US embassy cable - 05CAIRO3941

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ARREST OF SENIOR MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OFFICIAL FURTHER ESCALATES "SHOWDOWN" WITH GOE

Identifier: 05CAIRO3941
Wikileaks: View 05CAIRO3941 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Cairo
Created: 2005-05-24 16:01:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV KISL EG Muslim Brotherhood
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KISL, EG, Muslim Brotherhood 
SUBJECT: ARREST OF SENIOR MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD OFFICIAL 
FURTHER ESCALATES "SHOWDOWN" WITH GOE 
 
REF: A. CAIRO 3755 
     B. CAIRO 3424 
 
Classified by A/DCM Michael Corbin for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The GOE arrested on May 22 Mahmoud Ezzat, 
Secretary-General of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB).  Ezzat 
 
SIPDIS 
is the most senior MB official to be arrested in at least a 
decade.  His arrest comes in the context of an increasingly 
sharp and sustained confrontation between the government and 
the MB, as the former frets over unprecedented pressures - 
internal and external - to reform, and the latter adopts both 
more assertive street tactics and a more carefully tailored 
public message playing up reformist rhetoric and playing down 
traditional Islamist slogans (ref A).  Ezzat's arrest, and 
the MB's harsh rhetoric in response, suggest attitudes on 
both sides are continuing to harden.  End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Same Net, Bigger Fish 
--------------------- 
 
2. (C) As predicted in ref A, the standoff between the GOE 
and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the illegal but partially 
tolerated group which claims to speak for the majority of 
Egyptians, has continued to escalate.  The May 22 arrest of 
Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat, the MB's Secretary-General and 
second-in-command, along with six "key" MB figures in several 
governorates, appeared to bring the confrontation to a new 
level.  Ezzat is the most senior MB figure to be arrested in 
at least a decade. 
 
3. (C) Ezzat's arrest also follows the May 6 arrest of 
prominent MB spokesman Essam Erian, who was reportedly 
preparing to announce an (illegal) campaign for the 
Presidency.  Hundreds of other MB members, up to 3000 by the 
group's count, have been arrested in the past six weeks, 
although there have also been reports of subsequent 
mass-releases.  Independent media reports estimate about 800 
in custody from the current crackdown. 
 
4. (C) Until recently, the GOE and the MB appeared to have an 
unwritten understanding that periodic arrests would exclude 
the group's senior echelon, presumably in exchange for some 
level of restraint on the part of the MB.  As discussed 
reftel, that understanding began to unravel, and tensions 
with the group began to flare, earlier this spring, as the MB 
shifted gears and began to defy bans on public demonstrations 
and step up its demands for "political reform" and "freedom 
of association" in place of its traditional Islamist slogans. 
 
------------------- 
The GOE's Complaint 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The pro-government daily Al-Ahram printed highlights 
of the GOE's legal complaint against Ezzat and other MB 
defendants (which, according to the daily al-Hayat, is being 
applied against 700 co-defendants in case number 604/2005). 
The complaint accuses defendants of: 
 
-- Acting to create chaos and instigate the masses; 
-- Calling for civil disobedience; 
-- Creating chaos to embarrass the state; 
-- Encouraging people to boycott the (May 25) referendum; 
-- Collecting funds for a banned organization; 
-- Recruiting new members, especially among those of limited 
income; 
-- Printing large quantities of leaflets in support of these 
activities. 
 
--------------------- 
Campus Connections (?) 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Al-Ahram also speculated that Ezzat's arrest had been 
prompted by his participation in several recent 
demonstrations at university campuses, during which groups of 
faculty members (to the chagrin of university 
administrations) had threatened to refuse to correct 
students' annual exams as an act of "civil disobedience" in 
solidarity with Islamist faculty colleagues swept up in the 
GOE's recent arrests of MB members.  As noted in ref B, State 
Security maintains a large presence at most universities, 
apparently to keep Islamist students and faculty members in 
check.  Their presence, generally seen as heavy-handed and 
even academically stifling, prompted unprecedented 
demonstrations by faculty members at several universities in 
April. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Reactions - Satisfied and Defiant 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Commentators in several pro-government newspapers 
described Ezzat's arrest as a "crippling blow" and a 
"terrible shock" to the MB.  One pro-GOE commentator 
interpreted the move as a "clear signal from the government 
that it would not be intimidated by the MB and was capable of 
taking action against them." 
 
8. (SBU) If Ezzat's arrest shocked and crippled the MB, 
Supreme Guide Mahdy Akef did not reflect this during a May 22 
appearance on the Arabic satellite channel Al-Arabiyya.  He 
stated that the arrests would not dissuade the MB from 
continuing to demand reform and accused the GOE of losing 
direction.  In particularly provocative language, Akef 
accused the GOE of arresting any MB members who might run for 
parliament this fall, claiming that the GOE lives in fear of 
the "landslide victory" the MB would achieve if allowed to 
compete in a free election.  In remarks to the regional 
Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Akef described the GOE's 
arrests of MB members as proof that the regime "is weak and 
about to crumble" and said "let them arrest whoever they want 
- we have thousands of others who can run." 
 
------------------ 
Parliament Dust-Up 
------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Meanwhile, on May 23, Assistant Minister of Interior 
Ahmed Dia'addin appeared at parliament in response to 
interpolations filed by several of the 15 "independent" MPs 
affiliated with the MB in the People's Assembly to protest 
the arrests.  The MB MPs harangued Dia'addin, asserting that 
the Minister himself should have appeared and accused the 
Ministry of Interior of mistreating MB detainees, denying 
them due process, and applying excessive emergency law powers 
in conducting their arrests.  Dia'addin rejected the MPs 
complaints, asserting that the MB detainees were being 
processed and charged under the penal code, underlined that 
"no one is above the law," and said that demands that the 
Minister of Interior himself appear were unreasonable and 
intended to "divert the Minister's attention from addressing 
real problems" and safeguarding the country. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) While Ezzat's arrest represents an escalation in the 
current round of GOE-MB tensions, both sides still have more 
weapons at their disposal, should they wish to further 
intensify their dispute.  As Supreme Guide Akef himself 
acknowledged, there are still plenty of MB members (including 
senior leaders) the GOE could arrest.  The GOE could also 
close down MB central offices and those MB-affiliated 
organizations.  It is not clear whether or how the MB could 
further flex their muscles, but Akef's most recent remarks - 
predicting an electoral landslide that would shame and 
humiliate the GOE (if the MB was allowed to compete), and 
asserting that the GOE is "about to crumble" suggest a 
hardening attitude - come in stark contrast from his remarks 
a week earlier (ref A) in which he asserted the group did not 
seek the downfall of the regime.  For now, we believe the MB 
will stick to its strategy of "civil disobedience" and 
reformist rhetoric, but may also seek to ramp up its 
aggressive street tactics, with the attendant potential for 
violent clashes with police.  End comment. 
 
 
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo 
 
You can also access this site through the 
State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. 
 
GRAY 

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