US embassy cable - 05QUITO1169

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 001169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, SNAR, PTER, EC, CO, KICC 
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT CHANGE FURTHER HINDERS ARTICLE 98 
CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: QUITO 1018 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  With the rise to power of President Alfredo 
Palacio, Article 98's chances in Ecuador sunk from bad to 
worse.  Palacio's right-hand man, Minister of Government 
Mauricio Gandara, laid down an early marker, claiming there 
would be "no immunity for U.S. soldiers" during this 
government.  Facing such opposition, the Embassy considers a 
frontal Article 98 assault doomed to fail.  Rather, a 
"confidence building" strategy seems in order, with early 
efforts aimed at promoting USG assistance and shared 
interests.  Under this scenario, direct Article 98 engagement 
would commence in late summer.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Opponents Pepper New Administration 
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2.  (C) Reftel outlines short-term Embassy challenges with 
the fledgling Palacio Administration.  Near the top lie 
political-military negotiations, Article 98 the toughest nut 
of all.  Alfredo Palacio took office amidst elites' uproar 
that predecessor Lucio Gutierrez had kowtowed to the United 
States on security matters; they demanded he change tack and 
protect Ecuadorian "sovereignty"  In Gandara, Palacio found 
the quintessential gringo-basher who rarely has met a U.S. 
policy he doesn't oppose.  While his formal responsibilities 
as minister of government do not include military affairs, he 
nonetheless exercises great influence over his cardiologist 
boss.  We therefore consider Gandara's early, anti-Article 98 
remarks Ecuador's current policy. 
 
3.  (C) Recent weeks have seen further roadblocks erected, in 
the form of strange-but-true Palacio hires.  For example, as 
national security adviser the president tapped retired 
Colonel Jose Brito, a former coup participant and, as a 
founder (with Gandara) of the "Monitoring Group over Plan 
Colombia," himself a U.S,-basher.  Even more bizarre, retired 
Colonel Patricio Acosta, whose visa the USG pulled last year 
on corruption grounds, is now a trusted Palacio confidant. 
Both will oppose Article 98 tooth-and-nail. 
 
4.  (C) Our past reporting has highlighted Article 98's 
unpopularity here, as well as prior presidents' unwillingness 
to expend political capital in its pursuit.  Palacio 
definitely falls among the unwilling.  Many consider him an 
interim president; taking on the controversial Article 98 
might turn their beliefs into fact.  Palacio therefore is 
unlikely to lead a top-down effort to spur good-faith 
negotiations. 
 
5.  (C) In meetings with Embassy officials, Palacio's foreign 
minister, Antonio Parra, appeared less ideological and more 
approachable than Gandara and company.  Our early take?  He 
merited cultivation.  For various reasons -- the corpulent 
diplomat's difficult adaptation to 9300-ft elevation Quito 
for one -- Parra has spent less time in that capital than a 
Cabinet minister should, hampering our efforts to get close. 
But we'll need FM support even to get talks restarted. 
 
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Supporting a Soft Sell 
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6.  (C) Pressing him hard and early on Article 98 seems 
counterproductive to our interests, however.  We are not yet 
convinced Parra enjoys the president's ear, for example. 
Were he to introduce the measure to Ecuador's "interagency," 
it undoubtedly would energize Gandara, giving the government 
minister the U.S. dogfight he so desires.  Ecuadorian elder 
statesman Raul Baca, a former government minister himself, 
confirmed that our fears had merit, counseling the Ambassador 
May 16 we "would be crazy to raise immunity now." 
 
7.  (C) It remains difficult to envision the GoE surrendering 
a U.S. national to the International Criminal Court anytime 
soon.  As such, we believe there is time for a more 
deliberate, but potentially more successful approach; 
confidence-building measures seem in order.  Rather than hit 
Parra with Article 98, perhaps the hottest bilateral potato 
he'll encounter, we favor an early campaign to educate him on 
"softer" U.S. assistance and shared interests. 
 
8.  (C) In two weeks, Ecuador's defense minister will 
accompany the Ambassador to a U.S. Military Medical Readiness 
Training Exercise (MEDRETE) in Cotopaxi province; we plan to 
extend Parra similar invitations to view USG aid up-close. 
Similarly, shared USG-GoE interests abound, the fight against 
trafficking in persons (TIP) coming first to mind.  As Parra 
grows to realize that close U.S. relations benefit Ecuador, 
he should become less apt to dismiss Article 98 out-of-hand. 
We could see a strong USG pitch coming at UNGA in September, 
for example. 
 
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Congress Less the Enemy? 
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9.  (C) Although we're yet to see a GoE counter-proposal, 
much less a signed Article 98 ready for legislative approval, 
Ecuador's Congress has long been an impediment to a deal. 
Ecuador's recent upheaval might prove beneficial in this 
regard, however.  Responding to protesters' cries "que todos 
se vayan" ("all must go"), eleven deputies have lost their 
seats, including Carlos Vallejo, the yankee-hating (despite 
his significant business dealings with the U.S.) former head 
of the International Affairs committee.  Poloff called on 
Vallejo's replacement (for the seat, not the committee chair) 
May 18 and found him engaging and pro-American.  We have 
heard rumors that Social Christian Deputy Pascual del Cioppo 
might inherit the committee chair; the Guayaquileno in 2004 
told us he supported Article 98 in theory. 
 
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A Parting Shot 
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10.  (C) Article 98 discussions with Ecuador commenced in 
July 2002.  In the 33 months that followed, with Ecuador 
governed by leaders with reasonably pro-U.S. philosophies, we 
measured our progress by millimeters, not miles.  Palacio and 
the ultranationalists in his employ most definitely aren't 
allies, and we should expect tough sledding on this 
controversial initiative. 
KENNEY