US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI3744

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NRC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, KSTC, KNNP, TRGY, ETTC, CH, IR, IN, Export Control Initiatives 
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT BRIEFS ON NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3652 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 2601 
     C. NEW DELHI 2599 
 
Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  MEA Additional Secretary (International 
Security) Meera Shankar expressed MEA intentions to take the 
lead on implementation of the new WMD law in a meeting with 
Charge, PolCouns, and PolMilOff on May 18.  According to 
Shankar, the real success of the WMD bill was not its passage 
by Parliament, but that it had found consensus within the GOI 
interagency process.  By framing the bill as an extension of 
existing laws and expansion (not restriction) of agencies' 
areas of responsibility, MEA was able to overcome ongoing 
skepticism among certain GOI agencies.  An interagency group 
will develop a new curriculum for customs officials to raise 
awareness of the provisions of the new law.  Shankar signaled 
that maintaining consensus for the more difficult task of 
implementation, however, would benefit from more positive 
signals from the US regarding flexibility to allow India 
access to nuclear fuel to meet its growing energy needs. 
Shankar refused to be drawn out on GOI plans for new export 
control lists to complement the WMD law, noting only that the 
GOI "is working on it."  Finally, she disclosed that the GOI 
has formed a task force to share intelligence on any 
procurement opportunities Iran may be seeking for WMD 
purposes.  End Summary. 
 
Consensus Was the Real Success 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C) Responding to Charge's congratulations on the passage 
of the new law (Ref A), Shankar downplayed the praise, 
stating that the law is simply the product of India's role as 
a responsible nuclear power and enhances its own national 
security.  She did admit, however, that the law reflected 
discussions with "key interlocutors."  According to Shankar, 
the real success of the WMD bill was not its passage by 
Parliament, but that it achieved consensus within the GOI 
interagency process comprised of the Departments of Atomic 
Energy, Space, Revenue, Customs, the Defense Research and 
Development Organization (DRDO), the Ministries of Law and 
Justice, Finance, and led by MEA.  As the lead agency, MEA 
presented the bill as an umbrella for existing legislation; 
updating and upgrading, but not replacing current laws.  "If 
(the agencies) thought we were intruding on their turf, they 
wouldn't buy in," she said, adding, "We presented the bill as 
expanding their areas of responsibility, not losing them." 
 
New Legal Elements 
------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) Reiterating that laws governing exports have been 
on the Indian law books for some time, Shankar explained that 
in addition to being an umbrella for  existing laws, the WMD 
law provides authority to reconcile differences between laws, 
and introduces new elements to make GOI law more responsive 
to current threats.  For example, where definitions or 
provisions differ between the WMD law and other laws, the WMD 
law will prevail.  If penal provisions differ between two 
laws, however, the more severe punishment will prevail. 
Further, India has laws regarding the export of chemical and 
biological weapons, but the WMD law criminalizes the transfer 
of a broader spectrum of weapons, and specifically prohibits 
transactions involving non-state actors.  Control of dual-use 
items was implied in other GOI laws, but the WMD bill goes 
further to explicitly control the transfer, transit, 
transshipment, and brokering of dual-use items and intangible 
technology, according to Shankar. 
 
Implementation:  Pending Questions 
---------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Clause 7 of the law states that the GOI will 
designate an authority to implement the law.  However, in 
Parliament, FM Natwar Singh raised the possibility that the 
law would be implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat.  Charge 
queried which Ministry may be given this authority. 
According to Shankar, MEA will continue to lead the 
consultative process to determine the appropriate authority. 
She stressed that existing structures such as Customs and the 
Director General for Foreign Trade (DGFT) would retain 
enforcement responsibility. 
 
5.  (SBU) On possible revision of India's current control 
list, SCOMET, Shankar declined to speculate when the GOI 
might release a new list, saying only, "We're working on it." 
 
6.  (C) Charge also asked what enforcement-enhancing changes 
might be made to customs procedures which are currently 
focused on revenue generation.  Shankar reiterated that 
enforcement measures are already carried out by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and DGFT under the Customs Act.  A new 
curriculum to raise awareness of the provisions of the new 
law would be developed by the interagency working group on 
SCOMET implementation, according to MEA Under Secretary 
(Disarmament and International Security Affairs) Nutan 
Kapoor.  PolCouns recalled the recent break-up of a large 
international narcotics ring, and noted that kind of close 
cooperation should be the model for US-India interaction on 
proliferation cases.  With that example in mind, he asked who 
would be the GOI counterpart of the Commerce Department's 
Bureau of Industrial Security (BIS).  Shankar reiterated that 
MEA would remain the lead GOI agency for proliferation cases. 
 Charge expressed hope that the GOI could provide a briefing 
for A/S Rademaker on GOI enforcement initiatives during his 
upcoming visit in June. 
 
Quid Pro Quos 
------------- 
 
7.  (C) Achieving the full support of all the relevant 
ministries as well as Parliament, Shankar expected the new 
law to be recognized by the international community in terms 
of greater willingness to accommodate India's "sensitivities 
and concerns about existing regimes."  Asserting that 
Secretary Rice's positive remarks on nuclear energy 
 
SIPDIS 
cooperation had facilitated the passage of the WMD bill by 
overcoming "what's in it for us" skepticism among some GOI 
agencies, Shankar encouraged further positive signals from 
the US, especially regarding access to nuclear fuel for its 
civil energy program.  PolCouns stressed that the policy 
shift toward India is already demonstrable, citing recent 
examples of the Chidambaram visa, the launch of a new space 
working group, and increased US-India dual-use trade. 
 
8.  (U) Shankar noted PM Manmohan Singh's May 17 address to 
DRDO favorably measuring the new law to the highest 
international standards, but read an excerpt reiterating 
India's opposition to external controls on its indigenous 
programs:  "India is willing to shoulder its share of 
international obligations as a partner against proliferation 
provided our legitimate interests are safeguarded.  In the 
defense field and the nuclear field, our strategic programs 
are indigenous and not dependent on external sources of 
support.  Nor can they be the subject of externally imposed 
constraints.  Within these parameters, India is prepared for 
the broadest form of engagement with the international 
non-proliferation regime."  (Speech to be reported septel.) 
 
9.  (C) Charge probed further about current GOI plans for 
adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, as a requirement of 
NSSP Phase II.  "I'm not in a position to say," she demurred. 
 
 
10.  (SBU) Regarding the NSSP requirement to have outreach 
events to explain export control to the private sector, 
Shankar asserted that this is also an ongoing program run by 
various agencies for their respective sectors, e.g., by the 
Department of Chemicals for the chemical industry. 
 
Pending Proliferation Cases 
--------------------------- 
 
11.  (C) Another source of skepticism about the value of the 
US-India relationship, according to Shankar, is the perceived 
double standard of US assistance on Chinese nuclear reactors 
given China's known proliferation links with Pakistan.  "Our 
proliferation record is better than China's," Shankar 
asserted.  Charge responded that since China is an NPT 
signatory, the US may work with it on civil nuclear projects. 
 
 
12.  (C) Charge inquired if the GOI had any more information 
on two cases of recent proliferation concern because of their 
Iranian connections: Sabero and Sandhya.  Kapoor stated there 
was no further information about these cases since the GOI 
non-papers on March 25 (Refs B and C) and reiterated earlier 
GOI requests for additional information about the end-users. 
 
13.  (S) In light of Iran's apparent efforts to diversify its 
sources for WMD-related material, PolCouns asked what steps 
the GOI is taking to ensure that Indian entities are not 
involved.  According to Shankar, the GOI has formed a task 
force of relevant agencies to share intelligence on any 
procurement opportunities Iran may be seeking for WMD 
purposes. 
BLAKE