US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN901

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000901 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, AM 
SUBJECT: ARMENIA ENACTS ELECTORAL REFORMS, BUT DOES NOT 
GUARANTEE FAIR ELECTIONS 
 
Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1. (C) In an extraordinary session May 19, the Armenian 
Parliament voted to increase the number of its seats 
apportioned on the party list basis, to nominally curtail 
President Robert Kocharian's authority to directly appoint 
members of electoral commissions, and to reform the way the 
government draws up voter lists.  The changes were part of a 
package of amendments to the Electoral Code that respond to 
recommendations of the Council of Europe's (CoE) Venice 
Commission.  Along with detailed reforms that, for example, 
change the layout of voting booths and the posting of voter 
lists, major reforms balance the President's political power 
base (the coalition government) with his extra-political 
power base (non-partisan oligarchs) and do little to balance 
the interests of the government and the opposition.  Whether 
these changes will, as the government claims, "complicate 
vote-rigging" is more a question of overall political will to 
have fair elections than the specific changes that the 
parliament passed yesterday.  End Summary. 
 
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PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION INCREASED 
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2. (SBU) The most notable amendment, and one not called for 
by the COE, raised from 75 to 90 the number of parliamentary 
deputies who will be elected under the system of proportional 
representation (by party list) in the next elections.  The 
increase will come at the expense of single-mandate 
constituencies that will be reduced from 56 to 41.  Prime 
Minister Andranik Markarian (Republican Party) brokered the 
redistribution between junior coalition partners Orinats 
Yerkir and the Armenian Revolutionary Faction (ARF) Dashnaks 
who wanted greater proportional representation and the 
Republican Party, backed by the People's Deputy group of 
non-partisan lawmakers, who opposed change in existing 
distribution.  (Note:  The People's Deputy group is a "who's 
who" of Armenia's oligarch businessmen, who typically contest 
and win the single mandate seats.  Only loosely, if at all, 
affiliated with the parties in parliament, these truant MPs 
seldom appear in parliament or participate in political 
activities, but do form a large non-partisan power base for 
the government and the president.  End Note.) 
 
3. (C) Since a seat in parliament, and the criminal immunity 
that goes with it, became de rigueur for Armenia's tycoons, 
oligarchs have found it easier to buy-off electoral 
commissions and otherwise cheat on the single mandate seats 
than to purchase a spot on a party list.  These elections are 
thus the most corrupt, and even the Central Election 
Commission invalidated the results of a tainted oligarch 
run-off in Kotayk region last August.  Reducing the number of 
single-mandate seats may arguably reduce the number of the 
most unfairly contested elections, but it also increases the 
strain on popular candidates without party support who must 
compete with the oligarchs who buy elections.  In all, 
greater proportional representation is better for the 
coalition and opposition parties alike, who will have more 
places on the party list to dole out or sell to tycoons. 
 
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PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS LIMITED? 
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4. (SBU) The other important amendment changed from 3 to 1 
the number of members that Kocharian can appoint on the 
Central Election Commission and its territorial divisions, a 
response to the COE's recommendation to establish more 
balanced representation on the electoral commissions.  In the 
2007 elections, the Court of Appeals and the non-partisan 
group of parliamentary deputies, People's Deputy, will now 
each appoint a member in place of two of the President's 
appointments on the Central Election Commission.  In a May 19 
briefing, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, 
Garegin Arzizyan, told us that after 2007 the Council of 
Court Chairman (made up of the chairmen of the various 
courts) would appoint one member on each commission in place 
of the People's Deputy group.  The other six seats on 
election commissions will continue to be distributed among 
the parties in parliament, giving the coalition three seats 
on each commission.  Commenting on the changes, opposition 
parliamentarian Viktor Dallakian told us that these changes 
look good on paper but amount to no change at all, as six 
seats will remain in control of the government. 
 
5. (C) Until now, the President's three seats together with 
the governing coalition's three seats meant that 
pro-government members had a controlling majority of each 
Electoral Commission.  We agree with Dallakian that these 
changes will not bring significantly more balance.  The 
People's Deputy group of oligarchs are intensely loyal to the 
executive with whom they have cut the deals that maintain 
their power bases.  The ostensibly independent judges on the 
Court of Appeals owe their jobs to the pro-government 
Minister of Justice, who, with the President's approval, 
appoints them to their terms from which they can be recalled 
by the President. 
 
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POLICE TO CONTROL VOTER LIST 
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6. (SBU) Another amendment, supported by the OSCE, gives the 
national police and OVIR, the passport office, the 
responsibility for drawing up and maintaining Armenia's voter 
lists.  The OSCE had supported this change because OVIR has 
centralized information about the comings and goings Armenian 
citizens.  While local authorities have done a poor job 
maintaining voter's lists, OVIR is a centralized agency under 
firm executive control and rife with corruption.  While we 
recognize that moving responsibility for voter lists to OVIR 
increases the opportunity for large-scale political 
corruption, even if (or, maybe, because) it is more effective 
at assembling national voter lists and provides us and other 
donors a potential target for technical assistance. 
 
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PROXY POWERS INCREASED 
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7. (C) Opposition party member Viktor Dallakian told us that 
the most positive change in the election code was an increase 
in powers for candidate's proxies during vote counts. 
Proxies would now take an active role in the count, and have 
the right to physically examine questionable or discarded 
ballots during the count, whereas before they had to keep a 
distance from the counting and could not handle the votes. 
 
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COMMENT:  FAIR ELECTIONS A QUESTION OF POLITICAL WILL 
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8. (C) The Council of Europe's recommendations for electoral 
change notwithstanding, Armenia could have had free and fair 
elections under the old electoral code.  While the government 
has enacted changes that meet the letter of some CoE 
recommendations, there is little sign of significant change 
in spirit.  The redistribution of parliamentary seats is a 
compromise between two of the government's political power 
bases rather than between the government and opposition.  The 
government ostensibly changed the composition of election 
commissions but did not, in fact, make them more balanced. 
Moving the responsibility to maintain voter lists to OVIR 
gives the government more opportunity to manipulate in their 
favor, but also more opportunity to ensure their fairness and 
accuracy.  Much depends on the government's political will to 
have fair elections, rather than on the composition of the 
electoral commissions or the ownership of the voter lists. 
EVANS