US embassy cable - 05RANGOON639

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000639 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PINS, BM, Ethnics 
SUBJECT: BURMA: SHIFTING ALLIANCES AMONG SHAN ARMIES 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 507 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     B. RANGOON 332 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Burmese regime has successfully pressured 
elements of ethnic cease-fire groups in Shan State to 
surrender their weapons.  These groups comprise former rebels 
seeking autonomy or independence from Rangoon who were 
allowed to retain their arms as part of an agreement to give 
up fighting.  The recent regime pressure has reportedly 
caused other ethnic militiamen to annul a heretofore observed 
cease-fire agreement and throw in their lot with insurgents 
still resisting the Burmese regime along the Burma-Thai 
border.  The number of formerly pacified insurgents 
purportedly heading back to the warpath remains small.  As an 
isolated incident, this development is probably 
insignificant.  If it is the start of a trend, however, it 
could herald a return to low-intensity conflict in many parts 
of northeast Burma and added turmoil in border areas.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) With much fanfare, the SPDC has over the past six 
weeks succeeded in convincing three small ethnic military 
groups in Shan State to surrender their arms.  They include 
Aik Mone's Palaung State Liberation Party (cease-fire since 
1991) two units of the Shan State National Army (SSNA) 
(cease-fire since 1995).  Following pressure by the Burmese 
Army, Shan sources report that on May 21, one SSNA group 
surrendered over 300 soldiers and their families along with 
some small armaments.  Shan sources allege that this unit 
transferred its heavier weapons to other SSNA units before 
the full surrender. 
 
3. (C) Shortly thereafter, the commander of SSNA, Col. Sai 
Yi, and three remaining SSNA "brigades" with an estimated 
strength of around 2,000 soldiers, reportedly declared an 
alliance with the largest insurgent movement in Shan State, 
the SSA-S.  Shan sources report that it was the regime's 
strong pressure on the cease-fire groups to hand over their 
arms that caused Col. Sai Yi and his troops to abrogate the 
1995 cease-fire agreement and throw his support behind the 
SSA-S. 
 
4. (C) On May 22, the Burmese Army reportedly moved three 
battalions to seal off the SSNA's stronghold near Mong Yin in 
central Shan State.  Key SSNA leaders and the bulk of the 
holdout SSNA soldiers are reported to have moved to an area 
near the Thai border controlled by SSA-S and thus beyond the 
current reach of the Burmese Army. 
 
Comment:  Rumblings in the Hinterland 
 
5. (C) The arrest of Shan political leaders in February (ref 
B), an overblown PR campaign to discredit an exile-led 
declaration of Shan independence effort (ref A), and the 
orchestrated surrender of small armed groups underscore the 
regime's considerable paranoia over ethnic issues in general, 
and Shan aspirations for greater autonomy in particular.  The 
GOB's efforts have in part served to solidify disparate Shan 
groups, angered by the heavy-handed treatment, to resist 
domination by Rangoon. 
 
6. (C) The SSNA's apparent declaration marks the first 
collapse of one of the regime's 17 cease-fire agreements 
brokered by former PM Khin Nyunt.  A tie-up between the SSNA 
and the SSA-S is unlikely to pose a serious threat to the 
SPDC's grip on power (indeed, we would expect a swift 
response by the Burmese Army to neutralize the SSNA 
holdouts).  However, further consolidation among Shan State's 
archipelago of sundry cease-fire and insurgent groups could 
certainly complicate things for the regime.  End Comment. 
Martinez