US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3973

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 003973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL, KDEM, PHUM, IN, CH, UNSC 
SUBJECT: AMB TAHIR-KHELI HEARS INDIAN UNSC PITCH 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: In meetings with senior MEA officials on May 
26, Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, the Secretary's UN Reform 
Adviser, heard a strong Indian claim for a permanent UNSC 
seat, and identified peacekeeping, management and 
accountability reform, counterterrorism, nonproliferation and 
democracy promotion as common areas of interest for the US 
and India.  GOI officials observed that both India and the US 
believe that the UN was not as effective as it could be, and 
welcomed input on US reform priorities, noting that an Indian 
permanent seat on the UNSC was the GOI priority.  Foreign 
Secretary Shyam Saran emphasized India's extraordinary 
 
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investment in its UNSC campaign and the need for the US to 
differentiate its position from China which is now viewed as 
opposing India's effort.  He suggested that the outlines of 
UN reform could be finished by September, even if 
implementation will take longer.  The GOI requested US 
support for its UNSC candidacy, arguing that this would be 
consistent with USG statements welcoming a larger Indian role 
in the world, and bemoaned the apparent Chinese campaign to 
obstruct UNSC expansion.  End Summary. 
 
UNSC Proposals 
-------------- 
 
2.  (C) MEA Additional Secretary (UN and International 
Security) Meera Shankar, leading an MEA delegation, told 
Ambassador Tahir-Kheli, PolCouns and Poloffs that the 
momentum for reform arising from the High-Level Panel (HLP) 
report and the UNSYG's report created a "unique opportunity" 
to shape a UN that would be "revitalized, more responsive, 
and more representative."  In a separate conversation, FS 
Saran emphasized that India has "invested huge political 
capital to get this far" in its campaign for a Security 
Council seat, adding that the GOI has to "try to get this 
through before anything else" and that "if it doesn't 
materialize then all is lost."  Summarizing his view of US 
policy, Saran suggested the US should recognize that the UNSC 
structure does not reflect the current international 
situation, and that other countries, like India, need to be 
"accommodated." 
 
3.  (C) The FS suggested that US and Indian reform efforts 
converge in two important areas, which should form a basis 
for cooperation.  First, both countries are looking at UNSC 
enlargement in the overall context of UN reform.  Secondly, 
as part of Security Council reform, the US must also believe 
that expansion is necessary, although it is "unclear" how 
Washington wants to expand. 
 
4.  (C) Shankar stated that the G-4 framework resolution for 
UNSC expansion was "sensitive to P-5 concerns," and was still 
under review as the G-4 sought to win co-sponsors to its 
approach.  Although India still prefers a "clean slate" of 
identified candidates for permanent seats in the draft 
resolution, the Africa's inability to settle on two 
candidates required the current approach proposing new seats 
for regions, but not countries.  She added, however, that 
election by secret ballot for UNSC membership would more 
transparently endorse the selection of the self-proclaimed 
candidates, and meet the "norms of democracy." 
 
5.  (C) Decrying what she called a "lack of legitimacy and 
ineffectiveness" at the UN, Shankar stated that UNSC 
expansion is "intrinsic" to comprehensive UN reform. 
Asserting that many member states believe UN reform without 
UNSC expansion will not "revive their faith" in the 
legitimacy of the UN system, she noted that the proposal to 
add both permanent and non-permanent members was one that 
would attract a maximum of support in the UNGA.  Extension of 
veto power to new permanent members is a "principled 
position," Shankar said, stressing that India's stance has 
been determined at the highest levels of government and 
Parliament.  However, she noted, the G-4 had toned down its 
draft language from "shall" have the veto to "should" as a 
concession to P-5 concerns. 
 
Problems from China 
------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Saran and Shankar both emphasized that China's 
"activism" against any UNSC expansion was a concern to the 
G-4.  In reaction to the GOI's success in joining the G-4 and 
securing UNGA member state assurances of support, China had 
"pulled out all the stops" to prevent an Indian seat, Saran 
said.  He admitted that India had been at the bottom of the 
aspirants list until New Delhi joined the G-4, which made it 
a credible candidate.  The G-4 had raised India's profile in 
a way that was not possible alone.  Saran noted that as 
recently as early May, China never thought India's candidacy 
would progress this far, on the grounds that the G4 could not 
agree on a Framework Resolution or that India would not 
gather enough support. 
 
7.  (C) Since these developments, China has "gone all out" on 
the offensive against the GOI, even incorrectly suggesting 
that their views coincided with the rest of the P5, Saran 
observed.  Expressing his understanding that the US position 
was not in line with the Chinese and not out of line with 
India, Saran suggested it would be "worthwhile and helpful 
for the US to reiterate these differences." The Foreign 
Secretary called the threat of the Coffee Club "incidental 
 
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compared to the Chinese." 
 
8.  (C) Pointing out that China obtained its UNSC seat under 
the 2/3 support requirement, Shankar argued that any new 
permanent members should need only an equivalent level of 
UNGA support.  She argued that the US should support addition 
of both permanent and non-permanent seats, and reject the 
Chinese proposal that new candidates needed 90% backing in 
the UNGA.  She added that "it is not becoming to a country 
like the US to be seen in the same camp as China" in blocking 
expansion. 
 
9.  (C) Ambassador Tahir-Kheli stressed to the Foreign 
Secretary that there were many differences between the US and 
 
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Chinese views on reform and we should not be lumped together. 
 Saran acknowledged this and complained that China has been 
"playing games" with its support for India.  By making reform 
conditional on consensus, their earlier statement of support 
for India is made hollow.  He added that Chinese support for 
Plan B (addition of non-permanent seats only) "negates the 
idea of greater representation in the Security Council." 
 
10.  (C) Saran warned that the US and China might appear to 
have similar approaches if the US does not clearly articulate 
its distinct position.  If the US signals that there might be 
difficulties in the Framework Resolution but is proactive 
about reform and not opposed to expansion with a two-thirds 
majority, this would separate the US from the Chinese.  Any 
Indian perception that the US and China were working together 
would then disappear.  In Saran's view, such a statement 
would support India's aspirations without compromising the US 
position, and it would distinguish the US from those "trying 
to wreck the G-4."  Although the US may not accept the G4 in 
its current form, Saran repeated several times the hope that 
the US would publicly support UNSC expansion in principle. 
 
How Far Does Support for Japan Go? 
---------------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Ambassador Tahir-Kheli pointed out to Saran that the 
most obvious difference between the Chinese and US positions 
is that the US openly supports a Japanese seat, while the 
Chinese are using their protest against the Japanese as a 
basis for stifling all reform.  Saran acknowledged this 
difference but wondered how far the US would be willing to go 
for Japan.  He asked hypothetically whether the US would 
"still support Japan or give it up" to prevent unwanted 
changes if the US has to make other compromises on UNSC 
composition. 
 
New Responsibilities 
-------------------- 
 
12.  (C) According to Shankar, the GOI recognizes that any 
new permanent members of the UNSC would need to carry a 
larger share of the financial burden, but did not specify 
India's view on what level of the UN assessment would be 
appropriate.  She pointed out that India fulfills some of its 
responsibility to play a leading role by contributing large 
numbers of troops to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), and 
said India could be an even more substantial contributor to 
PKO if it had a seat on the UNSC. 
 
Convergent Interests? 
--------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Claiming that an Indian permanent seat would not be 
contrary to US interests, Shankar listed several areas of 
convergence between USG and GOI interests in the UN.  These 
include: 
 
-- Democracy promotion; 
 
-- Counterterrorism; 
 
-- Nonproliferation of WMD and their means of delivery; 
 
-- Peacekeeping and peace support operations, including 
support for a new peacebuilding commission. 
 
14.  (C) Responding to USG priorities for UN reform, Shankar 
stated that India supports management reform of the UN, 
noting that the GOI has also called for increased 
accountability, transparency and efficiency in UN operations. 
 Agreeing with the need for greater flexibility in personnel 
and resource management for the Secretariat, she suggested 
that member states first ensure increased accountability and 
transparency before approving more flexibility.  She agreed 
on the need to review mandates after five years, observing 
that rule 5.6 already requires the SYG to do so, but that it 
has not been followed in the past. 
 
15.  (C) Supporting the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, 
Shankar welcomed continued discussions on its details and 
stated that it was important to "get the details right the 
first time."  She suggested that the commission be located in 
ECOSOC, but noted that the GOI was open to alternative 
suggestions.  Shankar agreed to "look carefully" at US 
proposals for reforming the UNCHR but reaffirmed India's 
support for human rights and dislike of country-specific 
resolutions.  The new body must be more focused toward 
capacity building in countries with poor human rights 
records, not simply highlighting abuses, she said.  She also 
suggested that a new human rights organization should have a 
role in restoring democracy in countries where it has been 
overthrown.  Linking UNCHR reform to UNSC enlargement, she 
argued that in both bodies developing countries see the 
developed world "sitting in judgment" on their failings, 
instead of assisting them to progress, and said that UNSC 
expansion would help orient the overall UN objectives to be 
more supportive of developing state needs. 
 
Timeline for Reform 
------------------- 
 
16.  (C) The Foreign Secretary explained that two matters 
shaped the UNSC reform timeline.  First, India needed a 
"degree of confidence" that it would receive two-thirds UNGA 
support needed for the UNSC seat.  Otherwise, the timeline 
was "dependent on the P5 position," he said, underlining how 
important the US position is for India.  Saran explained that 
although India had at one time collected 140 votes of support 
for its UNSC seat, he believed China in the meantime "scared 
other countries into backing out," and now the GOI was in a 
"holding operation" to return to this level of support. 
 
17.  (C) Saran agreed with Ambassador Tahir-Kheli that much 
work needed to be done by September in order to create a 
consensus on any reforms and understood that the US was 
concerned about the timeline moving too fast.  Nevertheless, 
he hoped that all nations could capitalize on the momentum 
for reform and not defer needed changes.  He described 
overall confidence in the UN "at an all time low," adding 
that if change did not happen now, attitudes towards the UN 
would only worsen.  While he agreed that the implementation 
process would be lengthy, he stated that we "should declare 
the landmark decisions" at September's UNGA. 
 
Strategists:  The Veto Dilemma 
------------------------------ 
 
18.  (SBU) Reinforcing the challenges facing the GOI, a cross 
section of retired Ambassadors and strategic thinkers agreed 
over dinner in honor of Ambassador Tahir-Kheli that 
pragmatists in the strategic community would consider a 
permanent UNSC seat a success even without a veto.  However, 
they called the disconnect between this quietly-held goal and 
public opinion (shared by many in Parliament) that a veto is 
the "minimum acceptable offer" a serious dilemma for the 
government.  They noted that domestic pressure will make it 
difficult for the government to compromise.  However, the GOI 
did not express this view to us in official meetings. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
19.  (C) The Foreign Secretary's emphasis on the political 
capital India has spent to get to this stage in its UNSC 
quest indicates that it will be difficult for the GOI to take 
"no" as an answer on both a permanent seat and a veto.  While 
it seems to be going for broke to attain a place at the 
international high table, the GOI is nervous about the 
implications if it fails and is hesitant to burn bridges with 
its traditional NAM partners, which accounts in large measure 
for its continuing rhetoric and developing country 
solidarity, even while claiming that it has stepped up to a 
larger global role. 
 
20. (C) The GOI certainly recognizes that this issue is more 
complicated than former NSA Brajesh Mishra recently put it 
when he told a journalist that the US could help India most 
to become a global power by supporting it for a seat in the 
UNSC.  However, the FS noted that the Secretary's remarks in 
New Delhi that the US recognizes the regionally important 
role of India and the need for UN reform have created 
expectations of US support for a UNSC permanent seat.  Many 
decision-makers in India will be bitterly disappointed if 
this support does not materialize.  End comment. 
 
Participants 
------------ 
 
21.  (U) Participants in the MEA meetings were as follows: 
 
US: 
 
Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Senior Advisor to the 
Secretary for UN Reform 
 
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Charge Robert O. Blake Jr. (Saran only) 
Geoff Pyatt, PolCouns 
Jai Nair, Poloff 
Courtney Kramer, Poloff 
 
Indian: 
 
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran 
Meera Shankar, Additional Secretary, UN and International 
Security 
S Jaishankar, Joint Secretary, Americas 
Hamid Ali Rao, Joint Secretary, UN Political 
Manjeev Puri, Joint Secretary, UN Economic and Social 
Pankaj Sharma, Deputy Secretary, UN Political 
K Nandini, Under Secretary, UN Political 
Siddarth Nath, Attache, UN Political 
 
22.  (U) Ambassador Tahir-Kheli has cleared this message. 
BLAKE