US embassy cable - 05ANKARA3018

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2029 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, MARR, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH PM ERDOGAN AND FONMIN GUL'S JUNE VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON: HOW SERIOUS ARE THEY ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP? 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Erdogan government's serious drift on 
EU-related reform; failure to take the lead on religious 
tolerance and indeed encouragement of intolerance; flawed 
handling of relations with still powerful Turkish State 
institutions; and unwillingness to invest in a robust 
bilateral relationship with the U.S. characterize GOT policy. 
 At the same time, the Turkish armed forces are working 
steadily to signal their commitment to a strong bilateral 
relationship.  Erdogan and FonMin Gul need to hear a brisk 
message on five themes and, since they are motivated by fear, 
to feel just enough doubt about our view of their AKP 
government that they brace up.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Three negative trends in the Erdogan government's 
domestic and foreign policy form the backdrop to Erdogan and 
Gul's June 8 call on President Bush and Gul's meeting with 
Secretary Rice.  These trends have had a debilitating impact 
 
SIPDIS 
on the U.S. ability to work strategically with Turkey. 
 
3. (C) First is a combination of retrenchment on reform; 
drift on preparations for EU harmonization; and degradation 
of an already troubling environment for religious freedom and 
tolerance.  Second is deep tension and mistrust between the 
Erdogan government and core institutions of the Turkish State 
(Presidency, armed forces, judiciary, bureaucracy).  Third is 
the government's long-term neglect, and then merely 
perfunctory affirmation, of the value of strong relations 
with the U.S., accompanied by a ceaseless search for 
"Eurasian" or Arab-Muslim world alternatives to the U.S/NATO. 
 
 
Reform, EU Candidacy, Religious Tolerance Under Pressure 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
4. (C) The Erdogan government's post-December 2004 retreat on 
political reforms (e.g., inclusion of retrograde articles in 
the revised criminal code), ambivalence about economic reform 
and indiscipline in its relationship with the IMF, as well as 
indifference to the poor conditions for foreign direct 
investment concern a broad spectrum of our contacts. 
Erdogan's aggressive legal suits against caricaturists and 
GOT pressure on the media and universities to conform to the 
government line (on May 24 Justice Minister Cicek forced 
Bogazici University to postpone an alternative-view 
conference on the Armenian tragedy of 1915 by accusing the 
organizers of "stabbing Turkey in the back") raise sharp 
questions about Erdogan's and his AK party's (AKP) commitment 
to freedom of expression and an open society. 
 
5. (C) There is an attendant serious drift in preparations 
for the long, grueling process of EU harmonization, scheduled 
to start October 3.  Although Erdogan has suddenly announced 
the appointment of Economy Minister Babacan as chief 
negotiator, all our contacts who have expressed an opinion 
say Babacan lacks the political clout to sell the EU 
positions to the cabinet and to ensure coherent harmonization 
in ministries.  Turkey is unequipped to manage the 
consequences of the upcoming French and Dutch referenda on 
the EU constitution or the foreseeable shift in German policy 
on Turkey's EU candidacy if the CDU-CSU wins what are 
expected to be early German general elections in September. 
In this context, Erdogan's recent accusation that some EU 
member states aim to divide Turkey, a clumsy attempt to 
outflank resurgent nationalism, has in fact contributed to 
the spread of a surly, defeatist attitude toward the EU. 
 
6. (C) In addition, the Erdogan government refuses to reopen 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary, shut by the 
Turkish State in 1971, on terms acceptable to the 
Patriarchate and rejects the ecumenical status of the 
Patriarchate.  The government continues a long-standing 
policy of malign neglect toward religious minorities by 
failing to ensure rapid and fair restitution of many hundreds 
of properties confiscated by the State from mainly Christian, 
but also some Jewish, foundations.  Religious tolerance, 
never as high in practice as on paper, has degraded further. 
The government has stirred up anti-Christian feelings by 
attacking missionary activities through statements by 
ministers and an anti-Christian sermon drafted and 
disseminated nationwide on March 11 by the Religious Affairs 
Directorate, which is attached to the Prime Ministry. 
Long-term resident American pastors have begun to be 
assaulted or threatened by e-mail in incidents across the 
country.  Anti-Semitism is more visible than before. 
 
7. (C) All the more troubling is the government's combination 
of the politics of denial that these glaringly obvious 
negative trends exist and politics of intimidation against 
anyone who points out the open scissors between GOT claims 
and reality.  In this latter regard, GOT complaints about 
alleged "Islamophobia" in the West are a hypocritical 
smokescreen to obscure the intolerance against "the other" in 
Turkey. 
 
Government-State Tensions: Implications for Governance 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
8. (C) Government-State relations have often been strained in 
Turkey, but the terminal mistrust between AKP and 
deeply-rooted State institutions has caused a breakdown in 
what limited dialogue existed at the beginning of AKP's 
tenure.  Erdogan and his party complain that the State is 
trying to apply a harsh and sclerotic Kemalist brake on 
popular will.  The State, most prominently in CHOD Ozkok's 
nationally-televised April 20 address, warns in turn that it 
will not tolerate what it perceives as (1) the AKP 
government's failure to tackle growing street crime, abiding 
poverty, and corruption; (2) the government's lack of a 
coherent policy to deal with the PKK and the Kurdish 
question; and (3) AKP's attempt to infiltrate and capture the 
State with an Islamist (anti-secular) ideology. 
 
9. (S) The most sober, experienced observers of AKP and of 
the Turkish State among our contacts see a confrontation 
brewing.  These contacts note that the only factors 
protecting AKP are Erdogan's ability to preserve his 
heartland popularity and the current lack of a realistic 
political alternative on the one hand and, on the other, the 
State's reluctance to be blamed for any breakdown in Turkey's 
EU accession process while the process appears to be moving 
forward. 
 
10. (S) But our contacts, some within AKP, assess Erdogan and 
AKP as clueless; visionless; corrupt; and certain to alienate 
the State further through ill-timed, ill-explained 
initiatives.  Our contacts predict that, step by step, the 
State will use all constitutional means to exploit fissures 
among, and expose the corruption within, the various factions 
in the conglomerate that is AKP.  The journalist who has 
consistently maintained the best access to the whole spectrum 
of AKP agrees with the judgment that Turkey can expect a 
"post-post-modern" (i.e., constitutionally-grounded and more 
indirect than the "post-modern" move against the Islamist 
Erbakan government in 1997) easing of AKP from power over the 
next two years. 
 
AKP's Search for Foreign Policy "Alternatives" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
11. (C) The contrast between the State and government is 
equally stark in foreign policy.  Over the past six months 
Turkish CHOD Ozkok and deputy CHOD Basbug have repeatedly 
expounded -- in Ozkok's April 20 address in the name not of 
TGS but of the Turkish State -- a comprehensive vision of 
Turkey's foreign policy priorities with the U.S. in first 
place.  In his April 20 speech Ozkok emphasized the 
resilience and pride of place of bilateral relations with the 
U.S.; cogently promoted the U.S. Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative; drew attention to strong concerns 
about Iran's nuclear policies; expressed skepticism about 
Syria; and articulated caution about Russia.  At the same 
time he reverted to more restrictive language on Cyprus and 
was quite harsh in his assessment of Greek policy toward 
Turkey. 
 
12. (C) In contrast, while searching for a way ahead on 
Cyprus and reluctantly bringing Turkey's Iraq policy more 
into line with ours, Erdogan and Gul avoided any strong 
public commitment to the bilateral relationship for their 
first two and a half years in power.  Indeed, their anti-U.S. 
outbursts during the Fallujah and Tal Afar operations in 
autumn 2004 played to the worst, most ignorant anti-American 
Islamist prejudices in Turkey. 
13. (C) Only belatedly, and each time lagging behind Ozkok 
and Basbug's declarations, have they recently expressed any 
support for the relationship, and then mostly in a 
perfunctory manner.  Only in the run-up to the June 8 White 
House meeting have they exercised any influence on a normally 
rabid press, both on relations with the U.S. and on Iraq 
(thus underscoring how complicit they were in the media's 
campaigns of opprobrium against the U.S. from November 2002 
until March 2005).  Their response lacks a comprehensive 
vision; instead, with Erdogan's typical trader mentality, 
they think it is possible to satisfy the U.S. by throwing a 
contract our way here, agreeing to our routine request to use 
Incirlik air base as a cargo hub after a ten-month delay 
there.  They persist in believing -- and implying to the 
Turkish public -- that the road to Washington goes through 
Tel Aviv, not directly. 
 
14. (C) Instead, Erdogan denies that there are any problems 
in the U.S.-Turkish relationship (many of our contacts 
predict Erdogan will use his White House meeting to assert 
that his stewardship is successful).  Gul and his close 
collaborator Ahmet Davutoglu, whose Malaysianist/hard-line 
Sunni views appear to have deep influence on the government's 
foreign-policy "strategizing", continue to search for 
alternatives to the U.S./NATO in Syria, Iran, "Eurasia", and 
the Arab and broader Muslim world.  In this regard, Davutoglu 
has asserted publicly and privately that the U.S. has been 
forced to come to terms with both Turkey's "indispensability" 
and the fact that Turkey has "viable alternatives". 
 
Delivering a Tough Message to Erdogan 
------------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) For all his swagger, Erdogan is at heart afraid of 
losing the power he so long and so desperately pursued.  He 
will react counter-productively to naked threats.  But it is 
possible to motivate him by indirectly raising doubts in his 
mind about our patience and our view of his performance.  Gul 
is far more ideologically Islamist than Erdogan, but equally 
susceptible to artfully sown doubts. 
 
16. (C) We therefore suggest that President Bush may wish to 
focus above all on five messages: 
 
--The world is changing and the U.S. is determined to move 
with, and harness these changes in Iraq, the Broader Middle 
East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe; Turkey 
has a chance to join us or lag behind. 
 
--Our government-to-government relations cannot develop 
robustly if the Turkish government does not own the 
relationship and lead public opinion; what counts are 
actions, not words. 
 
--Steady, transparent, fair, open-society reform is crucial; 
it is important for AKP to correct the widespread impression 
that it has a hidden agenda; we would not want to see reform 
that does not have the support of the Turkish State and 
broader segments of society lead to confrontation. 
 
--Religious tolerance and religious freedom are paramount, 
and we are deeply disturbed by ugly trends in Turkey; we have 
invested considerable diplomatic capital to ensure that the 
EU keeps its door open to predominantly Muslim Turkey, but 
Turkey has to deliver equally resolutely, broadly, tangibly 
and consistently on freedom of religion and tolerance. 
 
--The GOT must lead Turkey boldly into Europe; conciliating 
extremist nationalists will block Turkey's progress and 
provide no viable avenue for Erdogan and Gul to lead the 
country to full prosperity that benefits the common man. 
EDELMAN