US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2839

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, TU, OSCE 
SUBJECT: SE TURKEY:  DSM EXPERIMENT DRAGS ON 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 2525 
     B. 04 ANKARA 6994 
     C. 04 ADANA 0147 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John W. Kunstadter for reasons 1.4 ( 
b) & (d). 
 
THIS CABLE IS FROM AMCONSUL ADANA. 
 
1. (C) Summary:  DEHAP leaders have yet to realize their 
hopes of creating a new, national-level, moderate political 
party from the Democratic Society Movement (DSM) announced 
last fall.  One observer attributes the delay to both the 
PKK,s popularity and pro-Kurdish politicians, need to 
recalculate based on the ECHR,s May 12 ruling on Abdullah 
Ocalan,s 1999 trial.  Many contacts claim any &new8 party 
would just be DEHAP by a different name.  The Acting Mayor of 
Diyarbakir, however, claims that precinct-level elections for 
the new entity will be held within two weeks.  Meanwhile, the 
Diyarbakir Governor continues to build dialogue with civil 
society, while lamenting the lack of a common GoT policy in 
the region.  In the current polarized political climate, 
exacerbated by violent clashes and the ECHR ruling, it is 
unlikely that a DEHAP facelift can have a meaningful impact 
in the short term.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Late last year leaders of the pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Peoples, Party (DEHAP) told emboff they were planning the 
formation of a new party that they hoped would be legally 
established by April 2005 (Ref A).  The new political 
initiative, referred to as the Democratic Society Movement 
(DSM), was initially announced in October by the four Kurdish 
former DEP MP,s (including Leyla Zana), and was later 
endorsed by DEHAP leadership.  Despite the desired timetable 
laid out last year, the new party has yet to materialize. 
 
Why the Delay? 
-------------- 
 
3. (C) In response to queries about the delay in the 
development of the DSM, Hakkari human rights attorney Rojbin 
Tugan told consulate officers in a May 6 meeting that the 
emergence of any new, moderate political force is hampered by 
the PKK,s popularity (septel), and by voices in the 
government and State that label all discussions of the 
Kurdish problem as ultimately linked to the PKK agenda, and 
therefore terrorist-tainted.  While former DEP deputies (and 
potential DSM leaders) Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle are still 
quite popular in the region, &their8 movement has not been 
able to come up with any fresh ideas, Tugan said. 
 
4.  (C) Zana and Dicle lost some support last December, she 
added, when they signed on to a declaration by Kurdish 
intellectuals and then seemed to regret doing so, accusing 
the drafters of having amended the declaration after they had 
signed it.  (Note:  That declaration, entitled &What do the 
Kurds want in Turkey?8, was published in an advertisement in 
the International Herald Tribune on December 9, 2004.  In it, 
signatories called for a new Turkish Constitution that 
recognizes the existence of Kurdish people, as well as for a 
general amnesty to establish a climate of reconciliation, and 
a program of economic development for southeast Turkey. 
According to Tugan, these views express what is in the hearts 
of &90 percent8 of the Kurds in the region.  End note.) 
 
5. (C) Tugan noted that the delay in formally announcing the 
transformation of the DSM into a new party may also be 
partially attributable to the May 12 European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) ruling on Abdullah Ocalan,s 1999 trial (Ref 
B).  DSM leaders may have been waiting to see the reaction of 
all sides to such an announcement, Tugan explained, and 
preparing to tailor their response accordingly.  (Note:  The 
ECHR,s ruling was received with little reported or observed 
GOT-local populace confrontation on May 12, however the 
eventual GoT response to the ruling could yet provide a spark 
for nationalists of all stripes to react, per reftel B.  End 
note.)  She also hinted that the delay in announcing the 
party may be due to internal disputes as to who will be its 
leader. 
 
We,re Working On It 
------------------- 
 
6. (C) Despite the delays, Acting Mayor of Diyarbakir Yusuf 
Akgun told PO on May 9 that plans for further DSM development 
were still rolling along, and that precinct elections for 
local councils would take place within two weeks.  &This 
will be an organization from the ground up,8 he said, 
explaining that the ward/precinct level councils would then 
elect town level bodies, leading to provincial and eventually 
national-level leadership decisions.  In response to PO 
queries as to whether this was the beginning of a new party 
or a transformation of DEHAP that would feature the same 
personalities, Akgun would only responded that it all 
depended on the will of the people.  &We can,t know because 
we haven,t had elections yet.8  He also noted that a GOT 
decision on whether or not DEHAP would be shut down would be 
instrumental in determining the future of DSM.  (Note:  In 
PO,s meeting with the DEHAP Acting Mayor, the only media 
representatives invited to cover the meeting were from Gun 
TV.  End note.) 
 
Been there, done that 
--------------------- 
 
7. (C) Several other contacts, including an advisor to the 
Mayor of Diyarbakir, the Diyarbakir Human Rights Association 
president and an independent businessman, said they saw the 
DSM going nowhere slowly.  The DEHAP Mayor of Dogubeyazit, 
one of Turkey,s and DEHAP,s few female mayors, said the 
movement would simply be DEHAP by another name, and 
explicitly regional in character.  Akgun remained on message, 
however, throughout his discussion with PO.  Though he was 
unable to state clearly whether DSM would remain a movement 
or become a party, or whether it would replace or be a new 
version of DEHAP, Akgun averred that whatever it turned out 
being, it would be a national-level, not regional, entity, 
though it would strive to keep the Kurdish issue on the 
national agenda. (Note:  This echoes language used by 
contacts last fall per Ref C.  End note.) &We will cross 
bridges and reach out to others,8 he insisted, but did not 
provide specifics on how that would be achieved when 
specifically asked. 
 
Diyarbakir Governor:  Building Dialogue 
--------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Separately, Diyarbakir Governor Efkan Ala told PO in a 
May 10 meeting that he was working hard to establish dialogue 
with different sectors of civil society.  (Note: 
Non-governmental contacts, including the HRA Diyarbakir 
branch president told PO the Governor was experiencing some 
success in that regard and creating favorable impressions. 
End note.)  Ala half-heartedly claimed the TRT 
Kurdish-language broadcasts were manifestations of increased 
language rights in Turkey, but he acknowledged that the GoT 
could do more in regard to mother tongue demands. He said 
that a &day when Kurds can see other languages than Turkish 
used in some courses in state schools and in private media 
would be a logical future development.8  He seemed unsure 
whether he could predict use of Kurdish in future public 
political dialogue in Turkey when PO pursued the issue. 
 
8. (C) He also seemed to indicate that the Ministry of 
Interior did not always see eye to eye with the Turkish 
military,s strategy in the region.  &Not everyone sees 
things the same way,8 he said, lamenting the lack of an 
NSC-like national level process whereby common GoT policy 
could be forged.  (Note:  He expressed specific interest in 
the U.S. National Security Council approach and its 
mechanics.  If Ala,s International Visitor program 
nomination is approved, this may be considered in terms of 
program suggestions.  End note.)  Ala accepts the notion that 
both the GoT and the PKK have contributed to a &with us or 
against us8 situation in which there is little space for any 
independent political expression in the region. 
 
9. (C)  Comment:  The already polarized political climate in 
southeast Turkey is being exacerbated by ongoing clashes 
between the PKK and security forces, as well as by the May 12 
ECHR ruling on Ocalan,s retrial.  The ECHR ruling may be 
creating broad, non-elite expectations in the region, in 
light of the popularity that Ocalan continues to enjoy. 
There is potential for this development to be misinterpreted 
by his supporters in southeast Turkey, and subsequent 
disappointment about his non-release could be turn into 
something more, depending on GoT reaction to the ECHR ruling. 
 Under such conditions, it is unlikely, if not impossible, 
that DEHAP leaders, like Diyarbakir mayor Osman baydemir, and 
other pro-Kurdish politicians, such as Leyla Zana and Hatip 
Dicle, will have much success going the &moderate8 route 
and pushing a national-level party where the &Kurdish 
issue8 is but one agenda item.  Unfortunately, a DEHAP 
facelift ) the most likely outcome of the elections Akgun 
mentioned ) will not have any meaningful impact on the 
political scene.    In the meantime, public mood seems to be 
indicating growing desperation at the prospect of another 
summer regional conflict.  End comment. 
EDELMAN