US embassy cable - 05PRAGUE814

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 000814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EZ, CU, EUN 
SUBJECT: EXPELLED CZECH POLITICIAN SAYS CUBA UNDERESTIMATED 
EUROPEAN REACTION 
 
REF: HAVANA 10180 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Kim Krhounek for reasons 1.4 b+d 
 
 1.  (C) Summary.  On May 25, we met with Czech Senator Karel 
Schwarzenberg, who was one of the European politicians 
deported from Cuba during last week's opposition gathering in 
Havana (see reftel).  Schwarzenberg who did have an 
opportunity to meet with some dissidents prior to his 
expulsion, stressed the importance of building up Cuban civil 
society through making Spanish-language publications on the 
Central European transformation experience available, and 
putting continued pressure on Castro to release jailed 
dissidents who are living in very severe conditions in Cuban 
jails.  He also strongly advocated inviting dissidents to 
national day receptions and other diplomatic events as one 
means of providing them "protection."  While he regretted his 
expulsion from Cuba, he also believes that the Castro regime 
underestimated the impact of the expulsions in Europe; in 
particular the extensive, negative press coverage in Paris, 
Madrid, Germany and Poland.  End summary. 
 
3.  (C) Senator Schwarzenberg -- who travelled to Havana on a 
tourist passport -- was able to spend a few days in Cuba 
before he was unceremoniously escorted from his hotel back to 
the airport.  His personal views are that Castro ordered the 
deportations of European politicians for his own propaganda 
purposes; namely to show that foreign emissaries have no role 
to play in Cuban politics.  (By the same token, Schwarzenberg 
believes Castro let the dissident gathering proceed to be 
able to claim that civic groups can meet peacefully.)  While 
Castro may have succeeded in this limited goal, Schwarzenberg 
claims that the Cuban government vastly underestimated 
European reaction.  The Czech Ambassador to Paris organized a 
packed news conference on Schwarzenberg's arrival back on the 
continent, and other deported politicians held similar press 
events in Madrid and Germany.  According to Schwarzenberg, 
these events generated "more than 80 pages of critical 
comments," becoming a "bigger than expected echo" that the 
Cuban government probably did not intend. 
 
4.  (C) While in Cuba, Schwarzenberg had some important 
meetings with Cuban dissidents, including at a reception 
hosted by the Norwegian Ambassador, confirming his belief 
that it is important to include dissidents in national day 
receptions and other diplomatic events.  Schwarzenberg 
believes the link to the diplomatic community makes 
dissidents better known, thereby providing them "some 
protection, weak as it is."   When dissidents are known and 
welcome visitors at diplomatic events, the embassies are 
better informed of events on the ground and quicker to react 
to arbitrary imprisonments and other oppressive acts.  Such 
connections are invaluable in keeping pressure on Cuban 
officials to provide better treatment of prisoners and warn 
them that the international community is watching.  In 
general, Schwarzenberg decried the conditions in Cuban jails, 
comparing them to Czechoslovak jails of the 1950's where 
severe conditions lead to serious health risks.  He declared 
all imprisoned dissidents to be "in serious danger" and 
expressed hope that the EU would continue to press for their 
release before granting any further benefits to the Castro 
regime.  He expressed support for Czech diplomacy within the 
EU, and optimism that recent events on the island would 
translate into a more robust EU stance against the Castro 
regime. 
 
5.  (C) Schwarzenberg also cited the necessity to build up 
Cuban civil society.  Again comparing the situation there to 
the Czechoslovak experience, he noted that there are very few 
"samizdat" publications in Cuba, compared with Czechslovakia 
in the 1970's and 1980's.  (Samizdat were independent 
underground publications of Czech articles and news that were 
often published abroad and re-imported and distributed within 
the country by members of the dissident movement).  Further, 
he believes that too few Cubans speak or understand foreign 
languages, limiting their exposure to helpful advice from 
abroad.  He recommended translating into Spanish a number of 
Central European publications that dealt with their own 
experiences transforming their country into democracies with 
free market economies.  Schwarzenberg noted that many of the 
more moderate Cuban dissident groups are emphasizing a 
long-term strategy to build up civil society institutions 
over time, so that they are prepared when Castro finally dies 
(Schwarzenberg thought this would come in about ten years). 
Schwarzenberg agreed with this approach, although he thought 
the European countries should do more to treat Castro as a 
"rambling old man with no new ideas" as a way to further 
marginalize his power.  (Septel discusses current GOCR 
efforts to support Cuban civil society.) 
 
6.  (C) Comment.  It appears that the Castro regime has 
underestimated the accord within the EU concerning equal 
treatment to all member states.  While the Cuban government 
may have been able to treat pesky politicians from the Czech 
Republic and Poland as individual irritants in the past, such 
targeted behavior now that these countries are full voting 
members of the European Union has much more serious 
repercussions.  For the Czechs and other EU members promoting 
a tougher EU common position these deportations were 
well-timed, as Czech MFA Cuba specialists headed to Brussels 
this week for working-level meetings on the June review of 
the EU's Cuba policy.  We expect to have a full readout of 
those meetings next week.  End comment. 
CABANISS