US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2832

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SCENESETTER FOR WASHINGTON VISIT OF TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER BULENT ARINC

Identifier: 05ANKARA2832
Wikileaks: View 05ANKARA2832 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2005-05-18 15:29:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PGOV PINS TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181529Z May 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2025 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR WASHINGTON VISIT OF TURKISH 
PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER BULENT ARINC 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 
12958 1.4 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Courteous but highly protocol-conscious and 
volatile Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Bulent Arinc looks forward to a highly ceremonial May 24-26 
visit to Washington at the invitation of Speaker of the House 
Hastert. What matters above all to Arinc, who sees his visit 
as advancing his domestic political fortunes, is his hosts' 
attention to high protocol over substance.  A firm Islamist 
who remains seriously misinformed about U.S. policies despite 
our continuing efforts to enlighten him, Arinc is 
nevertheless impressionable if the reception is warm.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Turkish Grand National Assembly Chairman (Speaker) 
Arinc has tirelessly sought an invitation from House Speaker 
Hastert for the past two-and-a-half years, and eagerly awaits 
from his May 24-26 visit what he expects will be the pomp and 
circumstance he considers his due as the number two in 
protocolary order in Turkey. 
 
3. (C) A main figure in ruling AK Party (AKP), Arinc will aim 
to use his visit for two domestic purposes.  First, to 
solidify his political position against his principal 
intraparty rivals, PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul.  In this 
regard, Arinc forced Erdogan and Gul to accept his candidacy 
as Speaker in 2002 and again in 2004; Erdogan and Gul see him 
as a trouble-maker and he apparently has enough sway over 
20-40 MPs from the Islamist Milli Gorus line to determine 
whether they stay in AKP or bolt to rival Islamist Saadet 
Party.  Second, to burnish what he considers to be strong 
credentials to be elected president in spring 2007 or to make 
a run for the prime ministership if Erdogan seeks the 
presidency. 
 
4. (C) The visit gives us an opportunity to work on the 
firmly Islamist heart and mind of this outwardly-courteous 
(he will be on his best behavior), influential but 
exceptionally volatile figure.  At the same time the visit 
also presents Washington with a series of challenges in 
determining how to satisfy his ultra-sensitivity to protocol 
and his prickly Islamist instincts over issues of central 
importance to the U.S.: Iraq (through deliberate 
parliamentary maneuvering Arinc played a key role in ensuring 
that the March 1, 2003 vote on deployment of U.S. troops 
failed to garner enough votes to pass; he considered the 
Fallujah operation an abomination and persists in believing 
the U.S. has killed more than 100,000 civilians in Iraq), 
BMENA, the war on terrorism, religious freedom. 
 
5. (C) What matters for Arinc is not substance but form.  The 
thickness of the red carpet, the graciousness of his hosts 
(offering tea, coffee or soft drinks at every, repeat every, 
meeting is essential; Arinc has refused to visit the Embassy 
since we omitted to offer him tea at a group meeting here 
months before the November 2002 elections), and the warmth of 
ceremony are paramount.  In this context, and in the spirit 
of paying court to his overweening pride, we should be ready 
to listen patiently to his formulaic perorations.  We should 
expect that he will not absorb nuanced messages but at the 
same time he will react sharply to any messages he perceives 
as being delivered in a lecturing or disputatious manner. 
The key is to appeal more to his heart than his head. 
 
6. (C) A final note on Arinc's volatile personality. 
Although he is of at least part Kurdish origin he obscures 
this fact.  A product of a narrow Islamist environment in 
high school and university (he studied law at prestigious 
Ankara University), he puts heavy emphasis on his Muslim 
identity but also professes a sensitivity to perceived 
slights toward Turkey.  Always considered a firebrand with 
strong rhetorical gifts, he remains popular among the more 
Islamist core of AKP's grassroots.  The volatility in his 
personality increased markedly with the 1996 death in an auto 
accident of a son, a loss that appears permanently to have 
shattered him (two children survive) and to have darkened his 
attachment to Islam. 
 
7. (U) Suggested points: 
 
--Bilateral Relations: Welcome uninterrupted cooperation in 
Afghanistan, Balkans, on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 
Cyprus, and war on terrorism; U.S. will continue to support 
Turkey's EU candidacy; need for Turkish government to lead 
public opinion in defending and promoting our bilateral 
relations just as the U.S. government is doing. 
 
--Religious Freedom: A key issue for us and for EU; we look 
for Turkey to re-open the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki 
seminary under conditions acceptable to the Patriarchate; 
call on Turkey to give Christian, Jewish and other so-called 
minority foundations unhindered ability to retain the 
properties they have and to reclaim properties expropriated 
by the Turkish State; and express our concern about 
tendentious campaigns against missionaries. 
 
--Iraq: Important to recognize the progress the Iraqis are 
making in forging a democratic, inclusive system in a unified 
country despite continuing terrorist attacks; we are 
determined to help the Iraqis overcome the terrorist threat; 
appreciate that Turkey now also accepts the need for a 
Baghdad-centered policy. 
 
--BMENA Initiative: Welcome Turkey as a partner in 
encouraging democratic change, rule of law, civil society, 
and open markets in the broader region. 
 
--War on Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation: Appreciate 
Turkey's cooperation in war on terrorism; as you know, the 
U.S. supports the Anglo-French-German diplomatic initiative 
to get Iran to comply fully with IAEA rules and to desist 
from any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons and we look for 
equally vigorous support from Turkey. 
 
--Syria: Reflecting close U.S.-EU ties, France co-sponsored 
with us UNSC Res. 1559 calling for withdrawal of all Syrian 
troops and intel services from Lebanon; UN Secretary General 
is calling on all countries to avoid giving Syria room  to 
renege; Syria continues to harbor terrorists and to allow 
infiltration of terrorists into Iraq; we look to Turkey to 
join the rest of the world community in pressing Syria to 
remove all intel forces from Lebanon, stop supporting 
terrorists, and get rid of its weapons of mass destruction. 
EDELMAN 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04