Basbug has been at the forefront of TGS's efforts to move beyond the 2003 disappointments on March 1 (Parliament's failure to grant passage of our troops) and July 4 (our arrest of Turkish Special Forces personnel in Suleymania). His January 26, 2005 press conference in which he succinctly emphasized the breadth and importance of the Turkish-American relationship set the standard for subsequent statements by the military, the bureaucracy and the government which stemmed the tide of rising anti-Americanism here. Basbug has a realpolitik view of the world, emphasizing shared interests more than shared values as the basis for international cooperation. He is proud of the good relations he has cultivated with his principal American counterparts, VCJCS Gen Pace and EUCOM DCDR Gen Wald. He is expected to leave Ankara this August to become commander of the 1st Army in Istanbul, an essential step towards becoming head of the TGS -- a position most observers believe he will receive in 2008. ----------------------------------- Common Themes: Bilateral Relations, Appreciation for Cooperation ----------------------------------- 3. (C) Since the beginning of the year, each of these three has spoken out in support of our bilateral relationship with greater conviction and sincerity than we have seen from Erdogan and Gul. While this may change the way we address the three, it will be important that they leave Washington with the same understanding of the state of the relationship that the two AKP leaders receive. Thus, USG interlocutors should express appreciation for the positive statements these three have made and their impact on stemming the slide of public support in Turkey for bilateral cooperation. But our message must also underscore that consistent and insistent GOT moves to rebuild and maintain public support for the relationship are essential if we are to have the productive partnership both governments desire. This will require continuous efforts on the part of both capitals. 4. (C) Our message on the relationship will carry more weight if we acknowledge the valuable cooperation we currently receive from Turkey, without making our interlocutors think that Turkey is indispensable. Words of thanks would be appropriate for the use of Incirlik for tanker aircraft and the logistics hub that should begin operations June 1, for orchestrating a positive visit by Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Ja'afari, for organizing a PSI exercise in May 2006, and for taking on the command of ISAF for a second time. -------------------------------------- Specific Subjects: Iraq, EU, Military Modernization, BMENAI -------------------------------------- 5. (C) Some issues to address with these interlocutors might include: -- Iraq: Iraq dominates our bilateral agenda. Our operations there remain highly unpopular with the Turkish public and our will to see the process we started to its conclusion is doubted by many within the bureaucracy and military. While Basbug has access to information on developments from liaison officers with CENTCOM and MNFI, Alpogan will likely be decidedly less well informed. Nonetheless, both will be intently interested in the latest developments in Iraq and our strategy to effect a stable, united, prosperous Iraq. Kirkuk and ongoing operations in Talafar and Mosul will be of particular interest. The continued presence of the PKK/Kongra Gel in northern Iraq and persistent reports of increased PKK attacks in Turkey will also be on their minds. It will be important especially in Basbug's meeting with VCJCS Gen Pace that the two address this issue (see septel/notal). Turkey continues to reach out to various political groups in Iraq, offering training to political parties; encourages trade and other business ties despite the security risks; and is increasing its engagement with Iraqi authorities in Baghdad as demonstrated by Ja'afari's May 19-21 visit. The ITG has indicated that it will send ISF personnel to a training course in Turkey, which may be the ice breaker required for Ankara to send trainers to Iraq as part of the NATO Training Mission. We recommend that Washington officials express appreciation for Turkey's support of the ITG and the development of democracy in Iraq. (Note: Ankara's attitude toward our Iraq policy showed significant improvement after the results of the January 30 elections were announced.) At the same time, officials should encourage faster disbursement of the $50 million in development assistance Turkey has pledged and forgiveness of Iraq's outstanding $1.6 billion debt to Turkey along the lines of the Paris agreement. -- EU: The sudden appointment of State Minister Ali Babacan as EU negotiator after months of policy drift was likely motivated by fear about anti-Turkish drift in France and the Netherlands and political developments in Germany and their likely impact on Turkey's EU accession process. In fact, developments in Europe and the slippage in the GOT's reform efforts and standards since December 17 cast new questions about the GOT's intentions and Turkey's chances for membership. A significant number of military leaders have been skeptical about the EU's willingness to accept Turkey and worried about damage to the secular nature of republic by EU-mandated reforms. It will be important, therefore, to encourage Basbug and even Alpogan and Gonul to stay with the process. We should also offer the US's continued assistance and support with the EU, but we should be clear that Turkey must take the lead; we should support Turkey's initiatives and not act as Turkey's proxy. -- Military Modernization/Transformation: More with Gonul and Basbug than Alpogan, USG officials should emphasize the need that we move forward with military modernization and transformation in a way that ensures we have the interoperability necessary to operate effectively together. The "Peace Eagle" AEW&C aircraft procurement from Boeing and the "Peace Onyx" government-to-government brokered F-16 upgrade programs are good examples to follow. However, the recent RFP for attack helicopters, containing provisions that could effectively exclude American competitors, raised questions about whether the Turkish procurement agency, which falls under Gonul's authority, remains interested in working with us. Although the RFP was recently revised after Boeing laid out a long list of concerns, company representatives are skeptical that the changes were sufficient to permit the company to bid. Beyond the terms and conditions of this specific RFP, Turkey has developed a reputation among American defense companies as one of the most difficult customers in the world, with procurement officials constantly looking to squeeze more out of companies, even after contracts are signed, and with decisions influenced by politics and offsets more than capabilities and value. As a result, three companies have closed their local offices and others may follow suit. -- BMENAI: With Alpogan, a discussion of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative along the lines we suggest for PM Erdogan and FM Gul (septel) would be useful. It would be useful to note to Alpogan that the most cogent and positive Turkish analysis of BMENAI and the benefits of Turkish participation came not from the government but from CHOD Ozkok's April 20 nationally-televised address (reftel). EDELMAN
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