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| Identifier: | 05ANKARA2911 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05ANKARA2911 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2005-05-23 14:42:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | MARR PREL PGOV TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002911 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2015 TAGS: MARR, PREL, PGOV, TU SUBJECT: CHIEF OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF MOVES CENTER STAGE ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 1. (C) SUMMARY: In an unprecedented public address at the Istanbul War College on the occasion of his annual evaluation of the Turkish military, Chief of the Turkish General Staff (CHOD) Ozkok broke his almost two year silence on Turkish foreign policy to lay out his views, in the name of the Turkish state, on the country's national security and major foreign policy concerns -- including the strength and importance of the Turkey/US bilateral relationship -- and, most importantly, the AKP Government's policy drift and tampering with the core principles of the Republic of Turkey. While the CHOD downplayed the speech as standard practice, his words shook the Turkish government, which scrambled to catch up by claiming his views as their own. EU diplomats called the speech harsh and questioned Ozkok's continued commitment to democracy, civilian control over the military and the EU accession process. A Turkish think tank with ties to the military characterized the speech as noteworthy but pushed aside concerns about the military overstepping its bounds. In speaking out, Ozkok reverted to TGS tradition to step forward and press for a course correction when it decides the government has strayed from Ataturk's founding principles. His speech sent a clear message to the government to tighten the sails and get back on course. END SUMMARY. 2. (U) In a break from the past, CHOD General Hilmi Ozkok used his annual graduation speech to the Turkish War Academy on April 20 as a platform to present a 90-minute dissertation on the state of the Turkish state. Addressing his remarks to the cadets and other retired and active-duty military officers present, he nevertheless used the live TV coverage to reach beyond the academy in a public address to his troops, the government and the broader public. 3. (C) With the post-Sept. 11 security environment as a starting point, Ozkok did a tour d'horizon of global and regional priorities that impact on Turkey. He also drew attention to what the secular establishment considers "troubling" domestic trends. In subsequent comments to an EU Ambassador, Ozkok characterized the speech as a regular part of his job, but added that there were four reasons for the timing of the speech: 1) Requirement to give the annual war academy address; 2) Need to address the media distortion of matters under TGS purview; correct the record for his troops; 3) Routine for CHOD to provide a periodic tour d'horizon; 4) "People want to hear from me." EU FEARS OF TGS RECIDIVISM -------------------------- 4. (C) Trying to make sense of Ozkok's speech in preparation for an EU DCMs' meeting on the topic, Dutch Defense Attach and PolCouns conveyed to Deputy PolMilCouns their uncertainty about the real message and their uneasiness that the speech represented a shift in TGS policy away from support of the government. Characterizing Ozkok's words as "very harsh," and the points on Greece as "extremely negative," they registered discomfort with what they viewed as veiled threats to Kurdish rights, religious freedom and democratic practice. They questioned whether Ozkok, in speaking out, was distancing himself from PM Erdogan and from Turkey's EU accession drive, which he had firmly and overtly supported since taking office. Various EU representatives expressed dismay that Ozkok "stepped out in front of the government" with a policy speech and wondered if this signaled a TGS decision to re-assert its authority. In his own defense on this point, Ozkok told the Ambassador that much of his speech had been taken from one made by NSC SecGen Alpogan the previous month. Gunduz Aktan, Director of the Eurasian Strategic Studies Center (ASAM), a local think tank whose board is dominated by retired military officials, and who himself has close contact with the military, literally waved off this suggestion, dismissing Alpogan's speech as something he hadn't even bothered to read. With the speech out in the open, Turkish officials sought to paper over civil-military differences. MFA Americas Affairs Deputy Director General Ilicak claimed Ozkok's points on the US/TU bilateral relationship reflected MFA briefing material for various TGS meetings with American officials. PM Erdogan and FM Gul, in public remarks affirming that Ozkok's speech reflected the government position, took pains to reaffirm their commitment to the EU accession process. GOVERNMENT LOST ITS AUTHORITY ----------------------------- 5. (C) ASAM Director Aktan, who has reportedly advised TGS on occasion, blamed the government for the speech. In his view, the Erdogan government, which has enjoyed a longer honeymoon than any previous government, has begun to drift. While giving PM Erdogan credit as a quick study who has matured as a politician since his days as Istanbul Mayor, Aktan said the government's inexperience and ineptitude as a whole has led to its undoing. From a general lack of open communication with foreign interlocutors to hasty decisions based on emotion, the government has repeatedly stumbled and is beginning a decline that, once begun, no previous Turkish government had ever recovered from. If Aktan is to be believed, the fissures in the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are so deep that any significant event -- violence in the wake of a European Court of Human Rights decision that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan should be re-tried or a failure to advance Turkey's EU candidacy -- could provide the final blow to the government. 6. (C) In Aktan's view, Ozkok made the speech because he believed, as the head of the Turkish military -- charged with preserving Ataturk's Republic -- he had the right to lay out his views when he sensed the government was veering too far from the founding principles of the Republic. Aktan rejected the idea that the speech signaled the military was preparing for action, but rather provided a warning to the government to get back on track. "How could General Ozkok bring out the troops when President Bush is using the word "democracy" in speech after speech?" he asked, adding that TGS understands such action is not conceivable in the current political environment. Aktan considered the speech important for two reasons: 1) That it was made at all; and 2) that it reminded the government of TGS redlines, e.g. importance of secularism and opposition to fundamentalist activity and placing "reactionaries" in government positions. THE SPEECH: OZKOK'S VIEW OF THE WORLD ------------------------------------- 7. (C) Ozkok used his speech to the War Academy to educate his troops, the Turkish government and broader population on TGS's view of the global security situation and its impact on Turkey's domestic and international policy priorities. There were pointed messages for the US, the EU and the AKP government. US PARTNERSHIP CENTRAL TO TURKEY'S NATIONAL SECURITY/FOREIGN POLICY: Ozkok reaffirmed the centrality of the bilateral relationship, developing an approach first articulated by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug in his Jan. 26 televised press conference that the 50-year alliance with the US is too wide-ranging to be indexed to any one action or event (i.e., lack of US action against the PKK). Like any relationship, Ozkok said, ties with the US have witnessed ups and downs but are made durable by the mutual confidence in shared interests and expectations on a host of issues. The relationship will be strengthened by keeping the channels of communication and dialogue open and respecting mutual sensitivities. This message -- given the recent strain of relations over Iraq and US requests for Incirlik Air Base -- was for the Turkish government as much as the US. Ozkok went on to note areas of Turkish sensitivity: Turkey Not an Example: Right off the bat, Ozkok felt compelled to re-educate his audience on the unique nature of the Turkish state. Saying "some circles want to define Turkey as a moderate Islamic country", he acknowledged Turkey's majority Muslim population, but underscored that Turkey is a secular, democratic country. It is not an "Islamic state", nor is it an "Islamic country." (Note: while most Turks could accept his first sentence, the second one was broadly perceived as attacking religion and caused a sharp reaction among more pious Turks, tangibly setting back TGS efforts to erode the AKP's public support by portraying the government as irresponsible and harmful. End Note.) He warned that it is unrealistic to expect Muslim countries that have not undergone the same historical process of secularization to easily transform into a democracy. BMENA: Following a dispassionate description of the political, economic and social goals of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) project, Ozkok shot a warning that successful democratization efforts are based on indigenous reform, not imposed from outside. Iran: Ozkok emphasized Turkey's concerns that Iran may try to impose its brand of theocratic regime on its neighbors and questioned Iran's nuclear activities. He underscored that Turkey supports a nuclear-free Middle East, achieved peacefully, and plugged the EU-3 negotiation process. Iraq: Ozkok laid out TGS' three policy priorities - 1) the political and territorial integrity of Iraq; 2) a strategy to deal with the PKK; and 3) Special Status for Kirkuk. Ozkok made clear his belief that US "failure" to expel the PKK from northern Iraq strengthened the terrorist organization. He dismissed the addition of the PKK to US and EU terrorist lists as meaning nothing in actual practice. Ozkok said the lack of US kinetic action against the PKK is "thought-provoking", a statement that was probably inteded as much a reproach to the AKP government for failing to allow US OIF deployment through Turkey as an oblique reference to suspicions that the US meets with or supports the PKK. Ozkok characterized Kirkuk as a bomb ready to explode (a common Turkish metaphor to describe Kirkuk) - claiming the Kurdish influx into Kirkuk after US forces entered was greater than the numbers forced out by Saddam, affecting the voter demographics in favor of the Kurds; and Kirkuk sat on oil resources that belonged to all Iraqis and must be shared. For that reason, Ozkuk said, Turkey favors granting Kirkuk a special political status. (NOTE: At a subsequent TGS briefing for U.S. visitors which PolMilOf attended, the military called for a UN or OSCE observation mission to Kirkuk for the expected December 2005 elections. END NOTE.) Syria: In contrast to private meetings with US officials, during which members of the General Staff tout the virtues of President Bashar Assad and urge the US to support him against others in the government who seek to take advantage of his youth and inexperience, Ozkok spent little time on Syria in this speech. While noting Turkey's thaw in relations with Syria since PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's 1999 capture, he said Turkey is closely following events in Lebanon and suggested that Syria's actions with respect to Lebanon must continue to be watched. Other: Ozkok noted Turkey's support for the Middle East Peace Process, emphasized the continued need for NATO and the EU in the Balkans, and outlined Turkey's role in the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan. He mentioned the importance of continued peace and stability in Georgia to the Baku-Tiblis-Ceyhan pipeline. On the Black Sea, Ozkok provided a straightforward accounting of Turkey's anti-terrorist activities in the sea and its plans for cooperative efforts with littoral-nations. Unlike private TGS statements on the issue, Ozkok mentioned nothing non-littoral or NATO activity there. GREECE/CYPRUS/ARMENIA - The Big Three: Ozkok did not mince words when providing his perspective on Turkey' top three regional heart burns. Ozkok's speech followed on the heels of an incident in which a Turkish cadet in Greece on a military exchange found a desecrated Turkish flag in his room (Note: Greece later apologized for the incident and launched an investigation which TGS accepted, and both countries have resumed mil-mil exchanges. End Note.). After first noting the recent improvement in bilateral relations, Ozkok criticized Greece for its high level of defense spending and for defining Turkey as a "threat." He placed blame for the Aegean conflict squarely in Greece's hands, criticizing Greece for arming its Aegean islands and "constricting" international airspace. Cyprus: Moving from the Aegean to the Mediterranean, Ozkok called Cyprus among the Turkey's most important national interests and international agreements for two reasons: 1) Turkey's security responsibility to Turkish Cypriots under is guarantor agreement; 2) Cyprus' strategic security role for Turkey. Ozkok said TGS supported a "durable and fair" solution on Cyprus. Alluding to the EU requirement for Turkey to recognize all new EU member states, including Cyprus, in its EU Association Agreement, Ozkok gave Turkey credit for the Turkish Cypriot vote in favor of the Annan Plan in the April 2004 referendum. In Ozkok's view, Turkey should not be asked to make any additional "gestures" after all the Turkish Cypriots did to work for a solution only to see promised assistance not materialize. He accused the Greek Cypriots of dragging out the negotiations in order to extract further Turkish concessions, with no view towards a settlement. Armenia: While welcoming better relations with Armenia, Ozkok lambasted that government for not respecting Turkey's territorial integrity, allowing continuation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and pressing for international recognition of an Armenian genocide in Turkey during WWI. Ozkok asserted that the 1915 deportation of Armenians was designed to protect Armenians from Turks who were angry about the uprising of Armenians against the Ottoman empire. Without explicitly saying it, Ozkok did recognize that any blame for massive deaths would lie with the former Ottoman Empire when he noted that the issue was closed with the 1923 Lausanne Treaty establishing the Republic of Turkey (Note: a useful approach the Turkish government has failed to pick up on. End Note.) EU: In contrast to his putting relations with the US first, Ozkok spoke of "EU prospects." He repeated three times that EU membership is at the top of Turkey's agenda. However, in between each affirmation he criticized the accession process and expressed dismay about what he views as the negative turn of public and political opinion in some EU countries against Turkey's accession. He touted the size, youth and political power that Turkey would bring to the EU and emphasized that the yes/no decision on Turkey's accession does not belong to the EU alone. Turkey will make its own determination. (Note: One senior TGS officer told us that Ozkok's remarks represented a watered-down version of widely held frustration with the EU within TGS HQ. End Note.) MESSAGE FOR THE AKP GOVERNMENT: Saving the most important message for last, Ozkok drew attention to TGS' deep concerns with the course of domestic events. He reminded his audience that the Turkish Armed Forces will continue to strive, as they always have, to protect and guard the democratic, secular, and social character of the Turkish republic, as well as its territorial indivisibility. He attacked a variety of social ills he claimed are undermining the Turkish public's belief in itself and in the government, and having deleterious effects on society as a whole: separatist terrorist activities turned political activity; fundamentalist activity; cultural degeneration; corruption; and endemic poverty. Separatists: Ozkok said that what separatists (read: Kurds) tried but failed to accomplish through terrorism in the 1990s, they are now working to do politically, using the EU as their vehicle. Ozkok stated that those groups pressing for separate ethnic rights in Turkey were aiming to undermine the unitary nature of the Republic and warned that any attempt to do so could incite a conflict. He underscored the need for all "conscious" people to accept and support the inviolability of the territorial unity of the Republic of Turkey. Fundamentalists: Ozkok again underscored that secularism is the core principle of Ataturk's Republic. He criticized what he saw as intensified efforts to drag "a personal matter" - religion - into politics through schools, businesses and the media and through stepped-up efforts by fundamentalists to get their staff into public institutions. Drawing a clear red line for the AKP government, Ozkok said secularism and modernity will "carry the Republic of Turkey further ahead. No one should expect the Turkish Armed Forces to be impartial on this issue." Cultural Degeneration: To these problems, Ozkok added corruption, poverty and rural-to-urban population shifts. Separatists, fundamentalists and others who sought to undermine the unity of Turkey, he said, used mass media and other means to play on the vulnerabilities of the impoverished and uneducated. The combination of factors, in his view was leading to a cultural degeneration in Turkey and an erosion in the "Turkish" identity of its citizens. Ozkok called for efforts to support the poor, strengthen the middle class and to incorporate the poor squatter communities on the outskirts of major urban centers into city planning efforts. 8. (C) COMMENT: The timing of the speech, coming after months of government policy drift, was not coincidental. Nor is the fact that the speech touched on domestic issues outside of the traditional purview of the Western military model Turkey has been working to embrace, but of consistent concern to the core institutions of the Turkish State. A forward-leaning TGS naturally makes the EU uncomfortable but is consistent with TGS' historical role to preserve the secular, unitary Turkish state, as they believe Ataturk would have wanted it. Ozkok drew a clear line in the sand on developments the Turkish military will not tolerate. We view this address as a wake-up call for a government that has lost its way. As Aktan and others suggest, the government was not pleased with this speech but all are linking arms in a purported show of unity now that it is out. Whether the AKP government will take the message to heart remains to be seen. If Aktan is to be believed, the government has begun down a slippery slope to self-destruction. General Ozkok, in the name of the Turkish State, may just have given them a post-post-modern nudge forward. END COMMENT. 9. (U) Baghdad minimized considered. EDELMAN
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