US embassy cable - 05THEHAGUE1434

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: WHERE'S PLAN B?  DUTCH BRACE FOR 
"NO" VOTE ON EU CONSTITUTION 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 393 
 
     B. 5/25 "POLITICS IN THE NETHERLANDS" E-MAIL REPORT 
        AND PREVIOUS. 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  With polls showing a clear majority opposed 
to ratifying the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Dutch 
government is belatedly stepping up its efforts to obtain a 
"Yes" vote in the June 1 referendum.  At the same time, Prime 
Minister Balkenende is actively distancing his government 
from the results of the referendum and seeking to shift 
responsibility for dealing with a defeat to Parliament. 
Opponents and supporters of the Treaty agree that voter 
dissatisfaction with the Dutch and European political 
establishment is a major motivation for "No" voters.  Both 
sides concede that a "Yes" vote is not completely out of the 
question, and at least one recent poll suggests that the tide 
might be starting to turn, but there is very little time to 
turn the electorate around.  The Balkenende government will 
almost certainly survive a negative outcome, but such a 
public defeat will provide a clear boost to 
populist/nationalist politicians hoping to capitalize on 
public discontent in the runup to parliamentary elections 
scheduled for 2007.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) With all recent polls showing the "No" camp likely to 
prevail -- possibly by 60 percent or more -- in the June 1 
referendum on the EU's Constitutional Treaty, the Dutch 
government is stepping up its "Yes" campaign while seeking to 
minimize the political consequences of a defeat.  In several 
recent interviews, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende reminded 
voters that the referendum was a parliamentary initiative 
initially opposed by the two largest members of his coalition 
government; a vote against the referendum, therefore, would 
not be taken as a vote of no-confidence in his government. 
Some observers give Balkenende credit for at least making an 
effort in support of the Treaty despite his skepticism about 
the referendum while the main opposition Labor Party/PvdA, 
which was largely responsible for pushing the referendum 
legislation through parliament, has been missing in action. 
Far more, however, blame Balkenende and his government for 
incompetently managing the issue from the beginning.  Geert 
Wilders, the maverick Dutch populist politician who has 
become one of the most visible leaders of the "No" campaign, 
told POLCOUNS on May 24 that the government's missteps had 
probably done more to boost the "No" vote than any efforts by 
opponents of the treaty. 
WHY VOTE NO?  BECAUSE WE CAN. 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (C)  Both camps agree that many "No" voters are basing 
their decision on factors unrelated to the Treaty itself. 
Frustration with Balkenende (whose personal popularity 
ratings are at an all time low, hovering around 16 percent) 
and anger at a perceived Dutch-European political elite that 
pays little attention to the concerns of common citizens are 
clearly fueling the "No" movement.  A group of students from 
Leiden University told the DCM on May 18 that they intended 
to vote against the Treaty precisely because Balkenende was 
"telling them to vote for it."  Strong supporters of the 
treaty such as Lousewies van der Laan (foreign policy 
spokesman for the Liberal Democrat/D-66 party) and Jan 
Gooijenbier (a public relations/marketing expert brought in 
to head the government's Referendum Task Force) admitted in 
recent meetings with POLCOUNS that overcoming the public's 
lack of confidence in the current Dutch leadership and EU 
institutions has been the hardest hurdle for the "Yes" camp 
to overcome.  During his current bus "tourNEE" of the 
Netherlands, Wilders claimed to have been surprised by the 
"level of hate" routinely expressed for Balkenende's 
government, and agreed that for many the vote would be "all 
about a lack of trust."  The "No" campaign also draws 
strength from an eclectic mix of parties on the left 
(Socialist Party) and right (including the two small 
Christian parties) worried that a strengthened EU will reduce 
their ability to influence domestic politics, as well as a 
host of single-issue voters opposed to Turkish accession, 
increased immigration, and expansion of the EURO zone among 
other issues. 
 
4. (C) The fact that this will be the first national 
referendum in modern Dutch history, and that it is 
technically non-binding, has also played strongly into the 
hands of the "No" camp.  According to Gooijenbier, the 
government's own polls suggest that many voters see the 
current referendum as an opportunity to vent retroactively on 
earlier decisions made without their input, such as switching 
from the guilder to the EURO (a move many blame for 
subsequent inflation) and EU expansion (including possibly to 
Turkey).  The polls also show that most voters believe that 
their vote in a non-binding referendum will not be taken 
seriously, and therefore feel comfortable casting "protest" 
vote without regard to consequences.   (Note:  Although the 
referendum is legally non-binding, most political parties 
have announced formula under which they would "accept" the 
results; the Christian Democrats, for example, insist on a 30 
percent turnout with 60 percent opposed; others, such as the 
Liberal Democrats (pro) and Socialists (con) will accept any 
result regardless of turnout or margin of victory.)  Recent 
statements by opposition leader Wouter Bos suggesting that a 
"No" vote could lead to a second referendum were quickly 
seized upon as further evidence that the political 
establishment will ignore the people's will if faced with a 
negative vote.  Foreign Minister Bot's suggestion in 
parliament on May 23 that those wavering about the Treaty 
should stay home rather than vote no further reinforced the 
view that the government just doesn't "get it." 
 
OVERSOLD AND UNDERWHELMED 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) The "Yes" camp has been plagued from the beginning by 
disagreements over strategy and message.  While some advised 
minimizing the impact of a negative outcome by seeking to 
reduce turnout (ref a), others -- including Justice Minister 
Donner and Economic Affairs Minister/Deputy Prime Minister 
Brinkhorst -- engaged in scare tactics, suggesting that a 
"no" vote could return Europe to an era of chaos and war no 
seen in the past 60 years.  Not surprisingly, the public 
reacted negatively to both tactics.  The media and public 
have also been quick to point out apparent divisions within 
the cabinet, as when Finance Minister/Deputy Prime Minister 
Zalm reportedly refused to join the rest of the Cabinet in 
personally handing out pro-treaty leaflets outside the Prime 
Minister's office.  (Balkenende recently began hosting daily 
strategy sessions with key cabinet officials, including Bot, 
Zalm, Brinkhorst, and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
Atzo Nicolai to ensure all agree on a single, coordinated 
message.)  Even more damaging has been the failure of the 
government and the opposition PvdA party to develop a 
coordinated strategy in favor of the Treaty.  During a recent 
meeting with Ambassador Sobel and POLCOUNS, Wouter Bos openly 
admitted that he found it distasteful to be seen cooperating 
with the government as the head of the opposition, even 
though a vote against the treaty would essentially harm both 
as members of the political "establishment." 
 
6. (C) The government was restrained from campaigning 
aggressively in favor of the Treaty both by Dutch tradition 
and by the referendum legislation, which tasked the 
government with administering the referendum in a neutral 
fashion.  As noted ref. a, the "revelation" that the 
government had established a contingency fund of 1.5 million 
Euros to counter negative campaigning triggered a 
mini-scandal in parliament.  The government's over-reliance 
on "information" -- its first pro-Treaty hand-out consisted 
entirely of excerpts from the Treaty text -- and speeches by 
government officials to pitch the treaty backfired, with 
voters reacting indifferently to the first and negatively to 
the second.  Farah Karimi, a Green-Left member of parliament 
and one of the three original sponsors of the referendum 
legislation, told POLCOUNS on May 26 that most members of 
parliament "never dreamed" that the Dutch public would reject 
the treaty, so did not make any provisions for a "pro" 
campaign. 
 
THE FRENCH CONNECTION 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) All parties agree that the results of the May 29 
referendum in France will influence the Dutch vote, but 
opinions vary on exactly how.  Arno Brouwers, a journalist 
for Volkskrant, jokingly told POLCOUNS that a French "Non" 
could be the only thing that would convince the Dutch to vote 
"Ja," as it would give Dutch voters a new target for 
expressing their frustration.  Geert Wilders similarly 
suggested that some "no" voters might reconsider their view 
of the Treaty if the French reject it, reflecting the 
commonly-held view that what is good for France in the EU is 
generally bad for the Netherlands.  A more likely scenario, 
however, is that a negative result in France would convince 
many voters to remain home on June 1, lowering overall 
turnout but probably raising the "no" percentage.  According 
to Gooijenbier, the government has developed two campaigns to 
follow the French vote referendum.  If the vote is positive, 
the government will stress that "280 million Europeans are 
already in favor of the Treaty;" if not, then the theme will 
be along the lines of: "Don't let the French tell you how to 
vote."  According to the British Embassy, Prime Minister 
Balkenende has also quietly asked Prime Minister Blair to 
weigh in with Dutch voters following the French vote, either 
by traveling to the Netherlands (doubtful, according to the 
UK Embassy) or by recording a direct appeal for broadcast. 
The option of canceling the Dutch referendum is not on the 
table. 
 
ENOUGH TIME TO TURN THE TIDE? 
----------------------------- 
 
8. (C)  Despite most polls showing a growing a clear majority 
opposing the treaty, both camps are stepping up their 
campaigns in the final days before the referendum.  The 
government, having recently defeated a court action intended 
to prevent it from spending additional funds on the "Yes" 
campaign, has just budgeted an additional 7 million Euros for 
an intense pro-Treaty print and radio advertising blitz, 
according to Gooijenbier.  (Gooijenbier noted that he had 
also proposed television advertising, but that the Cabinet 
decided engaging in "partisan" television advertising was "a 
bridge too far.")  Familiar national figures, including all 
four living former Prime Ministers, have started to campaign 
actively in favor of the Treaty.  Gooijenbier cited a May 23 
poll showing a slight decrease in the number of "No" voters 
(from 60 percent to 57 percent) and increase in "Yes" voters 
(from 40 percent to 43 percent) although they still 
constituted a majority) as evidence that Dutch voters might 
be starting to "wake up and pay attention" to the possible 
consequences of a negative vote.  Van der Laan, who last week 
predicted a "colossal no" in a press interview, privately 
suggested that the government might just barely pull "a 
rabbit out of a hat" but was not optimistic.  Wilders also 
conceded that a dramatic turnaround in voter sentiment was 
not out of the question, and put the chances of a "Yes" vote 
at about 20 percent. 
 
THE DAY AFTER 
------------- 
 
9. (C)  Partly to convince voters to take the referendum 
seriously, the government has deliberately refrained from 
engaging in debate over what would happen in case of a "No" 
vote, and in fact appears to have no "Plan B."  Parliament 
will almost certainly insist on a debate on the Treaty -- 
which is already in Parliament and should be ratified before 
November 2006 -- within days of the referendum, regardless of 
the outcome.  If there is a negative result, the government 
will probably argue that it has done its duty and any further 
steps are the responsibility of Parliament, which forced the 
referendum on the government in the first place.  Balkenende 
has stated for the record that he and his government will not 
resign in the event of a negative result, although some 
observers speculate privately that State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs Atzo Nicolai, as the Cabinet member directly 
responsible for European integration issues, might choose to 
leave the government.  A Nicolai resignation would probably 
not bring down the government, however, as under the 
coalition agreement his party (Conservative Liberal/VVD) 
could replace him from its ranks.  Unless turnout is so small 
as to be absolutely meaningless, any effort to proceed with 
ratification following a "No" vote would provoke a more 
serious political crisis, as coalition partner the Liberal 
Democrats/D-66 is on the record refusing to accede to such a 
plan.  Most likely, the government and parliament will decide 
to delay definitive action for some period of time to see how 
the Treaty is received in other European countries holding 
referenda. 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
10. (C) On paper, the pro-Treaty coalition is impressive: 85 
percent of parliamentarians, all major unions and employer 
associations, most major media, and many notable public 
figures have come out in favor of the Treaty.  The fact that 
these traditional sources of influence have failed to produce 
a positive majority is viewed by many as proof that the 
populist "revolution" against the traditional political elite 
begun by Pim Fortuyn continues to be a major factor in Dutch 
politics.  While a "Yes" vote is not impossible, there is 
very little time left to turn around a deeply skeptical and 
angry electorate, and the government has so far shown little 
skill in guiding public opinion effectively.  There is little 
question that Balkenende's coalition government will survive 
a "No" vote in the short term, as all three partners are down 
in the polls and desperate to avoid early elections.  That 
said, a highly visible defeat in the referendum would clearly 
undermine Balkenende's standing among his European colleagues 
and would heighten the domestic perception of him as a weak 
and ineffectual leader.  Although the Labor Party/PvdA, as 
the main opposition party in Parliament, might gain a few 
poll points at Balkenende's expense, the real winners are 
likely to be populist, nationalist figures like Geert 
Wilders, who will seek to transfer the anti-establishment, 
anti-EU votes into a real political force prior to the 2007 
elections. 
SOBEL