US embassy cable - 05SANAA1352

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001352 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KMCA, KMPI, DOMESTIC POLITICS 
SUBJECT: ROYG INSIDERS INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH SALEH 
CLAN 
 
REF: SANAA 966 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (S/NF) Ambassador met informally with Shura Council Member 
Mohammed al-Tayeb at his home on May 19.  A member of a group 
of pragmatic, reform-minded ROYG insiders, Tayeb said that 
President Saleh is more interested in enriching his family 
than in making the strategic choices necessary to lead Yemen 
into the future.  Tayeb was gloomy about President Saleh's 
ability to understand the importance of the issues of 
controlling SA/LW and intelligence sharing to U.S.-ROYG 
cooperation, and said Saleh did not comprehend what was 
necessary to maintain a close relationship with the USG in 
the long term.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S/NF) Echoing what we are increasingly hearing from those 
ROYG interlocutors closest to the Embassy, Tayeb said that 
Saleh is more and more isolated, and less and less responsive 
to advice from those practical, progressive ROYG insiders 
whom he counts himself among (MOI Alimi, MFA Qirbi, DFM 
Noman, MOPIC Minister Sofan and a few other, mostly 
western-educated, reformers).  Tayeb moaned that Saleh 
"listens to no one," and is "unrealistically and stupidly 
confident" that he will always make the right decisions. 
Saleh, he said, does not think strategically and cares only 
about enriching his own family, particularly: Saleh's 
brother, Air Force Commander Mohamed; cousin, Ali Mohsen 
al-Ahmar Commander of Northern Army (considered the second 
most powerful man in Yemen); son, Yemen Special Forces 
Commander Ahmed Ali (and Saleh's preferred heir to the 
throne); and his two favored nephews, Yehia, Central Security 
Forces Commander, and Amaar, National Security Bureau Deputy 
Director. 
 
3. (S/NF) Together with Sheikh Abdullah al Ahmar's clan 
(speaker of the Parliament and supreme chief the Hashid 
tribal confederation which includes Saleh's tribe), all of 
Yemen's wealth is being squandered and stolen by Saleh who is 
increasingly "greedy and paranoid," especially regarding 
American intentions, said Tayeb.  Tayeb said extension of 
Hunt Oil's Block 18 concession is finished (reftel); the 
spoils will be divided up between the Haile Sayeeds, 
al-Ahmars, and Salehs with a UK company taking over the 
operation of the oil-fields.  Tayeb claimed that Amaar and 
Yehia Saleh are making millions working the diesel smuggling 
and black market along with Ali Mohsen, using military 
vehicles and NSB and CSF staff to move the fuel to markets in 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  One story has Amaar Saleh depositing 
more than 7 million USD cash into his private account in the 
National Bank.  Tayeb swore this was true and came directly 
from the bank manager and employees who had to scramble to 
find enough clerks to count the cash in front of a nervous 
and sweating Amaar. 
 
4. (S/NF) Tayeb also said that his contacts in Saada, 
including a leading sheikh (he would not give his name), are 
all furious with Saleh over the amount of indiscriminate 
killing and destruction perpetrated by the regular army in 
the north during last month's suppression of the al-Houthi 
rebellion.  Tayeb claimed that the "Believing Youth" were by 
far the minority of the fighters in Saada, rather he said, 
most fighters came from tribes allied together against Saleh 
and the central government.  He said Saleh is "extremely 
concerned" that he could lose control of the tribes in Saada 
and that this will spread to the al-Jawf and Ma'rib tribes. 
 
5. (S/NF) "Everyone", according to Tayeb, has had it with the 
corruption of Saleh and his family.  As an example, Tayeb 
cited the outrageous costs of this Sunday's May 22 
celebration of the fifteenth Unity Day being held in Mukalla 
at a cost, claimed Tayeb, of more than 300 million USD, most 
of which will go into the pockets of those government 
officials arranging the show.  (Note: The price tag Tayeb 
gave likely includes some of the massive development projects 
in Mukalla and elsewhere that the government is rushing to 
complete before May 22. End Note.) 
 
6. (S/NF) Comment: Tayeb is only one source, and this is not 
the first time he has given a pessimistic assessment of Saleh 
and his cronies.  He still has access to the President in the 
informal role of "American handler and analyst."  But we are 
increasingly hearing hints and murmurs from others, including 
DFM Mustafa Noman and Senior Presidential Advisor Abdul 
Kareem al-Iryani (who told Ambassador recently that he "wants 
out" of politics because the President no longer listens to 
his advice).  Even Hameed al Ahmar, the son of Sheikh 
Abdullah and CEO of Al Ahmar Inc., who, while most certainly 
profiting from the corrupt business dealings of his father 
and Saleh, claimed that he and a group of young GPC and Islah 
MP's intend to band together to force the government to 
control corruption and enact reforms. 
 
7. (S/NF) Comment Continued.  We have heard rumors backing up 
Hameed al-Ahmar's claim of an opposition candidate in 2006. 
Saleh is worried about a possible political challenge next 
year from Islah and the new opposition coalition JMP, or even 
from within the GPC.  We may well see another clamp-down on 
the press and political parties "for security reasons" that 
will roll back some or much of the progress made in 
democratic reforms and human rights just in time for this 
year's MCC reports.  End Comment. 
Krajeski