US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI2333

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MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN

Identifier: 05TAIPEI2333
Wikileaks: View 05TAIPEI2333 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Created: 2005-05-27 09:32:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW Foreign Policy Cross Strait Politics Domestic Politics
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - 
ROBERT PALLADINO 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC, KMDR, KPAO, TW, Foreign Policy, Cross Strait Politics, Domestic Politics 
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN 
 
Summary: As the major Chinese-language Taipei dailies 
continued to cover the contentious Law on National 
Assembly's Exercise of Power and other issues relating 
to local politics May 27, the pro-independence "Liberty 
Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, carried a news story on 
page four that headlined: "Bian: Both sides [of the 
Taiwan Strait] can resume talks as long as Taiwan's 
sovereignty is secured."  The sub-headline added: "With 
regard to the United States' concern about `both sides 
of the [Taiwan] Strait, one China,' [Chen] has given 
orders to clarify to the international community that 
`[Taiwan] is willing to promote cross-Strait dialogue 
on the basis on the 1992 [Hong Kong] talks.'"  A front- 
page news story of the pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" 
also said: "Bian broached the new Taiwan-centered 
consciousness again," with the sub-headline: "[Bian] 
emphasized [the importance of] `protecting Taiwan' and 
creating a new situation of cross-Strait and in-house 
reconciliation."  Commentator Lai I-chung, director for 
foreign policy studies of the Taiwan Thinktank, noted 
in a commentary (Part One) of the pro-independence 
"Taiwan Daily" that the meetings between Chinese 
President Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan and PFP 
Chairman James Soong have altered the strategic 
equation between Washington, Beijing and Taipei.  End 
summary. 
 
"The Strategic Equation between Washington, Beijing and 
Taipei Is Altered Because of the Meetings between Lien, 
Soong and Hu - Part I" 
 
Lai I-chung, Director for Foreign Policy Studies of the 
Taiwan Thinktank, commented in the pro-independence 
"Taiwan Daily" [circulation: 150,000] (5/27): 
 
"The trips of [KMT Chairman] Lien Chan and [PFP 
Chairman] James Soong to return to China, which have 
created disturbances [on the island] for nearly a 
month, have finally come to an end.  This drama of the 
absurd jointly performed by [Chinese President] Hu 
Jintao, [President] Chen Shui-bian, Lien and Soong, 
plus Washington's comments on this issue several times, 
which sounded almost like a strategic idiot, have cast 
a big shadow over Taiwan's democratic development.  As 
for the triangular relationship between Washington, 
Beijing and Taipei, the United States has lost its 
leadership over the current status in the Taiwan 
Strait.  Hu became the biggest winner, whereas Taiwan 
is the biggest loser in the triangular relationship. . 
 
"What is worse is that Lien has no guts, so he dared 
not to publicly mention `one China, different 
interpretations' in front of Hu, and he even embraced 
Beijing's `May 17 statement' issued in 2004.  Soong was 
even worse; his recklessness drove him to raise 
complacently the new interpretation for the `1992 
Consensus;' namely, the `both sides of [Taiwan] Strait, 
one China' statement.  His move has created an effect 
that is tantamount to the PFP endorsing Beijing's `new 
syllogism toward Taiwan' and its definition of Taiwan's 
status. 
 
"Soong attempted to argue irrationally that `both sides 
of the Strait, one China' means `both sides of the 
[Taiwan] Strait are free to interpret the one China.' 
But Hu has set the tune for this statement and 
determined that it means the `one China principle,' 
which is the same as the second sentence of Beijing's 
new syllogism toward Taiwan: `Taiwan and mainland China 
[i.e. both sides] belong to one China.'  Soong has 
turned the ambiguous `1992 Consensus' into `both sides 
of the Strait, one China,' and along with his position 
that opposes two Chinas, it means that Soong has 
acknowledged the connotation of China's new syllogism 
toward Taiwan, which claims that `Taiwan is part of 
China.' 
 
"The worst part is that such a statement is exactly the 
precondition laid down by China's `Anti-Secession Law,' 
so it also confirmed some people's criticism against 
Soong and the PFP, saying they have endorsed China's 
`Anti-Secession Law.' 
 
"In the aftermath of the meetings between Hu, Lien and 
Soong, Hu can [now] easily release himself from the 
international community's backlashes against China's 
`Anti-Secession Law' without costing him anything.  All 
the more, he has successfully made Taiwan's two major 
opposition parties accept China's `May 17 statement' 
and substantively acknowledge its `Anti-Secession Law.' 
No matter whether Hu wants to talk with the DPP or not, 
a political force has taken root in Taiwan that echoes 
the Chinese Communist Party's policy toward the island. 
Judged by the current situation, what Hu will face in 
the future is not the general public view of Taiwan but 
the basis of social support for each individual 
political party.  [In other words,] Hu has achieved his 
aim of isolating Chen Shui-bian. ." 
 
PAAL 

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