US embassy cable - 05ALMATY1938

UNCLAS  ALMATY 001938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, KDEM, KZ, POLITICAL 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI MFA "DISAPPOINTED" WITH CERTIFICATION 
DECISION 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  On May 19, Charge briefed Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aleksey Volkov on the Department's decision to 
request a national security interest waiver of Section 
578's requirement (Foreign Operations) that Kazakhstan 
demonstrate significant progress on human rights in order 
to continue funding for a range of U.S. assistance 
activities.  Volkov went to great lengths to express 
"disappointment" with the determination and called it a 
"step backward" in the bilateral relationship.  The 
certification decision, he maintained, was a "black mark" 
which would damage Kazakhstan's chances to gain the OSCE 
Chairmanship in 2009.  The DFM insisted that security would 
continue to be Kazakhstan's first priority.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Charge briefed DFM Volkov on events that led to 
the Secretary's decision to request a national security 
interest waiver rather than certification for Kazakhstan. 
While there had been a few bright spots since last year's 
certification, unfortunately numerous negative developments 
made it impossible for the Secretary to certify that 
Kazakhstan was making "significant" progress in improving 
human rights.  He noted that the flawed  September 2004 
parliamentary elections, the liquidation of opposition 
party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DCK), the electoral 
law amendment restricting the right of assembly following 
elections, the closing of opposition newspaper 
"Respublica," the continuing harassment of NGOs, and 
limitations on the parole status of Galhymzhan Zhakyianov 
had all contributed significantly to the decision. 
 
3. (SBU) Charge highlighted the strong relationship between 
the two countries and the ability to speak frankly with a 
partner.  The United States wanted to look forward and work 
with Kazakhstan to avoid a similar decision on Cooperative 
Threat Reduction assistance.  Emphasizing U.S. respect for 
Kazakhstani sovereignty, Charge outlined a number of areas 
where important progress on human rights was within reach, 
and encouraged the DFM to view the areas as guideposts.  He 
noted that certification decisions were not permanent. 
(Note:  Charge passed a non-paper with the benchmarks along 
with other background materials at the end of the meeting.) 
 
4. (SBU) Volkov spent considerable time relaying 
Kazakhstan's "disappointment" with the decision.  There had 
been other years, he said, with difficulties where 
certification had been possible -- why not this year? 
President Nazarbayev had just signed a foreign policy 
decree for release on June 7, designating the United States 
as a strategic partner.  The decision not to certify ran 
counter to establishing such a relationship and provided 
support to "destructive forces" in Kazakhstan.  Astana's 
bid for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009, Volkov maintained, 
had been damaged.  News of non-certification would almost 
certainly generate a "lively" reaction in the press and 
from government figures.  The opposition would undoubtedly 
take great pleasure in the decision, seeing it as a "black 
mark" against Kazakhstan. 
 
5. (SBU) As President Nazarbayev travels around Kazakhstan, 
Volkov continued, he meets people who are happy and don't 
want to see a repetition of the unrest and violence that 
have marked Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  Security is the 
primary concern, the DFM said, of the public and the 
government.  Astana foresaw trouble ahead in the next 2-3 
years in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan and would not take any 
risks with Kazakhstan's stability.  Kazakhstan wants a 
leadership role that strengthens the region, but the U.S. 
decision had undermined that concept. 
 
6. (SBU) Guaranteeing Kazakhstan's security, Volkov 
insisted, will be made without reference to the views of 
"outsiders."  He argued the United States had not consulted 
others on its security after September 11.  Astana's felt 
strongly that NGOs had to be accountable for their 
activities and that this was the goal behind the draft NGO 
law. 
 
7. (SBU) Charge said that the impact of the NGO draft law 
could make it all but impossible for U.S. funded NGOs to 
operate in Kazakhstan.  He asked rhetorically if that was 
really what the GOK wanted, given the fact that such 
assistance directly supported the goals the President had 
annunciated in his state oQthe nation address.  The Charge 
added that the best way for Kazakhstan to distinguish 
itself from its neighbors was to conduct fair presidential 
elections in 2006, and adopt proposals in the benchmark 
document.  Much had already been done on political and 
economic reform, but President Nazarbayev, the Charge 
pressed, had an opportunity to parlay his popularity into a 
secure Kazakhstan that also fully respected civil 
liberties. 
 
8. (SBU) Charge concluded that the United States wanted a 
dialogue that would led to progress in the area of human 
rights, much as had happened in the past with Kazakhstan's 
advances in addressing the problem of trafficking in 
persons.   For this reason, the Secretary was requesting a 
waiver of the certification requirement so that assistance 
programs could continue.  Such assistance benefited not 
only U.S. national security interests, but also supported 
the ambitious goals the President had set for his country. 
Ultimately, whether Kazakhstan achieved these goals, 
including the OSCE chairmanship, depended on its deeds and 
not just rhetoric. 
 
9. (SBU)  Comment:  Volkov seemed genuinely surprised by 
our certification decision, despite the fact that 
Ambassador Ordway had clearly informed Foreign Minister 
Tokayev last week that this outcome was all but certain. 
Volkov's reaction made it clear just how seriously the GOK 
views the issue of waiver vs. certification in terms of 
former's impact on Kazakhstan's international image and its 
aspirations to regional leadership. 
 
ASQUINO 
 
 
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