US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA1502

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 001502 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, IN, CA, Pol-Mil Talks 
SUBJECT: US-CANADA POLMIL TALKS: FIRST IN A DECADE 
 
Classified By: POL M/C BRIAN FLORA.  REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1. (SBU) On April 27, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) hosted the 
first US/CAN political-military consultations in more than a 
decade.  The day-long talks opened with each side providing 
an overview of its recently released national defense 
policy/strategy.   Topics covered in the talks included 
continental security, transatlantic relations (NATO, EU and 
OSCE), Haiti, Venezuela, Sudan, the Global War on Terrorism, 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), India and 
Pakistan (raised by A/DM Wright), the EU China arms embargo, 
SA/LW and landmines.  Discussions were substantive and 
informative, reinforcing shared security interests around the 
globe, and presenting opportunities for closer cooperation in 
a number of areas.   END SUMMARY 
 
2. (SBU) Led by Acting A/S for Political-Military Affairs 
Rose Likins, the U.S. delegation included representatives 
from DOD/OSD, NORTHCOM, State WHA/CAN and EUR/RPM, and 
Embassy Ottawa.  Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) Assistant 
Deputy Minister for International Security Jim Wright and DG 
Paul Chapin led the Canadian side, flanked by DG-level 
representation from DND and the PCO, as well as several other 
divisions in FAC and Canadian Embassy representation. 
 
"SCENESETTERS" 
 
3. (C) In introductory remarks, A/DM Wright hailed the 
consultations as an opportunity to strengthen our mutual 
engagement on a number of issues.  The meetings coincided 
with the release of Canada's long-awaited International 
Policy Statement (IPS), which included significant funding 
(CAD 100 million/approx. USD 80 million annually for 5 years) 
in support of the GOC's key foreign policy priorities: 
-- dealing with failed and fragile states; 
-- countering terrorism and organized crime; 
-- combating WMD proliferation; and 
-- promoting human security. 
 
4. (C) In reviewing the defense component of the IPS, the GOC 
noted a "radical departure" from the last defense review 
exercise in 1994.  The demands on Canadian Forces (CF) had 
changed dramatically in the past decade:  In the post-9/11 
environment there was new and increased demand for support to 
civil authorities and Canadian security requirements, while 
internationally, the CF had been stretched thin through a 
combination of factors.  In addition to outlining the 
transformational changes that were needed, the new defense 
paper articulated CF priorities --  defense of Canada, 
defense of the continent, and promoting international peace 
and stability.  To this end the GOC was expanding the size of 
the CF and designating a single, integrated operational area 
--"CANCOM," or Canada Command -- that would balance the 
still-emergent demands on the domestic front (to include 
Arctic sovereignty concerns) with international demands for 
the CF.   Finally, the document emphasized the primacy of a 
strong security and defense relationship with the United 
States as a basic tenet in the defense of Canada and the 
continent.  Wright emphasized that the approach outlined in 
the IPS represented "a huge change in mindset" for Canadians 
and the government. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Likins thanked the GOC for taking the 
initiative to restart pol-mil consultations and welcomed the 
opportunity to amplify the US-Canada dialogue.  Briefly, she 
outlined U.S. foreign policy priorities, from winning the 
GWOT as the centerpiece of U.S. policy, to the many 
components in aiding the spread of democracy.  In all these 
endeavors the key to success was working with partners like 
Canada, whether through the G-8 Action Plan for the Global 
Peace Operations Initiative or bilaterally.  OSD Director for 
Northern European Policy Jesse Kelso provided a briefing on 
DOD's recently completed National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 
support for the U.S. National Security Strategy.   While he 
underscored that the NDS was an internal document and did not 
reflect U.S. government policy, Ambassador Likins hailed the 
unprecedented involvement of the State Department in this 
defense review. 
 
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
 
6. (C) Reacting to the briefing on NDS, Chapin asked how the 
U.S. "sees Canada" in its security future.  Canada had 
invested a great deal in the joint NORAD command, he said, 
but it was unclear whether the trend might be moving toward a 
U.S.-only approach to defend the United States, or if the USG 
saw a "real future for sharing continental defense with 
Canada."  Ambassador Likins responded that when one 
considered the tremendous security cooperation that had 
evolved post-9/11, all approaches pointed to Canada as our 
primary partner.  That said, was Canada willing to be a full 
partner?  This was a decision for Canadians to make.  Canada 
had to decide if it wanted to maintain collaboration "at 
arm's length" or closer; the U.S. would "react" to Canada's 
choice.  Wright asserted that Canada wanted to be a good, 
strong partner for its own sake; that it sees itself as 
America's primordial partner in defense of the continent. 
 
7. (C) Though not an agenda topic, Wright raised the subject 
of missile defense as an element of continental security. 
The GOC had taken a certain decision "at this time," he said, 
but the two countries' threat perceptions were not that far 
apart.  Canada "will need to know how the U.S. is taking 
(missile defense) forward"; Canada "will need to follow" the 
process, Wright concluded. 
 
8. (C) The GOC also wanted to "encourage and cajole our 
Mexican friends" to become more engaged, to become "more 
aware."  Stating that Canada would be looking for 
opportunities to bring Mexico into the discussion, Wright 
floated the possibility of having the NORAD/NORTHCOM 
Binational Planning Group look at broader hemisphere security 
initiatives, to include Mexico.  Ambassador Likins welcomed 
the initiative, noting that Canada was in a unique position 
to engage Mexico's interest. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
 
9. (C) Opening the discussion on transatlantic relations, 
Chapin reaffirmed Canada's view of NATO as the cornerstone of 
the transatlantic relationship. He voiced Canada's deep 
concern about the direction in which the Alliance seemed to 
heading given the "overlay of EU ambitions," and appealed for 
greater Canada-U.S. discussion and collaboration. 
 
10. (C) Ambassador Likins said the U.S. shared Canada's 
concerns and agreed that a joint Canada-US approach could 
provide a wake-up call.  EUR/RPM Deputy Director Jeff 
Hovenier observed that there appeared to be some disparity 
between Ottawa's view and that of the Canadian mission in 
Brussels, which on the whole seemed more sympathetic to 
European perspectives.  Ambassador Likins asked Hovenier to 
have the U.S. mission in Brussels reach out to their Canadian 
counterparts to promote greater collaboration on these 
issues. (NOTE: Discussion of ISAF caveats reported septel. 
END NOTE) 
 
11. (C) Chapin said that Canada was very concerned about 
Russia's effort to undermine the OSCE.  At the same time, 
OSCE achievements had brought it closer to Russia's back yard 
and Chapin wondered if "we" had been sensitive enough to 
Russia's concerns in that sense. He proposed follow-on 
Canada-US consultations on Russia in the NATO/OSCE context. 
 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
 
12. (C)  Haiti. Chapin shared Canada's concerns about the 
slow pace of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti's 
(MINUSTAH) progress and noted that Prime Minister Martin was 
personally engaged on this issue.  Ambassador Likins noted 
that the U.S. and Canada share the same concerns about the 
situation on the ground in Haiti, including Brazil's approach 
to leading the MINUSTAH force, the use of MINUSTAH's civilian 
police (CIVPOL), and MINUSTAH's lack of an intelligence 
capability.  Chapin commented that he didn't think Canadian 
CIVPOL Commissioner David Beer was getting the support he 
needed from MINUSTAH due to tension between military and 
CIVPOL forces in MINUSTAH.  Ambassador Likins suggested the 
creation of a bilateral working group to further examine U.S. 
and Canadian concerns on Haiti.  Chapin agreed and noted that 
Beer should be included in the discussion. 
 
13. (C) Venezuela.  Ambassador Likins raised concerns about 
Venezuela's recent arms purchases and their impact on 
stability in the Andean region.  Venezuela's neighbors might 
be able to influence Venezuela and deter them from concluding 
these sales but they have not taken any action on this issue. 
 It might be helpful if Canada engaged Venezuela and its 
neighbors on this issue.  Chapin said Canada shares US 
concerns about Venezuelan arms purchases and is willing to 
engage bilaterally, though it wasn't clear that Canada had 
"much influence on its own."  Canadian Political M/C Jon 
Allen also noted that Canada believes we need to find a way 
to engage President Chavez.  Continued criticism grows his 
popularity and gives him a soapbox to stand on.  Ambassador 
Likins commented that given Chavez's recent actions, it is 
hard to imagine how the United States could engage him. 
Chapin proposed sending a team down to Washington to continue 
this discussion and to explore a possible OAS strategy for 
addressing Venezuela. 
 
14. (C) GPOI.  Canada and the U.S. share concerns that some 
elements of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
have not made as much progress as originally hoped. 
Ambassador Likins said it would be good to have the UK focus 
on logistics and transportation.  She underscored the 
importance of Italy's training initiative.  She noted that 
the U.S. had started to look a little beyond the initial 
implementation of GPOI and its focus on Africa.  In this 
regard, there is a burgeoning interest in developing a 
Central American peacekeeping battalion through the existing 
CFAC mechanism.  Chapin responded that Canada cannot provide 
financial support to the CFAC initiative but may be able to 
help with training through Canada's Pearson Centre for 
Peacekeeping, which already gives courses in Spanish. 
Ambassador Likins also asked Wright if Canada might be able 
to provide French-speaking trainers for the Center of 
Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, 
Italy.  Wright responded that Canada has already provided a 
number of French-speaking gendarme to Haiti and a number of 
African countries but the GOC will see if it might be able to 
provide additional support to COESPU. 
 
15. (C) GWOT.  Ambassador Likins summarized achievements to 
date in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  She voiced U.S. 
gratitude for Canada's support in Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and multilateral counter-terrorism activity.  Wright 
reaffirmed Canada's commitment but voiced concerns about 
growing public "complacency" in the face of perceived 
successful deterrence.  This had influenced the GOC's 
decision to launch its anti-terrorism "capacity building" 
program. 
 
16. (C) Afghanistan.  Wright reaffirmed Canada's support for 
OEF/ISAF merger and southward expansion of ISAF.  South Asia 
Director General Jim Fox briefed on Canadian lessons learned 
in Afghanistan, sharing the GOC's conclusion that greater 
emphasis needs to be placed on the civilian component of PRTs 
and that strengthening Afghan leadership is key to success in 
Afghanistan.  Addressing the narcotics problem is a prime 
concern for Canada.  The Canadians said there was an 
opportunity at the G-8 Summit to show more support to the UK 
on this.  Rear Admiral Robertson said that Canada was 
committed to a continued presence in Kandahar but was 
awaiting financial approval for establishing its PRT this 
summer.  Responding to a question from Wright about the 
long-term engagement of the United States, Ambassador Likins 
asserted that USG was committed to getting things "right" in 
Afghanistan and was engaged for the long haul.  She urged 
Canada not to let aspects of the ongoing review of global 
U.S. defense posture overshadow perceptions about that 
commitment. 
 
17. (C) Pakistan and India. Though not on the agenda for 
discussion, Wright raised concerns about the security 
situation in Pakistan and the disturbing trend for a 
significant increase in the drug trade.  He had just returned 
from the region, he said, and found the situation on the 
ground worrisome.  Despite a robust USG counternarcotics 
effort there appeared to be reversals in progress and the 
political process was "very fluid" on the ground, with the 
emergence of more conservative religious parties.  Though 
President Musharaf says he will remove his uniform for 
elections in 2007, he had said so before.  At the same time, 
it was Wright's judgment that Musharaf was showing courage 
and leadership in terms of dealing with India but Wright was 
uncertain about the prognosis for the next two years. 
 
18. (C) Ambassador Likins said that U.S. relations with India 
were better than they had been in a long time. It was 
important to keep the India/Pakistan relationship moving and 
the United States was cautiously optimistic on this front. 
Wright acknowledged that his readouts from senior GOI 
officials indicated that they saw the visit of Secretary Rice 
as a success.  Canada was worried about India's proclivity to 
heavy spending on armaments; it would be a challenge to keep 
this under control.  There was a need to take the bull by the 
horns and deal with India and Pakistan on nonproliferation. 
Both countries faced energy shortfalls in the not-so-distant 
future; the trend was toward significant growth in nuclear 
energy for civilian use.  Pakistan was not as forthcoming as 
it needed to be on the nuclear question and has been 
increasingly active with China on this subject.  Wright 
floated the idea of approaching Pakistan based on both 
countries' status in the British Commonwealth and proposed a 
bilateral Canada-U.S. dialogue to discuss how best to advance 
shared nonproliferation objectives with India and Pakistan. 
 
19. (C) Iraq. In her briefing on Iraq, Ambassador Likins 
thanked Canada for its support of Iraq reconstruction and 
urged the Canadians to take "process ownership" of various 
sectors within Iraqi ministries.  Wright acknowledged that 
the elections had turned out "better than expected." He 
reaffirmed Canadian commitment to a positive outcome in 
Canada, citing the continuing civilian police training effort 
in Jordan and strong support through NATO. 
 
20. (C) Sudan. Wright said the Prime Minister is a strong 
believer in a Canadian focus on Africa and that we need to 
act to prevent crimes against humanity in Darfur. But the 
approach should be through the AU. Canada was undergoing a 
comprehensive review of its policy in the region (including 
the ongoing visit to Darfur of the Chief of Defense Staff) to 
explore options.  Wright said that NATO was far more capable 
than the EU to lend assistance, should the AU invite it. 
Concluding, he urged Canada-U.S. teamwork on getting 
assistance to Darfur. 
 
ARMS CONTROL 
 
21. (C) EU China Arms Embargo.  Ambassador Likins was 
cautiously optimistic of progress in getting through to the 
EU on its prospective lifting of the arms embargo.  She noted 
that in consultations with the EU and member states, some had 
cited Canada as an example of a country with no embargo on 
China that maintains good defense cooperation with the U.S., 
including an ITAR waiver.  While USG understood that Canadian 
policy was not to export military items to China, it might be 
useful if Canada underscored this aspect to the Europeans. 
Bristling somewhat, Chapin said that Canada had indeed been 
delivering the message to the Europeans, emphasizing its 
effective export control regime.  Canada's focus was less on 
the embargo than preventing sales to China that would affect 
stability.  Chapin said he would raise this issue with the 
Europeans again to make clear Canadian policy on this issue. 
Canadian Political M/C John Allen observed that Canada had a 
vested interest in the embargo:  There was some concern that 
Canada could be "sideswiped by Congress" if the EU were to 
lift the embargo. 
 
SA/LW 
 
22. (C) Ambassador Likins highlighted opportunities for 
greater multilateral cooperation, particularly on MANPADS and 
gave Canada a "heads-up" on upcoming changes to the Canadian 
exemption in the ITAR that would affect MANPADS exports to 
Canada.  The United States reviewed the exemption and found 
that MANPADS exports to Canada had been allowed to go to 
Canada without an export license under the Canadian 
exemption, a procedure that goes against the Wassenaar 
Agreement.  The exemption will be changes so that MANPADS are 
no longer included in the exemption and therefore all exports 
of MANPADS to Canada will require an export license.  Chapin 
said that Canada was "very conscious" of MANPADS and the need 
to halt and prevent their proliferation.  The GOC had 
received excellent and positive feedback from a number of 
capacity-building workshops it had undertaken in the context 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); it hoped to conduct 
additional workshops on aspects of aviation security and 
airport vulnerability.  Canada hoped to expand this approach 
in other forums such as the OAS, APEC, G-8 CTAG and would 
welcome opportunities to "do more" with the U.S.  Chapin said 
Canada was preparing a MANPADS agreement with Russia and 
asked for a copy of the MANPADS agreement the United States 
had recently concluded with Russia for use as a model. 
Ambassador Likins agreed to brief Canada on the agreement. 
Acting Director for International Crime and Terrorism Peter 
Bates noted that Canada was conducting workshops on 
possibilities for fixed countermeasures to MANPADS and said 
they had been in contact with S/CT on this issue.  Ambassador 
Likins commented that PM/WRA had the lead on MANPADS issues 
and offered to send a team up to meet with Canada on these 
workshops.  Joint Staff Deputy Director for Politico-Military 
Affairs Brigadier General Field expressed interest in 
accompanying the PM/WRA team in their discussion with Canada 
on MANPADS. 
 
LANDMINES 
 
23. (C) Chapin opened the discussion by acknowledging that 
USG is the largest single contributor to landmine 
eradication.  He said that Canada supported the U.S. proposal 
in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but 
characterized as "very difficult to accept" the proposal in 
the CD.  Canada could not endorse "signing onto a lesser 
standard" than those of the Ottawa Convention.  At the same 
time Canada wanted to try and find a way forward.  Ambassador 
Likins said the USG commitment to de-mining would remain 
strong down the road.  The public/private partner approach to 
the Mine Action Plan was proving fruitful and had leveraged 
USD 50 million.  The U.S. continued to have difficulty with 
its Conference on Disarmament (CD) proposal, though the 
latter had been crafted to be attractive to signatories of 
the Ottawa Convention.  Ambassador Likins agreed that the 
goal was to move forward and suggested further discussion on 
this issue with Arms Control Assistant Secretary Rademaker. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
24. (C) In their concluding remarks, Ambassador Likins and 
A/DM Wright agreed that consultations had been very useful 
and were worth repeating at a later date.  Wright expressed 
hope that a follow-on session could take place in Washington 
before the end of the year.  Ambassador Likins noted that 
timing would be driven by the selection and confirmation of a 
new Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs. 
 
25. (U) This report has been approved by Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Rose Likins. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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DICKSON