US embassy cable - 05AMMAN4125

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DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR 2005-2006: JORDAN

Identifier: 05AMMAN4125
Wikileaks: View 05AMMAN4125 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2005-05-25 15:37:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PGOV KDEM KMPI JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 AMMAN 004125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, KMPI, JO 
SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY FOR 2005-2006: JORDAN 
 
REF: STATE 80607 
 
1.  Post has identified four desired outcomes in our effort 
to support Jordan's reform plans and to advance democracy: 1) 
enhancement of political participation and representational 
government through passage of new election and political 
parties laws; 2) greater government accountability resulting 
from public sector reform; 3) promotion of the rule of law by 
improving the performance of the judiciary; and 4) 
strengthening the freedom and professionalism of the news 
media.  The GOJ has made some progress in line with its 
publicly declared reform strategy, but considerable space 
remains for increased USG support of GOJ initiatives. 
 
2.  Desired Outcome:  Passage of new elections and political 
parties laws that will encourage a more representative 
parliament, and that will promote the development of 
political parties. 
 
Baseline: 
 
Elections Law -- The GOJ and political activists have 
identified reform of the current elections law and political 
parties law as key to enhancing political development in 
Jordan.  Under Jordan's existing elections law, the country 
is divided into 45 districts for purposes of elections to the 
Lower House of parliament.  Some of the districts are 
allotted several legislative seats (e.g., the 3rd District of 
Amman elects five MPs) while other districts are allotted 
only one seat.  In theory the number of seats should 
correspond to the population of a given district, but in 
practice districts with Palestinian-Jordanian majorities 
(often in urban areas) are under-represented in the Lower 
House, whereas districts dominated by East Bank Jordanians 
are over-represented.  The districts in the urban area of 
Zarqa, for example, which are heavily Palestinian-Jordanian, 
contain approximately 16 percent of Jordan's population, yet 
are allotted only about 9 percent of seats in the Lower 
House. 
 
Due in part to the current electoral law's bias in favor of 
East Bankers, only 17 out of 110 MPs in the Lower House are 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin -- a percentage far 
below the estimated 60 percent plus of Jordanians whose 
families came from west of the Jordan River.  While voters in 
districts with large Palestinian-Jordanian majorities have 
opted to elect some East Bankers, this is sometimes the 
result of two factors:  1) the perception that an East Banker 
MP will have more influence with the government to provide 
jobs and services for constituents; and 2) behind-the-scenes 
lobbying by the state security services for their preferred 
East Banker candidates. 
 
Within each electoral district, Jordanians presently cast a 
vote for only one candidate.  Particularly in tribal areas, 
voters are strongly encouraged by their families to vote for 
a candidate who is a member of their tribe, rather than a 
candidate who reflects their political beliefs.  Some reform 
advocates have accordingly called for an electoral system 
where voters are allowed to cast ballots for more than one 
candidate, with the candidate or candidates in each district 
receiving the most total votes being sent to the Lower House. 
 
 
The governments of former PM Faisal al-Fayez and current PM 
Adnan Badran (chosen by King Abdullah in April 2005 to 
replace Fayez) have pledged to push for the adoption of a new 
elections law prior to parliamentary elections scheduled for 
the summer of 2007.  The text of such a new law will 
reportedly reflect the recommendations on electoral reform 
generated by a commission appointed by King Abdullah to 
design a comprehensive &National Agenda8 to guide Jordan's 
development -- including political development -- over the 
next 10 years.  The commission's recommendations are expected 
no later than the Fall of 2005. 
 
Political Parties Law -- Strengthening political parties has 
also been identified as a key component of political 
development in Jordan.  There are currently 33 legally 
recognized political parties in Jordan.  Apart from the 
Islamic Action Front (IAF), which is the only strong, 
organized political force in the country, the parties are not 
well developed and are poorly integrated into the country's 
political landscape.  The majority of political parties are 
very small (none but the IAF has more than 500 registered 
members), pursue limited agendas driven by individual 
personalities, and lack the ability to present national 
political platforms or programs responsive to citizen needs. 
As a result, most Jordanians consider them to be ineffective 
and irrelevant.  Some political party leaders recognize these 
deficiencies and are working to broaden their political base 
and expand outreach efforts.  They complain, however, that 
they are hampered by a lack of financial resources, a 
restrictive political parties law, and close monitoring (and 
at times interference) by state security services. 
 
In his vision for political reform, King Abdullah has 
expressed his desire for effective political parties and the 
merger of current groups into three distinct ideological 
political movements: conservative/Islamist, centrist, and 
progressive.  To achieve this goal, the King has called for a 
new political parties law that would aid in the development 
and strengthening of parties.  A proposed draft law on 
political parties presented in March 2005 by the  government 
of former PM Faisal al-Fayez was poorly received.  Although 
this draft provided for state funding of parties over a 
certain size (a long-standing demand by party leaders), it 
contained several troubling clauses, most notably a 
prohibition against activity that 
"interferes" in the affairs of other states or "harms" 
Jordan.  The proposed law was never submitted to parliament, 
however, and the Minister of Political Development who 
presented it publicly for comment (and who has since been 
replaced in the new cabinet) pledged that the final draft of 
the law would be in harmony with the recommendations made by 
the National Agenda commission. 
 
2005 Milestones: 
 
-- Work on National Agenda continues on track for unveiling 
in September 2005. 
 
-- Proposed National Agenda issued which includes guidelines 
and/or recommendations on new elections law and new political 
parties law. 
 
-- GOJ reaches out to public for input on new elections and 
political parties legislation; private Jordanians (including 
political parties, activists, and academics) provide feedback 
on National Agenda recommendations for both laws. 
 
2006 Milestones: 
 
-- GOJ and private Jordanians actively consult on text of 
proposed new laws. 
 
-- GOJ drafts and presents new laws for public comment. 
 
-- Draft laws are revised in response to public comments and 
submitted to parliament. 
 
-- Parliament adopts new elections law and political parties 
law prior to summer 2007 parliamentary elections. 
 
Tactics/Diplomatic Strategies: 
 
-- U.S. Embassy and senior level officials from Washington 
actively encourage the GOJ to submit an improved elections 
law and political parties law to parliament, as well as to 
refrain from interfering in parliamentary elections and from 
harassing political activists. 
 
-- Continued funding and renewal of ongoing National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) program -- administered by USAID 
and MEPI -- to support and strengthen political parties in 
Jordan. 
 
-- Allocation of new funds for International Visitor Program 
to provide targeted study trips to U.S. for young political 
party leaders. 
 
3.  Desired Outcome:  An efficient and responsive public 
sector that provides better government services and is more 
accountable to citizens. 
 
Baseline:  Driven partly by growing public frustration with 
poor GOJ performance and a bloated bureaucracy, the GOJ has 
outlined a comprehensive public sector reform (PSR) strategy 
to increase the efficiency and transparency of government 
operations, enhance the rule of law, and provide better 
services to its citizens.  Increased USG support for GOJ PSR 
initiatives will address several of the objectives in the 
U.S. strategy of advancing democracy, including the 
improvement of a) institutional checks and balances, b) 
government accountability, c) responsiveness to citizens, and 
d) competent and effective government. 
 
The GOJ in 2004 created two units to implement and oversee 
the public sector reform initiative.  Based within the Prime 
Ministry, these units are supervised by two Ministers of 
State with the change of government in April 2005.  The 
Department for Monitoring Government Performance is 
responsible for tracking the overall progress in public 
sector reform, including the establishment of "key 
performance indicators" for each ministry.  The Department 
for Public Sector Reform is charged with providing ministries 
with technical support to carry out this initiative. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) has developed the PSR agenda for 
Jordan, and the World Bank is finalizing a $15 million loan 
to the Jordanians to plan follow-on activities based on PWC's 
recommendations.  USAID is providing substantial assistance 
for public sector reform in coordination with the World Bank, 
and has restructured its privatization program to include up 
to $5 million for public sector reform projects over the next 
two years. 
Several USAID-funded PSR activities are currently under way 
in Jordan.  For example, USAID is providing technical 
assistance to help build the capacity of the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology to manage a 
national e-government program.  An NGO called Excellence Inc. 
has recently been established to assist internal GOJ reform 
efforts.  USAID is also helping streamline operations in the 
Customs Department so that it can better serve Jordan's drive 
to increase trade and investment.  In a related project, 
USAID also has been instrumental in creating the Aqaba 
Special Economic Zone in the southern Red Sea port town of 
Aqaba.  The goal is to create a modern, efficient, and 
transparent model for good governance, municipal development 
and private sector participation, while serving as a model of 
reform for the rest of Jordan.  Technical assistance also has 
been provided to improve the operations and services in the 
Ministries of Health, Water, Industry and Trade, and Justice. 
 
 
In early 2005 King Abdullah appointed a royal commission to 
provide recommendations on devolving some government 
authority to three new regional assemblies.  Depending on the 
commission's findings (slated to be announced no later than 
the Fall of 2005), significant new opportunities may emerge 
for USG support of public sector reform in Jordan. 
 
2005 Milestones: 
 
-- Department of Public Sector Reform and Department of 
Monitoring Government Performance develop action plans and 
performance indicators for each government ministry designed 
to improve internal operations and citizen services. 
Ministries clearly articulate their plans to staff and the 
public. 
 
-- The GOJ, through the e-government program, develops 
uniform security, interoperability and web applications 
standards to be implemented by all government institutions. 
 
-- GOJ improves transparency of government operations, 
particularly on issues involving public expenditures. 
 
-- GOJ works with civil society stakeholders and the media to 
raise public awareness of the costs of corruption and to 
identify specific mechanisms through which corruption may be 
curbed. 
 
2006 Milestones: 
 
-- GOJ begins drafting a new civil service code linking grade 
levels with experience and training. 
 
-- Through the e-government program, GOJ establishes a secure 
government network.  It creates a work plan and timetable to 
integrate all government computer systems and expands the 
government e-mail system to connect GOJ ministries. 
 
-- GOJ increases outsourcing of GOJ activities, including the 
privatization of select operations and training courses. 
 
-- Citizens form lobbying groups designed to advocate citizen 
rights and pressure the GOJ to move forward on key aspects of 
the PSR strategy, including transparency and accountability 
in budgeting. 
 
-- Ministries create internal ombudsman to check reform 
efforts and provide an avenue of recourse for government 
employees. 
 
Tactics/Diplomatic Strategies: 
 
-- Build close ties with the new ministries charged with 
public sector reform in order to mutually determine 
additional areas for U.S.-GOJ cooperation. 
 
-- Institute a regular dialogue with contacts on multiples 
levels in each ministry about internal reform efforts and 
above mentioned action plans, with an eye to gauging progress 
and assessing additional needs as they arise. 
 
-- Provide financial and technical assistance for GOJ's 
e-government program. 
 
-- Provide technical assistance to privatize the National 
Information Technology Center, the implementation arm for 
Jordan's e-government activities. 
 
-- Through USAID and MEPI, provide training to members of 
parliament, the media, and activists affiliated with "watch 
dog" NGOs to better understand and monitor the budget process 
with an eye to increasing transparency. 
 
4.  Desired Outcome:  An open and transparent judicial 
system; improved public confidence in the courts to 
effectively resolve disputes. 
Baseline:  Jordan's justice sector has historically been 
plagued by inefficiency, a large case backlog and a mostly 
manual system of case management.  In cooperation with USAID, 
the GOJ has launched an ambitious initiative to modernize its 
court system and enhance judicial training.  More than 50 
percent of Jordan's judicial case load has now been 
automated, with plans to computerize an additional 20 percent 
over the next nine months.  An expanding alternative dispute 
resolution program is further reducing demands on the courts 
and case delays.  To improve training provided to judges, 
Jordan is also fully revamping its sole Judicial Training 
Institute. 
 
With the support of the American Bar Association (ABA), a 
working group of Jordanian judges from different levels has 
engaged in a year long efforts to develop a judicial code of 
conduct.  This effort included the study of comparative 
resource materials, a series of retreats to draft and revise 
code language, awareness sessions to gather feedback from 
over 500 Jordanian judges, and the publishing of a new code 
for public review and comment.  The new code will contribute 
to the enhancement of judicial independence, as well as to 
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. 
 
USAID has allotted $7.8 million to DPK Consulting and $3 
million to the ABA over a 3-year period to implement judicial 
reform projects. 
 
In addition, post funds supported other programs that boosted 
the judicial reform effort.  For example, the president of 
the Amman Shari'a Court will be in the U.S. for a three-week 
International Visitor Program, entitled "Promoting Interfaith 
Dialogue," in June 2005.  A two-week citizen exchange 
organized by the Institute of the Study and Development of 
Legal Systems is scheduled to take place in San Francisco, in 
September 2005.  Five Jordanians will attend this program: a 
Court of Appeals judge and member of the Judicial Council, 
two Reconciliation Court judges, an Amman Court general 
prosecutor, and a private lawyer.  USAID has nominated the 
Ministry of Justice Project Manager for a U.S. Judicial 
System training program. 
 
2005 Milestones: 
 
-- Trained personnel demonstrably affect efficiency of case 
management and quality of work in courts. 
 
-- Ministry of Justice continues to implement its reform 
strategy and expands court automation throughout Jordan. 
 
-- An alternative dispute resolution program is expanded, 
further reducing case backlogs and delays. 
 
-- Judicial Training Institute reorganized according to 
international best practices; modern teaching methodology 
adopted. 
 
-- New judicial code of conduct adopted and given force of 
law. 
 
2006 Milestones: 
 
-- Increased number of trained personnel continues to improve 
efficiency of case management and work. 
 
-- Ministry of Justice completes reform in 1-2 pilot courts. 
Case processing times reduced over previous year. 
 
-- The court automation system is implemented countrywide, 
and USAID automates 75% of Jordan's total judicial activity. 
 
-- The Judicial Training Institute is recognized as a 
regional model for sustainable training programs. 
Tactics/Diplomatic Strategies: 
 
-- Post and Washington officials encourage GOJ officials to 
draft, amend, pass, and implement laws that reinforce the 
rule of law, using contacts across every sector of the 
U.S.-Jordan relationship. 
 
-- Through the International Visitors Program and in-country 
events, provide training to judges, prosecutors, law school 
professors and other players within the judiciary to improve 
court administration, strengthen English skills, and increase 
computer literacy. 
 
-- USAID works to finalize a new judicial code of conduct, 
with enforcement mechanisms, to provide transparency to the 
rule of law and improve the public's perception of the 
judiciary. 
 
-- USAID continues to support court automation project and 
its implementation throughout Jordan. 
 
-- The Public Affairs section and USAID further develop an 
alternative dispute resolution system (ADR), allowing 
litigants to seek resolutions without formal court 
proceedings. 
 
-- Public Affairs and USAID continue work to build the 
capacity of the Judicial Training Institute to train new 
judges and continue educating the judiciary. 
 
5.    Desired Outcome: A more independent and freer press. 
 
Baseline: Jordan's overall media environment might be called 
"semi-independent."  The government owns a significant 
portion of the country's media outlets, including a 
controlling stake - via the social security corporation -- in 
the Jordan Press Foundation, which owns several papers, 
including top-circulation Al Rai Arabic daily and its 
English-language counterpart The Jordan Times.  The 
government also owns the Petra News Agency, a wire service 
that feeds news stories to the papers that are non-objective, 
essentially government propaganda.  What the GOJ does not own 
it often seeks to influence or control.  Much of the 
censorship is self-imposed out of fear of informal 
repercussions.  Journalists are sometimes harassed by the 
security services and in some rare cases security agents 
stationed at printing companies have held up the presses 
until offending articles are removed.  As a result, Jordan's 
press and broadcast media are constrained in their ability to 
report on sensitive domestic issues, especially when they 
touch the interests of the political elite. 
 
Media reform is a stated goal of the government.  The King 
has called for a freer and more open press in order to 
promote his reform agenda.  Some steps have been taken 
towards that end.  For example, the GOJ recently allowed the 
licensing of private TV and radio stations, although to date 
such stations have been limited to radio entertainment 
channels (the fee for non-entertainment licenses is 50% 
higher).  Also, newly launched independent publications like 
the Arabic daily al-Ghad have rapidly expanded their 
readership and promise to earn good advertising revenues. 
 
2005 Milestones: 
 
-- Criminal penalties under the current press law are 
eliminated. 
 
-- An independent radio station receives a license and begins 
broadcasting news and/or current events programs without 
government interference. 
 
-- A private terrestrial TV station is granted a license and 
begins broadcasting in competition with GOJ-controlled Jordan 
TV. 
 
2006 Milestones: 
 
-- The GOJ sells or divests its shares in the Jordan Press 
Foundation, thereby relinquishing its stake in the print 
media. 
 
-- The security services cease to detain or harass 
journalists deemed to have crossed redlines. 
 
-- Additional private radio and/or TV stations begin 
operation carrying local news and investigative reporting. 
 
Tactics/Diplomatic Strategies: 
 
-- USG weighs in against detention or harassment of 
journalists who criticize the government. 
 
-- PA and USAID continue to train young journalists and 
strengthen the mass communications faculties in Jordanian 
universities. 
 
--PA and USAID support high-profile conferences, workshops 
and other public events that underline the role of a free and 
reliable news media in promoting economic and political 
reform. 
 
Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through 
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE 

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