US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2911

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CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF MOVES CENTER STAGE ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

Identifier: 05ANKARA2911
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA2911 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-05-23 14:42:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR PREL PGOV TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002911 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF MOVES CENTER 
STAGE ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: In an unprecedented public address at the 
Istanbul War College on the occasion of his annual evaluation 
of the Turkish military, Chief of the Turkish General Staff 
(CHOD) Ozkok broke his almost two year silence on Turkish 
foreign policy to lay out his views, in the name of the 
Turkish state, on the country's national security and major 
foreign policy concerns -- including the strength and 
importance of the Turkey/US bilateral relationship -- and, 
most importantly, the AKP Government's policy drift and 
tampering with the core principles of the Republic of Turkey. 
 While the CHOD downplayed the speech as standard practice, 
his words shook the Turkish government, which scrambled to 
catch up by claiming his views as their own.  EU diplomats 
called the speech harsh and questioned Ozkok's continued 
commitment to democracy, civilian control over the military 
and the EU accession process.  A Turkish think tank with ties 
to the military characterized the speech as noteworthy but 
pushed aside concerns about the military overstepping its 
bounds.  In speaking out, Ozkok reverted to TGS tradition to 
step forward and press for a course correction when it 
decides the government has strayed from Ataturk's founding 
principles.  His speech sent a clear message to the 
government to tighten the sails and get back on course.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) In a break from the past, CHOD General Hilmi Ozkok 
used his annual graduation speech to the Turkish War Academy 
on April 20 as a platform to present a 90-minute dissertation 
on the state of the Turkish state.  Addressing his remarks to 
the cadets and other retired and active-duty military 
officers present, he nevertheless used the live TV coverage 
to reach beyond the academy in a public address to his 
troops, the government and the broader public. 
 
3. (C) With the post-Sept. 11 security environment as a 
starting point, Ozkok did a tour d'horizon of global and 
regional priorities that impact on Turkey.  He also drew 
attention to what the secular establishment considers 
"troubling" domestic trends.  In subsequent comments to an EU 
Ambassador, Ozkok characterized the speech as a regular part 
of his job, but added that there were four reasons for the 
timing of the speech: 1) Requirement to give the annual war 
academy address; 2) Need to address the media distortion of 
matters under TGS purview; correct the record for his troops; 
3) Routine for CHOD to provide a periodic tour d'horizon; 4) 
"People want to hear from me." 
 
EU FEARS OF TGS RECIDIVISM 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Trying to make sense of Ozkok's speech in preparation 
for an EU DCMs' meeting on the topic, Dutch Defense Attach 
and PolCouns conveyed to Deputy PolMilCouns their uncertainty 
about the real message and their uneasiness that the speech 
represented a shift in TGS policy away from support of the 
government.  Characterizing Ozkok's words as "very harsh," 
and the points on Greece as "extremely negative," they 
registered discomfort with what they viewed as veiled threats 
to Kurdish rights, religious freedom and democratic practice. 
 They questioned whether Ozkok, in speaking out, was 
distancing himself from PM Erdogan and from Turkey's EU 
accession drive, which he had firmly and overtly supported 
since taking office.  Various EU representatives expressed 
dismay that Ozkok "stepped out in front of the government" 
with a policy speech and wondered if this signaled a TGS 
decision to re-assert its authority. In his own defense on 
this point, Ozkok told the Ambassador that much of his speech 
had been taken from one made by NSC SecGen Alpogan the 
previous month.  Gunduz Aktan, Director of the Eurasian 
Strategic Studies Center (ASAM), a local think tank whose 
board is dominated by retired military officials, and who 
himself has close contact with the military, literally waved 
off this suggestion, dismissing Alpogan's speech as something 
he hadn't even bothered to read.  With the speech out in the 
open, Turkish officials sought to paper over civil-military 
differences.  MFA Americas Affairs Deputy Director General 
Ilicak claimed Ozkok's points on the US/TU bilateral 
relationship reflected MFA briefing material for various TGS 
meetings with American officials.  PM Erdogan and FM Gul, in 
public remarks affirming that Ozkok's speech reflected the 
government position, took pains to reaffirm their commitment 
to the EU accession process. 
 
GOVERNMENT LOST ITS AUTHORITY 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) ASAM Director Aktan, who has reportedly advised TGS on 
occasion, blamed the government for the speech.  In his view, 
the Erdogan government, which has enjoyed a longer honeymoon 
than any previous government, has begun to drift.  While 
giving PM Erdogan credit as a quick study who has matured as 
a politician since his days as Istanbul Mayor, Aktan said the 
government's inexperience and ineptitude as a whole has led 
to its undoing.  From a general lack of open communication 
with foreign interlocutors to hasty decisions based on 
emotion, the government has repeatedly stumbled and is 
beginning a decline that, once begun, no previous Turkish 
government had ever recovered from.  If Aktan is to be 
believed, the fissures in the ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) are so deep that any significant event  -- 
violence in the wake of a European Court of Human Rights 
decision that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan should be 
re-tried or a failure to advance Turkey's EU candidacy -- 
could provide the final blow to the government. 
 
6. (C) In Aktan's view, Ozkok made the speech because he 
believed, as the head of the Turkish military -- charged with 
preserving Ataturk's Republic -- he had the right to lay out 
his views when he sensed the government was veering too far 
from the founding principles of the Republic.  Aktan rejected 
the idea that the speech signaled the military was preparing 
for action, but rather provided a warning to the government 
to get back on track.  "How could General Ozkok bring out the 
troops when President Bush is using the word "democracy" in 
speech after speech?" he asked, adding that TGS understands 
such action is not conceivable in the current political 
environment.  Aktan considered the speech important for two 
reasons:  1) That it was made at all; and 2) that it reminded 
the government of TGS redlines, e.g. importance of secularism 
and opposition to fundamentalist activity and placing 
"reactionaries" in government positions. 
 
THE SPEECH: OZKOK'S VIEW OF THE WORLD 
------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Ozkok used his speech to the War Academy to educate 
his troops, the Turkish government and broader population on 
TGS's view of the global security situation and its impact on 
Turkey's domestic and international policy priorities.  There 
were pointed messages for the US, the EU and the AKP 
government. 
 
US PARTNERSHIP CENTRAL TO TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY/FOREIGN 
POLICY:  Ozkok reaffirmed the centrality of the bilateral 
relationship, developing an approach first articulated by 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug in his Jan. 26 
televised press conference that the 50-year alliance with the 
US is too wide-ranging to be indexed to any one action or 
event (i.e., lack of US action against the PKK).  Like any 
relationship, Ozkok said, ties with the US have witnessed ups 
and downs but are made durable by the mutual confidence in 
shared interests and expectations on a host of issues.  The 
relationship will be strengthened by keeping the channels of 
communication and dialogue open and respecting mutual 
sensitivities.  This message -- given the recent strain of 
relations over Iraq and US requests for Incirlik Air Base -- 
was for the Turkish government as much as the US.  Ozkok went 
on to note areas of Turkish sensitivity: 
 
Turkey Not an Example:  Right off the bat, Ozkok felt 
compelled to re-educate his audience on the unique nature of 
the Turkish state.  Saying "some circles want to define 
Turkey as a moderate Islamic country",  he acknowledged 
Turkey's majority Muslim population, but underscored that 
Turkey is a secular, democratic country.  It is not an 
"Islamic state", nor is it an "Islamic country." (Note: while 
most Turks could accept his first sentence, the second one 
was broadly perceived as attacking religion and caused a 
sharp reaction among more pious Turks, tangibly setting back 
TGS efforts to erode the AKP's public support by portraying 
the government as irresponsible and harmful.  End Note.)  He 
warned that it is unrealistic to expect Muslim countries that 
have not undergone the same historical process of 
secularization to easily transform into a democracy. 
 
BMENA: Following a dispassionate description of the 
political, economic and social goals of the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa (BMENA) project, Ozkok shot a warning 
that successful democratization efforts are based on 
indigenous reform, not imposed from outside. 
 
Iran: Ozkok emphasized Turkey's concerns that Iran may try to 
impose its brand of theocratic regime on its neighbors and 
questioned Iran's nuclear activities.  He underscored that 
Turkey supports a nuclear-free Middle East, achieved 
peacefully, and plugged the EU-3 negotiation process. 
 
Iraq: Ozkok laid out TGS' three policy priorities - 1) the 
political and territorial integrity of Iraq; 2) a strategy to 
deal with the PKK; and 3) Special Status for Kirkuk.  Ozkok 
made clear his belief that US "failure" to expel the PKK from 
northern Iraq strengthened the terrorist organization.  He 
dismissed the addition of the PKK to US and EU terrorist 
lists as meaning nothing in actual practice.  Ozkok said the 
lack of US kinetic action against the PKK is 
"thought-provoking", a statement that was probably inteded as 
much a reproach to the AKP government for failing to allow US 
OIF deployment through Turkey as an oblique reference to 
suspicions that the US meets with or supports the PKK.  Ozkok 
characterized Kirkuk as a bomb ready to explode (a common 
Turkish metaphor to describe Kirkuk) - claiming the Kurdish 
influx into Kirkuk after US forces entered was greater than 
the numbers forced out by Saddam, affecting the voter 
demographics in favor of the Kurds; and Kirkuk sat on oil 
resources that belonged to all Iraqis and must be shared. 
For that reason, Ozkuk said, Turkey favors granting Kirkuk a 
special political status. (NOTE: At a subsequent TGS briefing 
for U.S. visitors which PolMilOf attended, the military 
called for a UN or OSCE observation mission to Kirkuk for the 
expected December 2005 elections.  END NOTE.) 
 
Syria: In contrast to private meetings with US officials, 
during which members of the General Staff tout the virtues of 
President Bashar Assad and urge the US to support him against 
others in the government who seek to take advantage of his 
youth and inexperience, Ozkok spent little time on Syria in 
this speech.  While noting Turkey's thaw in relations with 
Syria since PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's 1999 capture, he 
said Turkey is closely following events in Lebanon and 
suggested that Syria's actions with respect to Lebanon must 
continue to be watched. 
 
Other:  Ozkok noted Turkey's support for the Middle East 
Peace Process, emphasized the continued need for NATO and the 
EU in the Balkans, and outlined Turkey's role in the command 
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in 
Afghanistan.  He mentioned the importance of continued peace 
and stability in Georgia to the Baku-Tiblis-Ceyhan pipeline. 
On the Black Sea, Ozkok provided a straightforward accounting 
of Turkey's anti-terrorist activities in the sea and its 
plans for cooperative efforts with littoral-nations.  Unlike 
private TGS statements on the issue, Ozkok mentioned nothing 
non-littoral or NATO activity there. 
 
GREECE/CYPRUS/ARMENIA - The Big Three: Ozkok did not mince 
words when providing his perspective on Turkey' top three 
regional heart burns.  Ozkok's speech followed on the heels 
of an incident in which a Turkish cadet in Greece on a 
military exchange found a desecrated Turkish flag in his room 
(Note: Greece later apologized for the incident and launched 
an investigation which TGS accepted, and both countries have 
resumed mil-mil exchanges.  End Note.).  After first noting 
the recent improvement in bilateral relations, Ozkok 
criticized Greece for its high level of defense spending and 
for defining Turkey as a "threat."  He placed blame for the 
Aegean conflict squarely in Greece's hands, criticizing 
Greece for arming its Aegean islands and "constricting" 
international airspace. 
 
Cyprus: Moving from the Aegean to the Mediterranean, Ozkok 
called Cyprus among the Turkey's most important national 
interests and international agreements for two reasons: 1) 
Turkey's security responsibility to Turkish Cypriots under is 
guarantor agreement; 2) Cyprus' strategic security role for 
Turkey.  Ozkok said TGS supported a "durable and fair" 
solution on Cyprus.  Alluding to the EU requirement for 
Turkey to recognize all new EU member states, including 
Cyprus, in its EU Association Agreement, Ozkok gave Turkey 
credit for the Turkish Cypriot vote in favor of the Annan 
Plan in the April 2004 referendum.  In Ozkok's view, Turkey 
should not be asked to make any additional "gestures" after 
all the Turkish Cypriots did to work for a solution only to 
see promised assistance not materialize.  He accused the 
Greek Cypriots of dragging out the negotiations in order to 
extract further Turkish concessions, with no view towards a 
settlement. 
 
Armenia: While welcoming better relations with Armenia, Ozkok 
lambasted that government for not respecting Turkey's 
territorial integrity, allowing continuation of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and pressing for international 
recognition of an Armenian genocide in Turkey during WWI. 
Ozkok asserted that the 1915 deportation of Armenians was 
designed to protect Armenians from Turks who were angry about 
the uprising of Armenians against the Ottoman empire. 
Without explicitly saying it, Ozkok did recognize that any 
blame for massive deaths would lie with the former Ottoman 
Empire when he noted that the issue was closed with the 1923 
Lausanne Treaty establishing the Republic of Turkey (Note: a 
useful approach the Turkish government has failed to pick up 
on. End Note.) 
 
EU: In contrast to his putting relations with the US first, 
Ozkok spoke of "EU prospects."  He repeated three times that 
EU membership is at the top of Turkey's agenda.  However, in 
between each affirmation he criticized the accession process 
and expressed dismay about what he views as the negative turn 
of public and political opinion in some EU countries against 
Turkey's accession.  He touted the size, youth and political 
power that Turkey would bring to the EU and emphasized that 
the yes/no decision on Turkey's accession does not belong to 
the EU alone.  Turkey will make its own determination. 
(Note: One senior TGS officer told us that Ozkok's remarks 
represented a watered-down version of widely held frustration 
with the EU within TGS HQ.  End Note.) 
 
MESSAGE FOR THE AKP GOVERNMENT: Saving the most important 
message for last, Ozkok drew attention to TGS' deep concerns 
with the course of domestic events.  He reminded his audience 
that the Turkish Armed Forces will continue to strive, as 
they always have, to protect and guard the democratic, 
secular, and social character of the Turkish republic, as 
well as its territorial indivisibility.  He attacked a 
variety of social ills he claimed are undermining the Turkish 
public's belief in itself and in the government, and having 
deleterious effects on society as a whole: separatist 
terrorist activities turned political activity; 
fundamentalist activity; cultural degeneration; corruption; 
and endemic poverty. 
 
Separatists: Ozkok said that what separatists (read: Kurds) 
tried but failed to accomplish through terrorism in the 
1990s, they are now working to do politically, using the EU 
as their vehicle.  Ozkok stated that those groups pressing 
for separate ethnic rights in Turkey were aiming to undermine 
the unitary nature of the Republic and warned that any 
attempt to do so could incite a conflict.  He underscored the 
need for all "conscious" people to accept and support the 
inviolability of the territorial unity of the Republic of 
Turkey. 
 
Fundamentalists: Ozkok again underscored that secularism is 
the core principle of Ataturk's Republic.  He criticized what 
he saw as intensified efforts to drag "a personal matter" - 
religion - into politics through schools, businesses and the 
media and through stepped-up efforts by fundamentalists to 
get their staff into public institutions.  Drawing a clear 
red line for the AKP government, Ozkok said secularism and 
modernity will "carry the Republic of Turkey further ahead. 
No one should expect the Turkish Armed Forces to be impartial 
on this issue." 
 
Cultural Degeneration:  To these problems, Ozkok added 
corruption, poverty and rural-to-urban population shifts. 
Separatists, fundamentalists and others who sought to 
undermine the unity of Turkey, he said, used mass media and 
other means to play on the vulnerabilities of the 
impoverished and uneducated.  The combination of factors, in 
his view was leading to a cultural degeneration in Turkey and 
an erosion in the "Turkish" identity of its citizens.  Ozkok 
called for efforts to support the poor, strengthen the middle 
class and to incorporate the poor squatter communities on the 
outskirts of major urban centers into city planning efforts. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT: The timing of the speech, coming after months 
of government policy drift, was not coincidental.  Nor is the 
fact that the speech touched on domestic issues outside of 
the traditional purview of the Western military model Turkey 
has been working to embrace, but of consistent concern to the 
core institutions of the Turkish State.  A forward-leaning 
TGS naturally makes the EU uncomfortable but is consistent 
with TGS' historical role to preserve the secular, unitary 
Turkish state, as they believe Ataturk would have wanted it. 
Ozkok drew a clear line in the sand on developments the 
Turkish military will not tolerate.  We view this address as 
a wake-up call for a government that has lost its way.  As 
Aktan and others suggest, the government was not pleased with 
this speech but all are linking arms in a purported show of 
unity now that it is out.  Whether the AKP government will 
take the message to heart remains to be seen.  If Aktan is to 
be believed, the government has begun down a slippery slope 
to self-destruction.  General Ozkok, in the name of the 
Turkish State, may just have given them a post-post-modern 
nudge forward.  END COMMENT. 
 
9.  (U) Baghdad minimized considered. 
 
EDELMAN 

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