US embassy cable - 05PARIS3486

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, FR 
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY FRENCH REACTION TO U.S. VIEWS ON 
POST-ELECTION INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1520 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: In preliminary comments on the U.S. nonpaper 
on an international framework of support for Lebanon 
(reftel), Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche 
confirmed GoF support for an international meeting on Lebanon 
but cautioned that we should remain discreet in preparations 
to ensure it does not become an issue in Lebanon's electoral 
campaign.  Boche urged that such a meeting should avoid 
addressing military/security cooperation and not give the 
impression of an international effort to disarm militias, 
which would put the new government in a difficult position. 
While stressing that the GoF was still formulating its views, 
Boche suggested that the GoF might advocate focusing efforts 
on two (rather than three) priority areas: rule of law and 
economic assistance.  The GoF was also reflecting whether it 
might be more effective to have one, vice two, international 
gatherings, to avoid misinterpretations from the Lebanese 
side and focus on the international response.  Boche also 
raised the familiar French argument that we must avoid any 
impression of creating a system of international "tutelage" 
in Lebanon, which retained a long democratic tradition and 
was not comparable with Afghanistan or Iraq.  MFA contacts 
stressed the "no tutelage" point in much more detail during a 
separate discussion, and were generally more cautious and 
negative on the U.S. paper than the Elysee.  Both Elysee and 
MFA contacts welcomed the idea of holding an informal 
planning meeting in Paris the week of June 13 and did not 
comment on proposed participants.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) During a May 19 meeting with poloff, Presidential 
Middle East advisor Dominique Boche commented on the U.S. 
nonpaper on a proposed international framework of support for 
Lebanon presented to French Ambassador Emie May 16 reftel). 
From the outset, Boche stressed that the GoF was still 
formulating a response and his views were only preliminary. 
That said, he noted that the GoF shared the U.S. desire to 
maintain international attention on Lebanon after elections, 
and favored the idea of an international meeting focused on 
supporting Lebanon's new government.  The meeting would need 
to be well-calibrated to avoid creating unrealistic Lebanese 
expectations of a massive increase in economic aid.  He 
stressed that we needed to work rapidly to prepare for the 
post-election phase, but also should be careful not to 
publicize our efforts and keep our consultations at the 
experts level, to avoid having them become an issue in 
Lebanon's election campaign or a topic of speculation or 
distortion in the scoop-hungry Lebanese press. 
 
3.  (C) Boche stressed the need to have a "correct" local 
Lebanese perception of our efforts, and suggested focusing 
the international meeting on less-controversial issues, such 
as rule of law, institutional aid, and economic assistance. 
Repeating arguments made by French Ambassador Emie in Beirut 
(reftel), Boche strongly cautioned against adding a 
security/military element to the conference, which he said 
would be interpreted very negatively in Lebanon.  In the GOF 
view, security and military assistance to Lebanon should 
proceed discreetly via bilateral channels, although of course 
donors could exchange information to better coordinate their 
efforts.  Boche similarly cautioned that the international 
conference should not be interpreted as a tactic to implement 
"part two" of UNSCR 1559, i.e. disarm militias, which 
remained a delicate issue in Lebanon and would put the new 
government in a difficult spot.  Boche noted that while the 
worst had been avoided, after the compromises reached between 
Christian and Muslim opposition factions following divisions 
over the 2000 electoral law, the episode exposed the 
fragility and inherent fissures in Lebanon's opposition. 
 
4. (C) Boche also noted that the GoF was hearing concerns 
from some Lebanese interlocutors over perceived U.S. plans to 
inscribe Lebanon in part of a larger USG plan to transform 
the region.  Repeating a familiar GoF point, he stressed that 
Lebanon was an "old democracy" and did not want to be treated 
like Afghanistan or Iraq; we should avoid any impression of 
seeking to create a system of international tutelage over 
Lebanon.  Poloff countered the misimpression that the U.S. 
was seeking any form of tutelage over Lebanon, which was 
without factual basis; the very nature of our joint effort 
with France was to help Lebanon realize its full independence 
and sovereignty, not to replace Syrian domination of Lebanon 
with another outside power broker.  Similarly, the USG fully 
recognized the distinct character of Lebanon and was not 
seeking to "cut and paste" an Afghanistan or Iraq model; at 
the same time, we should not dismiss the important democratic 
achievements in Afghanistan and Iraq as having no relevance 
to the people of Lebanon or the rest of the region. 
 
5. (C) In closing, Boche commented that the GoF was 
reflecting on whether it might make more sense to focus our 
efforts on two tracks, such as rule of law and economic 
assistance, vice the U.S.-proposed political, economic and 
security/military tracks.  The GoF was similarly considering 
whether it might be more effective to hold one conference, 
vice the proposed two, in order to avoid misinterpretations 
of our intentions among the Lebanese and focus on the 
international response to Lebanon's needs.  Boche welcomed 
the idea of holding an informal planning meeting in Paris the 
week of June 13, and did not question the U.S.-proposed 
participants in the core donor planning group. 
 
6. (C) In a separate discussion with poloff May 18, MFA 
DAS-equivalent for Levant/Egypt Christian Jouret offered a 
more cautious and negative preliminary reaction to the U.S. 
paper.  Like Boche, Jouret stressed that the GoF was still 
digesting the U.S. proposals and described his reaction as 
personal, not reflecting GoF policy.  Jouret suggested that 
the Lebanese might view the proposed "Beirut I" conference as 
seeking to create a system of international "tutelage" over 
Lebanon, which the new government would be likely to reject, 
though it would welcome a new donors conference.  Poloff 
countered the "tutelage" assertion as without basis, 
stressing that we were seeking to work with, not impose ideas 
upon, the new Lebanese government, who would identify and set 
forth its needs to the international community.  Jouret said 
he did not question the worthiness of U.S. intentions, but 
asserted further that a donor-driven reform process, as seen 
in the Palestinian example, would constitute a form of 
international tutelage.  We needed to make sure that 
ownership of the reform process remained with the Lebanese. 
Jouret added that the issue was not whether Lebanon needed 
reforms, as the government clearly needed restructuring "from 
A to Z."  The question remained how best could the 
international community help Lebanon, and whether the 
Lebanese would live up to international expectations.  Jouret 
added that the U.S. and France should continue our careful 
and close coordination on Lebanon, best exemplified by the 
twin efforts of our ambassadors in Beirut.  Despite his 
initial pessimism, Jouret was open to the proposal to hold 
informal planning meetings in Paris the week of June 13, as 
long as we kept these discussions discreet and did not give 
the impression that the future of Lebanon was being decided 
outside the country. 
 
7.  (C) Comment: To keep the French engaged and constructive 
on the post-election planning for Lebanon, we will need to 
keep our planning discreet before Lebanon's election cycle is 
complete and continue to hammer away at the "tutelage" 
argument, which gives the French a convenient (and false) 
point on which to distinguish their Lebanon policy from that 
of the U.S.  To this end, it would be helpful if we can avoid 
drawing parallels between our post-election Lebanon approach 
and past experience with Afghanistan, Iraq, and the 
Palestinians, to remind the French that we understand that 
Lebanon is a unique case.  While the GoF is still formulating 
its position, the repeated French cautions on including a 
security/military track in an international conference 
suggest a hardening GoF position on this point.  End comment. 
 
WOLFF