US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK3436

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003436 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR SECRETARY RUMSFELD 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: OVIP, PGOV, MARR, MASS, TH, Scenesetter 
SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE RUMSFELD 
 
 
Classified By: Charge Alexander A. Arvizu.  Reason 1.4 (a and d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.  (C)  Mr. Secretary, all of us in Bangkok look forward to 
your visit as an opportunity to advance a number of key U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.  We have just finished our annual 
Cobra Gold exercise -- the only multilateral training 
exercise in the Asia-Pacific region.   This year's exercise 
underscored the fact that the quick ramping up of our 
regional hub at Utapao Royal Thai Navy Air Base and our 
military's ability to interact rapidly with Thai counterparts 
during the recent tsunami crisis was a direct result of 
decades of joint combined exercises, training and 
cooperation.  We have requested meetings for you with Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (Prime Minister TOCK-SIN) and 
Defense Minister Gen. Thamarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya 
(Minister TA-MA-ROCK).  In those meetings, you can point to 
the critical U.S. military role in providing assistance to 
Thailand and the other tsunami-hit nations in the region as 
evidence that the United States remains engaged in Southeast 
Asia and is committed to our treaty obligations here.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin is a key ally in the Global War on Terror 
and would welcome your views on this subject as well as 
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Thaksin will likely 
share his opinions on his largest domestic challenge -- 
unrest in the predominantly Muslim provinces of southernmost 
Thailand.  Three other key foreign policy objectives can be 
advanced during your visit: 
 
--  Iraq.  CJCS Myers recently sent the Thai CHOD a letter 
asking Thailand to send officers to the OIF Multinational 
Headquarters.  We await a response to that request.  We have 
also urged Thailand to make another deployment in support of 
OIF, but have not received an official indication whether a 
deployment is in the offing. 
 
--  F-16 Purchase.  The MOD has indicated it plans to procure 
18 new fighter aircraft to replace its aging F-5's. 
Competitors include the Saab Gripen, SU-30 and the F-16 Block 
52.  Both Saab and Sukhoi have a head start on Lockheed 
Martin in the competition and rumors abound that back room 
deals favoring Russian planes may be in the works.  Thaksin 
has suggested any deal must be financed through barter trade, 
which Lockheed Martin is willing to do.  We are pressing the 
Thai to allow F-16 to compete fairly with the Russian and 
Swedish planes.  It would be extremely helpful to Lockheed 
Martin's bid if you were to reinforce points made recently by 
Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick and others. 
 
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-- PSI.  The Thai Foreign Minister has suggested that his 
Government is close to endorsing the Proliferation Security 
Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles (PSI-SOP). 
Nonetheless, the bureaucratic clearance process on 
endorsement is moving slowly.  Encouraging Thaksin to endorse 
the SOP prior to the July Operational Experts Group meeting 
in Copenhagen might prod the Thai Government to action on 
this priority non-proliferation issue.  End Summary 
 
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
2.  (C)  Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. 
The goodwill generated by America's quick and massive 
response to the December 26 tsunami is palpable.  American 
businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in 
Thailand.  The United States is Thailand's largest export 
market and its second-largest foreign investor. 
 
3.  (C)  Nonetheless, there are several points of friction. 
Human rights remain a key concern.  On October 25, 2004, 
poorly trained Thai military and civilian security forces 
forced nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be 
transported to a military base nearly three hours away.  78 
protesters died en route.  The State Department's annual 
human rights report (HRR), which in 2004 voiced concern over 
the lack of accountability for approximately 1,300 
extrajudicial killings in 2003 during a "war on drugs" 
promoted by the Prime Minister, rankles the Thai Government. 
 
4.  (C)  Thailand's policy of "constructive engagement" with 
the military junta in Burma and provision of economic 
assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing frustration 
for us.  The Thai government supports democracy in Burma but 
maintains, not altogether convincingly, that engagement with 
the SPDC is the only realistic approach it has to make 
progress on the major cross-border flows of refugees, illegal 
economic migrants, and methamphetamines it faces from Burma. 
Recently PM Thaksin has voiced growing frustration with 
Rangoon and his Ministers tell us that Thai policy may become 
less favorable towards Burma. 
 
5.  (C)  It surprises many visitors from Washington to learn 
that the Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons 
systems in its arsenal.  While Thai military links with the 
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai 
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast 
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media and the 
military.  Recent visitors have found PM Thaksin to be an 
engaging interlocutor when discussing China -- he would 
likely welcome a chance to discuss China's role in the 
region. 
 
PM THAKSIN 
 
6.  (SBU) In 2001, Thaksin became the first democratically 
elected civilian Prime Minister to win an outright majority 
in the Thai Parliament.  His Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) 
political party dominates domestic politics and controls 377 
of the 500 seats in Parliament.  Thaksin won reelection in a 
landslide victory on February 6th.  Thaksin comes from a 
prosperous Sino-Thai family in Thailand's second largest 
city, Chiang Mai, and placed first in his class at the 
National Police Academy.  He spent several years studying in 
the United States, earning a master's degree in Criminal 
Justice from Eastern Kentucky University and a Doctorate in 
Criminology from Sam Houston State University.  After a few 
years with the police, he left government service to run the 
family business (Shinawatra Corporation, or Shin Corp), which 
he turned into Thailand's largest telecom company, making 
himself a multi-billionaire (in US dollars). 
 
7.  (C)  Thaksin considers himself a personal friend of the 
President, drawing on their common Texas connections.  He 
characterizes himself as a "CEO Prime Minister" and likes to 
be known for being decisive.  He is also impulsive.  His 
critics accuse him of authoritarian tendencies, of staffing 
the major institutions of the country with his family members 
or classmates, and of reinforcing the business interests of 
family and political allies through government policies.  Of 
note, Chaisit Shinawatra, the Royal Thai Supreme Commander, 
is Thaksin's cousin; Chaisit was previously leapfrogged by 
the Prime Minister into the Army Commander position. 
 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
8.  (C)  We conduct a wide range of major exercises and 
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra 
Gold, our only joint/combined/multilateral exercise in the 
Asia Pacific Region.  2005 marked the 24th year we've held 
Cobra Gold.  Over that time, the exercise has transformed 
from a bilateral effort aimed at training to deter a 
conventional attack from Vietnam, to a multilateral exercise 
aimed at enhancing peacekeeping and other skills.  Cobra Gold 
2005 had a special focus on disaster relief and included 
observers and participants from over 20 nations as well as 
representatives from numerous international relief agencies 
and civilian governmental organizations.  For the past five 
years, Singapore has been a participant in the staff exercise 
portion of Cobra Gold.  In 2005, Japan agreed to participate 
in the STAFFEX for the first time and is prepared to send 
participants to Cobra Gold 2006 -- illustrating the special 
role Cobra Gold plays in promoting multilateral engagement in 
Asia. 
 
9.  (C)  Utapao, the Thai Naval Air Base used as the primary 
staging area for U.S. tsunami disaster relief efforts in the 
region, has long been a critical support hub for U.S. 
aircraft transiting the region.  Over 420 DoD aircraft use it 
each year.  From January 25 until February 4, we conducted 
our largest air exercise with the Thai, Cope Tiger.  This 
year, F-18's from the USS Abraham Lincoln, which was 
operating off of Aceh at the time, participated.  Our largest 
naval exercise is the Combined Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) series which will take place again in June. 
 
THE TSUNAMI AFTERMATH AND COBRA GOLD 
 
10.  (U)  The massive rescue and recovery operation 
undertaken by the U.S. military as a result of the December 
26 tsunami was historic.  Mercifully, U.S. casualties were 
much lighter (about two dozen confirmed or presumed dead) 
than those suffered by other countries.  Thousands of Thai, 
Europeans and other Asians were killed in the Phuket area -- 
a haven for vacationers during the holiday season.  Total 
fatalities will likely never be known; the official number is 
about 5,400 but Thai officials privately say they expect the 
final death toll to top 8,000. 
 
11.  (C)  U.S. disaster relief efforts, led by the U.S. 
military, had an immediate impact on affected areas in 
Thailand.  III MEF Commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman, was 
the commanding general of Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 
536), which was based out of Utapao.  CSF 536 worked closely 
with the Embassy and JUSMAGTHAI to ensure that requests for 
assistance were promptly addressed and to assist coordination 
of relief from civilian agencies, NGOs and corporate donors. 
The Royal Thai Armed Forces granted the U.S. military blanket 
overflight clearances for relief operations in the region, 
including for aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln Battle 
Group which operated off Sumatra.  In addition to permitting 
our use of Utapao, the Royal Thai Government integrated Thai 
officers into the CSF staff where needed.  During the height 
of operations, over 1800 USG personnel operated out of 
Utapao.  We distributed over 660,000 pounds of supplies 
within Thailand including medicine, food, dry ice and body 
bags.  USAF C-130s made regular delivery runs from Utapao and 
Bangkok to affected areas for time sensitive supplies while 
bulk shipments tended to go overland.  USN P-3s positioned at 
Utapao conducted search and rescue missions in the region. 
Teams made up of medical specialists from the CDC, the Armed 
Forces Research Institute of Medical Science and the Joint 
POW/MIA Accounting Command in Hawaii were also deployed to 
Thailand to assist with victim identification.  U.S. Navy 
SEALS and a representative from the Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance worked closely with Thai military units 
to search for the remains of American and other victims of 
the disaster.  From the beginning of the disaster, the 
Defense Attache Office painted the intel picture for 
commanders, forces, planners, and national decision makers. 
Embassy Bangkok provided 24-hour American Citizens Services 
for weeks after the crisis to assist Americans, claim Amcit 
remains and coordinate USG relief efforts. 
 
VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 
 
12.  (C)  Prime Minister Thaksin's biggest domestic challenge 
is the unsettled security situation in the far southern part 
of the country.  Southern Thailand, in particular the 
southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat, has experienced episodic violence since it was 
incorporated into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902.  However, 2004 
witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of violence, with 
over 500 people killed either by militants or by security 
forces.  Local Muslim separatist militants have attacked 
symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, and there continue to 
be almost daily incidents of violence, notably even after the 
tsunami disaster of December 26.  Attacks most often involve 
 
SIPDIS 
isolated shootings of local officials, although increasingly 
sophisticated bombing attacks have become more common.  While 
there is no credible evidence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or 
al-Qaeda direction of the violence, there is concern that 
they might attempt to exploit the local violence for their 
own purposes. 
 
13.  (C)  Thaksin has recently acknowledged that the problem 
in Thailand's south is not simply the work of criminal gangs 
as he once declared, and that recent RTG policies towards the 
South have failed to halt the violence.  Thaksin recently 
appointed a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed 
by highly respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
to look for althernative solutions to the long-running 
insurgency, and has indicated that he might replace martial 
law with something less harsh.  Until recently, this violence 
was directed primarily at RTG institutions with no evidence 
of attacks directed towards foreign interests.  On April 3, 
however, simultaneous bombs exploded outside a French-owned 
Carrefour supermarket in Songkla's Hat Yai City and at the 
Hat Yai airport, killing two persons.  Since then there have 
been no other attacks on foreign-owned targets.  Thai 
officials may ask you for U.S. equipment and technology such 
as UAVs to support efforts to monitor militant movements in 
the south.  We recommend you be receptive but noncommittal, 
and suggest that technical experts follow up.  You may also 
wish to point to our current efforts to improve human rights 
training for Thai soldiers and officers who will rotate to 
the south.  We are working with U.S. experts to develop a 
multi-faceted training program to educate enlisted soldiers, 
mid-level officers and senior Thai leadership.  Thaksin -- 
and most Thais -- are sensitive about any perception that the 
U.S. wants to establish a security presence in the south. 
Outrageous but widely circulated rumors that the U.S. has 
fomented violence in the South also need to be considered 
when discussing offers of possible U.S. assistance.  In your 
meetings, you may wish to: 
 
--  Seek Thaksin's assessment of the situation in the south 
and to ask what the Thai strategy is to bring the situation 
under control; 
--  Point out our desire that any Thai security response be 
consistent with international human rights norms. 
 
THAILAND AND IRAQ 
 
14.  (C) Thailand has played an important role in supporting 
the Global War on Terror.  In addition to capturing terrorist 
mastermind Hambali -- the link between the Jemaah Islamiah 
and al Qaeda -- Thailand sent troops to both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Thailand dispatched two deployments to Iraq as part of 
OIF.  In December 2003, two Thai soldiers were killed by a 
car bomb while on duty in Karbala.  Thailand's second 
six-month deployment of 443 medics and engineers to Iraq 
ended on September 20, 2004.  While participation in OIF has 
not caused the domestic furor in Thailand that it has in 
other countries, Thaksin's critics have used Thailand's 
deployments to Iraq against him.  Several RTG officials have 
told us that Thailand's deployments have been used by 
militants to stir up dissent in the Muslim south.  Recently, 
CJCS General Myers sent a letter asking Thailand to consider 
sending staff officers to man the OIF Multinational 
Headquarters.  Although in recent meetings with PACOM 
Commander ADM Fallon and Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick 
Thaksin had said that he would consider some "humanitarian" 
presence in Iraq, at a private dinner on May 12 with the 
Ambassador, Thaksin seemed extremely sensitive to the issue, 
particularly the symbolism that a Thai presence in Iraq would 
have among Muslims in southern Thailand.  Thaksin stressed 
that as an ally Thailand supported the U.S. on Iraq, but 
asked us to be sensitive to his own efforts to manage the 
situation in Thailand's south.  During your meetings with 
Thaksin and Thamarak, you may wish to: 
 
--  Express appreciation for Thailand's previous deployments 
to Afghanistan and Iraq; 
--  Ask whether Thailand would agree to send staff officers 
to man the OIF Multinational Headquarters; 
--  Probe for details about what type of Thai follow-on 
deployment might be possible; 
--  Assure RTG leaders that U.S. military experts will help 
them shape the deployment. 
 
F-16 SALE 
 
15.  (C)  Thailand recently announced its plans to purchase 
18 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-5s in the Royal Thai 
Air Force (RTAF) fleet.  Although the RTAF presently has 59 
F-16s in its inventory, reports indicate that the RTG is 
leaning towards purchasing Saab Gripens or SU-30s because of 
a belief (which we have worked to overcome) that Saab or 
Sukhoi can offer a better business deal to Thailand.  In his 
meetings with ADM Fallon and Deputy Secretary Zoellick, 
Thaksin indicated that a successful bid on the fighter 
contract would have to include barter trade.  Lockheed Martin 
subsequently made clear that it was willing to offer the same 
attractive barter deal that the Russians or Swedes offer. 
Lockheed Martin met with Ministry of Commerce officials for 
the first time to discuss barter trade on May 24 and plans to 
follow up shortly with a meeting with the Commerce Minister 
to assure him that Thailand is prepared to offer the same 
sort of financing package as Saab or Sukhoi.  RTAF officers 
generally support the F-16 Block 52 in the competition 
although rumors abound that the RTAF commander is leaning 
heavily towards purchasing Russian planes.  We have been 
making a full court press on Thaksin asking him to ensure 
that his Commerce and Defense Ministries give Lockheed 
Martin's bid the same serious consideration they are giving 
Saab and Sukhoi.  This point has been made by Secretary Rice, 
Deputy Secretary Zoellick and ADM Fallon.  The Embassy 
believes that pressure from senior U.S. officials like 
yourself is essential for Lockheed Martin's prospects.  It is 
our belief that a transparent competition that takes into 
consideration capability of the aircraft, interoperability 
with U.S. forces, and cost would result in F-16 winning the 
contract.  It would be extremely helpful in this effort if 
you would: 
 
--  Stress our desire for Lockheed Martin to compete in an 
fair competition with the Swedes and Russians. 
--  Note Lockheed Martin's willingness to conduct barter 
trade involving Thai agricultural products and other items. 
--  Point out the interoperability and technology transfer 
advantages F-16 has over SU-30 or Gripen and how it is the 
best choice to defend Thailand. 
 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
 
16  (C)  After a year and a half of lobbying from the U.S. 
and others, Thailand apparently has made the basic policy 
decision to be more supportive of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) and is moving through the final steps 
towards endorsement of the PSI Statement of Interdiction 
Principles (SOP).  However, despite recent assurances by both 
the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister that official 
Thai endorsement of PSI awaits only final Cabinet approval, 
the Royal Thai Government has failed to move forward with the 
initiative.  Prime Minister Thaksin's final scrutiny of the 
decision will be key, and his endorsement cannot be taken for 
granted given his mercurial decision making style.  An action 
driving event might be the upcoming PSI Operational Experts 
Group (OEG) meeting in Copenhagen in July.  If Thailand 
endorses the SOP prior to that meeting, it will be allowed to 
participate with other PSI endorsing countries.  In your 
meeting with PM Thaksin, you may wish to: 
 
--  Welcome the Thai Foreign Minister's recent suggestion to 
Secretary Rice that Thailand will soon endorse the PSI SOP. 
 
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--  Note the importance of the upcoming OEG meeting in 
Copenhagen in July and express our hope that Thailand 
endorses the PSI principles prior to that meeting. 
 
 
ARVIZU