US embassy cable - 05QUITO1177

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

ECUADOR: FM AND MINDEF MEETINGS

Identifier: 05QUITO1177
Wikileaks: View 05QUITO1177 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Quito
Created: 2005-05-19 23:05:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL MARR MASS PINR SNAR EC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001177 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MASS, PINR, SNAR, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: FM AND MINDEF MEETINGS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, for reasons 1.4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  The Ambassador met separately with FM Parra 
and MinDef Espinosa on May 19.  Parra expressed hope for the 
strongest possible relations with the U.S., and pledged MFA 
support for successful FTA negotiations.  He expressed GOE 
discomfort with language in the draft OAS resolution, said 
the GOE had not decided on its candidate for Ambassador to 
the U.S., and said he would not be traveling soon to Colombia 
to meet with his counterpart, contrary to press reports. 
Parra also said he was undecided whether to attend the 
upcoming Ft. Lauderdale OASGA.  The Ambassador urged Parra to 
accept a credible OAS resolution and develop fluid relations 
with his Colombian and Peruvian counterparts, and told him 
that the GOE must do more to combat TIP or face USG 
sanctions.  Espinosa also expressed hope for good relations 
with the United States.  He explained his recent replacement 
of the Army chief, outlined his goals, and signaled GOE lack 
of interest in an Article 98 agreement.  End Summary. 
 
FM Parra Staying Close to Home 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador and DCM lunched with FM Antonio Parra 
and VFM Marcelo Fernandez de Cordova at her residence on May 
19.  Parra said a busy schedule in Quito would prevent him 
from traveling May 21 to Colombia to meet with his 
counterpart, contrary to erroneous press reports.  The 
Ambassador suggested he develop close relations with both 
Colombian and Peruvian counterparts, to permit fluid 
communications.  Parra said events in Quito might also keep 
him away from the OASGA in Ft. Lauderdale June 5-7.  After 
all, he said, the GOE did not support any candidate for OAS 
Assistant SecGen, and the agenda for Ft. Lauderdale seemed 
thin.  Parra expressed concern that the OAS resolution on the 
change of government here not "put Ecuador under a cloud" by 
offering new oversight mechanisms.  He agreed with the 
Ambassador, however, that a forward-looking, credible 
resolution could be helpful, and said he would study the 
issue further. 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador thanked the GOE for its rapid approval 
of agrement for the U.S. Ambassador-designate. 
Unfortunately, our process for agrement usually took longer, 
but we would do our best to expedite it.   Parra said the 
post of Ambassador to the U.S. was still vacant.  The GOE is 
searching for a candidate of "great prestige."  The 
Ambassador said it was important for the candidate to enjoy 
President Palacio's and FM Parra's confidence. 
 
4.  (C) The Ambassador also thanked the ministry for its 
rapid turnaround of USG requests for maritime interdiction 
cooperation, and its agreement to cede jurisdiction over the 
Colombian national in the Simon Bolivar case.  VFM Fernandez 
agreed that bilateral maritime cooperation was working well. 
Shifting to economic themes, Parra said he was a proponent of 
the FTA and the MFA would play a supportive role to the 
Ministry of Commerce, which had the lead in negotiations. 
Unfortunately, unhelpful misperceptions exist in Ecuador 
which need to be countered with public information campaigns. 
 
 
5.  (C) The Ambassador told Parra that Ecuador was facing 
Tier III sanctions for its lack of effort to combat 
trafficking in persons (TIP).  Parra and Fernandez both 
seemed surprised to learn this, and clearly had only vague 
conceptions about TIP as an issue.  The Ambassador referred 
them to the efforts of their underlings on the issue, offered 
to provide background information, and urged the GOE to seize 
the opportunity of a negative report to redouble GOE efforts 
to combat this scourge.  Parra pledged to do so, and welcomed 
an Embasssy briefing on TIP. 
 
MinDef Rebuilding Mil Prestige 
------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) Gen. (ret.) Solon Espinoza invited the Ambassador to 
breakfast with him in his office on May 19.  He told her that 
he had replaced Army Chief Ubillus the day before because he 
lost confidence in Ubillus' loyalty.  Espinoza said that 
President Palacio had agreed with his decision, and, after 
Espinoza offered to resign,  also agreed that Col. (ret.) 
Jorge Brito's responsibilities should not include military 
security issues.  Espinoza would be the exclusive advisor to 
the president on these issues.  Palacio denied having offered 
the controversial Brito a position with cabinet rank, and 
immediately called him in to clear the air with Espinoza 
present.  Espinoza said no further changes were contemplated 
in the military leadership, but added that he would not 
hesitate to replace any officer in whom he loses confidence. 
 
7.  (C) The Ambassador ventured that Brito and Patricio 
Acosta, both linked to Chavez and Acosta proven corrupt, were 
not worthy of GOE confidence.  Espinoza agreed, saying 
President Palacio was troubled by their presence in his 
administration.  Espinoza also agreed to reach out to his 
Colombian and Peruvian counterparts, to prevent 
misunderstandings and build confidence. 
 
8.  (C) Espinosa outlined the following priorities for his 
term as MinDef: 
 
-- recuperate the military's prestige, which has declined 
following ten years of political instability and political 
plotting; 
 
-- to bring military codes and procedures into compliance 
with the 1998 constitution; 
 
-- to ensure the military fulfills its professional and 
constitutional role without deviation (an allusion to the 
military's role in the downfall of Gutierrez); and, 
 
-- to streamline and audit military finances. 
 
9.  (C) Espinoza said that while the military benefits from a 
cut from national oil revenues from parastatal Petroecuador, 
it receives no such benefit from private oil companies.  Many 
of those companies benefit from security provided by the 
military.  He concluded the meeting saying that while the GOE 
sought strong relations with the U.S., ever country must 
pursue its own interests.  Ecuadorian political debate over 
sovereignty concerns are exaggerated in today's globalized 
world, he said.  Ecuador needs to think globally, and as a 
fundamental tenet of its foreign policy would continue to 
support international institutions of justice. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (C)  Parra and Espinoza are cabinet members we respect 
and are coming to trust.  Espinosa is clearly a man of 
principle and a welcome ally against Bolivarian inroads (in 
the persons of Brito and Patricio Acosta) in this 
administration.  Parra seems a genuine ally in our efforts to 
smooth this administration's rougher edges.  Both men were 
convincing when professing hope for strong bilateral 
relations, within limits.  Espinoza's comments on 
globalization clearly signaled that Article 98 is not within 
those limits.  His hint that foreign companies should somehow 
contribute to the military budget is another cause for 
concern. 
 
KENNEY 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04