US embassy cable - 05BOGOTA4959

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 004959 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2015 
TAGS: PHUM, PTER, SNAR, KJUS, PINR, CO 
SUBJECT: INDIVIDUAL DESERTION PROGRAM CREATING CONCERN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Over 7,000 deserters from the illegal armed groups 
have entered the GOC's reinsertion program since Uribe took 
office.  The Ministry of Defense controls the first phase of 
reinsertion when deserters are debriefed for intelligence 
purposes and given basic humanitarian assistance. 
Intelligence provided by deserters has been used in an 
estimated 40 percent of all security operations.  The 
Ministry of Interior and Justice manages the second phase, a 
two-year program that provides housing, job training, health 
care, and social services.  The program has improved since 
Uribe took office, but is under-funded and struggles to 
provide even basic reinsertion services on a timely basis. 
The majority of deserters are housed in Bogota.  The Bogota 
Mayor's office has expressed serious concern about weak 
reinsertion services, heavy concentrations of deserters in a 
few neighborhoods, retaliatory attacks against deserters who 
provide intelligence, and a growing paramilitary presence in 
southern Bogota.  The Mayor's Office has created a 
demobilization office to compliment and support the GOC's 
reinsertion program.  End summary. 
 
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Desertions Rising 
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2. (C) Since President Uribe took office, over 7,000 illegal 
armed group members have deserted and entered the GOC's 
reinsertion program (this is separate, but similar, from the 
program for collectively demobilized paramilitaries). 
Desertions have continued at a steady rate.  In the first 
four months of 2005, over 900 deserted, slightly more than 
during the same period the year before.  More than half of 
the deserters are from the FARC, approximately 30 percent are 
paramilitaries, 15 percent are from the ELN, and the rest are 
from other minor groups.  Antioquia Department produces the 
most deserters, averaging about 30 each month.  Since 2004, 
the number of FARC deserters from Caqueta and Meta 
Departments, where the military is conducting an offensive 
against the guerrillas, has more than doubled to about 20 
each month. 
 
3.  (C) The desertion program has two phases: after 
deserting, individuals are turned over to the Ministry of 
Defense, where they are given basic humanitarian assistance, 
housing, and debriefed for intelligence purposes.  After this 
phase, which lasts about a month, they are enrolled in the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice's (MOI/J) reinsertion 
program, where they are given housing, job training, 
employment opportunities, and a monthly stipend of 
approximately USD 150.  Most of the deserters are housed in 
Bogota, but the GOC recently established shelters in 
Medellin, Cali, and other major cities.  During reinsertion, 
the Prosecutor General's office verifies that the deserters 
are not implicated in any serious crimes.  If so, they are 
pardoned under Law 782 for membership in an illegal armed 
group and connected minor crimes.  Those implicated in 
unpardonable crimes (i.e., violent crimes or drug 
trafficking) are processed under the normal criminal code. 
 
 
4.  (C) Funding is tight.  The Embassy's Narcotics Affairs 
Section provides technical support and some funding to the 
Ministry of Defense's part of the program.  The Dutch, 
Swedish, and Japanese governments are giving limited support 
to the MOI/J's program.  The MOI/J's 2005 reinsertion budget 
for both deserters and collective demobilizations is CP 71 
billion (approximately USD 29.5 million) and the Defense 
Ministry's desertion budget is CP 28 billion (approximately 
USD 11.6 million).  According to MOI/J reinsertion director 
Juan David Angel, this leaves the GOC with enough funding to 
cover basic reinsertion services but not enough for 
employment generation projects. 
 
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Key Intelligence 
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5.  (C) According to the Ministry of Defense, some 40 percent 
of military operations have used intelligence provided by 
deserters.  For example, the seventh and tenth mobile 
brigades in the Plan Patriota area of operations recently 
dealt the FARC's first front a serious blow using deserters 
as guides or informants.  At least 15 first front members 
were captured in the past few weeks. 
 
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Complaints 
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6.  (C) The Bogota Mayor's office has voiced concerns about 
the reinsertion program.  Bogota has approximately 3,500 
deserters and at least several hundred collective 
demobilized.  When immediate family members are included, 
there are over 8,000.  The vast majority of deserters are 
housed in 75 shelters throughout the city.  The collective 
demobilized and a small number of demobilized live in private 
residences.  Publicly, Mayor Garzon has said the deserters 
are a time bomb because they are not being given adequate 
reinsertion benefits or sufficient incentives to remain out 
of criminal life.  Privately, Garzon's staff told poloffs 
they had three principle concerns: 
 
-- Poor MOI/J management: Garzon's staff asserted that the 
MOI/J reinsertion program was struggling to provide 
reinsertion benefits on a timely basis and did not have 
funding to conduct employment generation projects (Juan David 
Angel has acknowledged this).  They expressed concern that 
the program did not track or monitor the deserters except by 
requiring them to report monthly to the reinsertion office to 
receive their monthly stipend, and that the deserters were 
returning to illicit activity undetected.  At least 240 
re-joined an illegal armed group in 2004.  They also 
expressed frustration with the MOI/J's failure to notify them 
when collective demobilized were being placed in Bogota. 
 
-- Heavy concentration in Bogota: the Mayor's office is 
worried that concentrating thousands of deserters, primarily 
in the neighborhood of Teusquillo, is a liability and does 
not discourage deserters to break all ties to illegal armed 
groups.  They were pleased that the GOC had begun placing 
deserters in other major cities such as Cali and Medellin and 
said they were also urging the GOC to consult with them on 
future locations of Bogota shelters so they could be more 
evenly spread throughout the city. 
 
-- Decree 2767: the GOC issued a decree detailing monetary 
compensation for deserters who provide intelligence on 
illegal armed groups.  Although the Mayor's Office 
acknowledged that deserters provide valuable intelligence, 
they believe the decree will encourage too many to come 
forward and cause retaliatory attacks.  They claimed that 
already there have been bomb threats against neighborhoods 
where deserters are housed. 
 
7. (C) To complement the MOI/J's reinsertion program and 
improve coordination with the GOC, the Mayor's Office created 
a demobilization office in March.  The office's three 
objectives are to (1) provide extra control and monitoring of 
deserters, (2) assist children of demobilized, and (3) 
provide assistance and monitoring after deserters depart the 
two-year MOI/J program.  Progress has been limited so far. 
It has employed 60 demobilized as Transmilenio (the city's 
public bus system) guides, chefs, and public health care 
receptionists.  It is training 50 more in office management 
at a local university, but has been unable to get private 
sector companies to hire them for mandatory internships.  It 
estimates the deserters have at least 500 children.  Over 400 
have been enrolled in free public education and the Mayor's 
Office is working with the MOI/J to organize a day of public 
services for the children. 
 
8.  (C) The Mayor's Office envisions its program to be 
similar to the program run by Mayor Sergio Fajardo in 
Medellin.  However, they noted that Bogota faces different 
challenges: the deserters are a more diverse group of rural 
ex-guerrillas and urban ex-paramilitaries, are not natives of 
Bogota, and face a constant threat of retaliation from their 
former commanders. 
 
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Paramilitary Recruiting 
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9.  (C) The Mayor's Office is alarmed at growing AUC 
dominance in southern Bogota, especially the poverty-stricken 
neighborhoods of Ciudad Bolivar, Suba, and Kennedy.  They 
said they had seen clear signs of paramilitary influence, 
including AUC graffiti, reports of AUC roadblocks, and 
recruiting efforts, especially among deserters.  Murders in 
the first three months of 2005 grew by eight percent compared 
to the same period in 2004.  According to the Mayor's Office 
the majority of those murdered have been gang members, 
prostitutes, drug addicts, and other delinquents the AUC 
wishes to eliminate. 
 
10.  (C) They noted that Bogota does not have enough police 
to prevent paramilitary incursions.  Of the 14,000 police 
officers serving in Bogota, only 7,000 were armed and 
actively protecting citizens while the rest were in unarmed, 
administrative, or private security positions.  The Peace 
Commissioner's Office and the National Police have pledged to 
work closely with the Mayor's Office but claim that common 
criminals rather than an organized AUC campaign are 
responsible for the increases in violence. 
 
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Comment 
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11.  (C) Deserters run significantly more risks than those 
who collectively demobilize.  They provide valuable 
intelligence and face the constant threat of retaliation from 
their illegal armed groups.  The program has the potential to 
remove as many, if not more, terrorists from the battlefield 
than the AUC peace process. 
 
 
 
 
WOOD