US embassy cable - 05MADRID1894

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, SP, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT AUTHORIZES GOS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ETA 
 
REF: MADRID 1859 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (b) 
 
1. (U) President Zapatero won Parliamentary approval on May 
17 for his plan to offer peace talks with Basque terrorist 
group ETA if ETA agrees to abandon the armed struggle.  The 
initiative passed by a vote of 192 to 147, with all parties 
except the Popular Party (PP) accepting Zapatero's proposal. 
The vote authorizes "dialogue between the appropriate 
authorities and those who renounce the use of violence." 
Zapatero's plan differs little from efforts by previous 
Spanish governments to negotiate an end to the Basque 
conflict, but the exclusion of the main opposition party from 
the accord and the shifting political landscape in the Basque 
country (in PSOE's favor) made this vote a dramatic political 
event.  Zapatero's victory renders moot a long-standing 
Socialist-PP accord to coordinate actions against ETA and 
symbolically places the Socialist Party (PSOE) in alliance 
with smaller leftist and nationalist parties in the fight 
against ETA.  Though Zapatero won by a wide margin, the 2000 
PP-PSOE Terrorism Pact won much more support with 313 votes 
in favor.  The PP adamantly opposed any conciliatory gesture 
towards ETA and warned that Zapatero's proposal would 
strengthen ETA, which has been weakened by the recent arrest 
of numerous key leaders.  The PP pointed to the fact that the 
vote took place just days after suspected ETA terrorists 
bombed four industrial sites in the Basque region as a sign 
of ETA's unwillingness to renounce violence (see reftel). 
The Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT), a support 
group for victims of ETA violence, opposed the proposal and 
plans a June 11 demonstration in Madrid to protest the vote 
results. 
 
//AN INSIDE VIEW// 
 
2. (C) Diego Iniguez, deputy chief of staff to Vice President 
Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, met with polcouns on May 
17 and shared his insights regarding the political context of 
the vote.  Iniguez made clear that political decisions 
related to the proposal were taken at the highest levels 
(President Zapatero, Vice President de la Vega, PSOE 
Parliamentary spokesman Pedro Rubalcaba, and PSOE 
Parliamentary leader Jose Blanco) and that planning was 
tightly controlled by this inner circle.  Iniguez, who had 
partial responsibility for negotiating the support of other 
parties for Zapatero's proposal, said that ETA's recent 
decline in strength was the primary motivating factor for the 
GOS in undertaking this iniative at this time.  It forces ETA 
to respond to a GOS overture from a position of weakness, 
perhaps making its leadership more willing to negotiate than 
at other points in ETA's history. 
 
3. (C) Iniguez also ventured a political motivation for 
Zapatero's proposal: further isolating the PP within the 
Spanish political system and allowing the PSOE to consolidate 
its control over the political center.  That suggestion 
seemed borne out by PSOE Spokesman Rubalcaba's post-vote 
comment that the PP is "using the issue of terrorism to 
attack the government... and has isolated itself from all 
other political forces in Spain."  Iniguez said that polls 
indicated that a strong majority of Spanish citizens 
supported talks to end the Basque conflict (obviously an 
important factor in Zapatero's decision to push this issue 
now).  He acknowledged that Zapatero was assuming a 
significant political risk given ETA's uncanny ability to 
resuscitate itself.  A new spate of serious ETA attacks could 
give the PP political ammunition on a highly sensitive issue 
for Spanish voters.  Iniguez argued, however, that the March 
11, 2004 Madrid train bombings significantly undermined the 
value of murder and terrorism as a viable tool for ETA.  For 
now, Zapatero sees little risk and strong political advantage 
in pursuing peace with ETA without the PP's backing. 
 
//CHANGED BASQUE POLITICAL DYNAMIC// 
 
4. (C) The vote on Zapatero's peace initiative took place 
against the backdrop of a radically changed political 
landscape in the Basque region.  As late as mid April, the 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) appeared poised to win an 
absolute majority in the Basque Parliament and to impose its 
plan to pursue a referendum on increased autonomy from 
Madrid.  Instead, the PNV lost seats to both the PSOE and to 
a small Marxist-Leninist group (EHAK) backed by ETA political 
front group Batasuna.  As a result, the PNV has been unable 
to form a government, nor even to place its favored candidate 
as leader of the Basque Parliament.  In this reduced state, 
the PNV had little choice but to back Zapatero's call for 
peace talks (on the PSOE's terms), further demonstrating that 
the PSOE has firmly seized the initiative in the Basque 
region, as well as at the national level. 
NEALON